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In literature, discussions exist with regard to the definition of concrete and abstract 
words and concepts. The general difference between them concerns the existence of 
their referents. The concrete words are the ones whose direct referents are found in our 
living environment, and are perceived in the form of sensorimotor information. The 
abstract words, in contrast, are the ones that do not have direct referents1. This general 
definition can be understood by means of some examples. The word cat has a direct 
referent in the world. There are several types of cats in our living environment. Each 
person has a different experience with cats. However, its general behavior, its sound, its 
general and schematic figure give us the necessary sensorimotor information to help 
humans to conceptualize, understand and process the word cat. The word cat can be 
connected with emotions such as fear, hate and so on. Contrary to cat, an abstract word 
like philosophy does not have referents in the material world. Its meaning does not 
originate from the sensorimotor information that human beings perceive in different 
situational contexts. According to some theories, such as dual coding theory (Paivio, 
1986; Paivio; 1991) and WAT (Borghi & Binkofsky, 2014)2, abstract words are rooted 
in the contexts related to language and thought.  
 
Contrary to the general definition described in the previous paragraph, in philosophy 
there are some accounts that reject this difference between abstract and concrete words, 
and claim that abstract words can have referents. This strange referent or ‘abstract 
object’ (Armstrong, 2010), will be explained in section 2.1.2, where an abstract item 
will find its existence in a very direct relationship with the causal role it plays. Keeping 
with the argument of the distinction between abstract and concrete words and concepts, 
in section 2.1.3 a historical background related to this difference will be provided. This 
historical background starts from the 20th century with some indications to the prior 
eras. These indications depart from the general distinction between concrete and 
abstract words in traditional grammar and reach a different sense of this difference in 
the 17th century. This different sense is the domain of objects and entities.  
 
After highlighting the general difference between concrete and abstract words, the type 
of this distinction should be specified. Namely, are there fixed features for abstract and 
concrete words? Are they categorized into two distinct types (a dichotomous 
classification)? Or are there different features for each abstract or concrete word, which 
form an abstract-concrete continuum? In the two extremes of this abstract-concrete 
continuum, there are prototypic concrete and abstract words and concepts. In section 
2.1.4, this question will be studied. To explain this part, the classical approach to 
categorization and prototype categories approach (Smith & Medin, 1981; Taylor, 1989) 
will be described. The reason for this theoretical part is that the existence of fuzzy 
boundaries between the members of a category is the basis of the existence of this type 
                                                          
1 This is a general definition. However, in section 2.1.2, I describe some accounts that argue against this 
general account.  
2 These theories will be described in chapter 3. 
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of concrete-abstract continuum. The concept of fuzziness will be illustrated by means of 
the example of diminutives in Italian (Taylor, 2003).  
 
In the next section, and after understanding the indicated difference, our discussion will 
go in the right direction. This right direction is the representational difference between 
concrete and abstract words and concepts, which is the main discussion of my thesis. In 
section 2.1.5, embodied cognition accounts will be studied. They admit that differences 
exist between abstract and concrete words and concepts from the representational 
viewpoint. They argue that this distinction does not stem from the modality of 
representation (grounded and modal versus ungrounded and amodal), but rather derives 
from the content of representation. In this part, two of these approaches will be 
described. The first one is that of Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005), who claim that 
concrete concepts contain more situational and introspective features and properties. 
The second approach is that of Vigliocco, Kousta, Della Rosa, Vinson, Tettamanti, 
Devlin, and Cappa (2014), who argue that the abstract concepts activate more emotion 
zones in the neural networks of the human brain in comparison with the concrete words 
and concepts.  
 
To better understand the proposed theory by Vigliocco et al (2014) and also the section 
related to categorization3, in section 2.1.6 the emotion words and concepts will be 
described. In this section in the first part, the emotion word position in the concrete-
abstract continuum will be analyzed. The discussion about emotion words in section 
2.1.6 is owing to the fact that they have some features in common with concrete words 
and some other features in common with abstract words. In the next part, the one-to-one 
correspondence between emotion words in a natural language and mental states will be 
studied. This claim is equivalent with the concreteness of emotion words, which is 
against the conceptual fuzziness (Shiota & Keltner, 2005). The origin of this claim 
could be the strong version of Whorf-Sapir account (Sapir, 1921; Whorf, 1956). In other 
words, in agreement with this account, the speakers of a given language do not 
experience an emotional state for which their language does not have any word. 
Keeping with the discussion corresponding to the emotion words and concepts, in the 
successive part the relation between emotions and human embodiment will be 
discussed. In this part, first a general overview related to the modal and amodal 
processing models will be given. For the amodal model, associative network models 
(ANM) will be explained. In the modal processing model part, after giving a brief 
description of embodied cognition theories, different aspects of human embodiment in 
relation with emotion words and concepts will be illustrated. In this context, the 
embodiment in emotional processing, embodiment of emotional language and embodied 
emotion metaphors will be described. In the Emotional Processing part, the brain 
representation of the sensorimotor process for the emotional experiences and the role of 
human body in perception of sensorimotor information will be discussed. In the 
Embodiment of Emotional Language part, the possible partial relationship between 
motor aspects of human body and conceptualization of human language will be 
analyzed. In the Embodied Emotion Metaphors part, the relationship between emotions 
and metaphors from the embodiment point of view will be explained. In this part, using 
several studies, different aspects of this relationship will be illustrated. For instance in 
the study of William and Bargh (2008), the possible relationship between physical 
distance and emotional distance will be analyzed. In the following part, the concept of 
                                                          
3 Emotion words in accordance with their features are categorized somewhere between concrete and 
abstract words and concepts.  
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synesthesia and pseudo-synesthesia in relation with linguistic expressions will be 
explained. Finally, in the last part of this discussion, with the consideration of different 
theoretical approaches such as Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986; Paivio, 1991), and 
Context Availability Theory4(Schwanenflugel, 1991; Schwanenflugel, 2013), the 
position of emotion words and concepts in concrete-abstract continuum will be studied.  
 
After a brief description of the representational difference between concrete and abstract 
words and concepts, in chapter 3 this difference will be analyzed from the viewpoints of 
distinct theories. Accepting this difference, now we should look for the cause of this 
difference. In literature, the fact that human beings process, understand and retrieve 
concrete concepts faster in comparison with the abstract concepts is accepted by all 
accounts, either modal accounts, amodal accounts or hybrid accounts. However, these 
different approaches believe in distinct reasons for this difference.  
 
CAT is the first approach that will be discussed in this chapter. According to this 
approach, the reason for which the concrete words and concepts are an advantage from 
the representational point of view is that they have stronger contextual resources. This 
contextual information is originated from human internal contextual knowledge and 
external contextual information in our living environment. This account will be 
analyzed as the opposite approach of DCT which will be explained in section 3.3. In 
part 3.2.1, the theoretical principles correlated to CAT will be illustrated. These 
principles show how contextual information, according to CAT, can influence the 
representation of different types of concepts. In section 3.2.2, the different experiments 
related to CAT will be studied. Some of them confirm the theoretical basis of CAT and 
some of them reject them. For example, Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1983) analyze the 
comprehension rates of concrete and abstract words in context and in isolation to 
understand the role of contextual information in the processing and comprehension of 
concrete and abstract words. The results of the performed experiments in this study are 
in favor of CAT and against DCT. In the second study in this section Schwanenflugel, 
Akin, and Luh (1992) compare CAT with strong and weak versions of DCT. With these 
two versions, we can understand if human beings employ imaginal representation in all 
verbal tasks or if they make use of it whenever they need a strategy to perform the 
necessary procedure of a verbal task. The results of the experiments in this study are 
against CAT and the strong version of DCT. In the last part of this section, different 
experiments related to CAT, without entering into details of the studies, will be 
illustrated. 
 
The second theoretical approach is DCT. After a brief description of DCT historical 
background in 3.3.1, in 3.3.2 the mechanism of DCT will be analyzed. DCT, contrary to 
CAT, does not believe that the availability of contextual information is the main reason 
for this difference. DCT claims that human beings possess two types of coding systems 
to process the information. This claim is based on the fact that the information we 
receive is divided into two kinds: non-verbal information and verbal information. The 
non-verbal information is the sensorimotor information that we receive from our living 
environment. The verbal information is that which is obtained from the linguistic input 
stored in the memory. DCT claims that, depending on the type of information that 
humans want to process, they use a different kind of representational system: a verbal 
one for verbal information and an imaginal one for non-verbal information. After 
                                                          
4 These theories in conjunction with other theories related to the representation of abstract and concrete 
words and concepts will be described. 
7 
 
explaining the theoretical basis of DCT, in part 3.3.3 the terminal meta postulate (Bever, 
Fodor & Garrots, 1968), which is a very serious criticism against associative theories 
and therefore against DCT, will be described. After the theoretical parts, in section 3.3.4 
the experiments in line with the described theoretical principles will be studied. For 
example, Paivio and Csapo (1973) study the picture superiority effect as evidence for 
DCT. They try to understand if the usual picture superiority effect in free recall tasks is 
explained by DCT, or whether this superiority appears due to the superiority of images 
as a memory code. Concerning the second question, apart from the general DCT 
hypothesis, they also examine verbal encoding hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that 
the pictorial stimuli provoke more verbal elaboration. Therefore, their memorability is 
increased, and consequently their recall rate will be faster. The results illustrated that 
verbal encoding hypothesis cannot be considered as the main reason for the superiority 
of the pictorial stimuli over the verbal stimuli in the free recall tasks. In addition, the 
results do not suggest any evidence in favor of DCT. Instead they are evidence in favor 
of imagery hypothesis (superiority of pictorial stimuli as a memory code). In the second 
study explained in this section Shen (2010) analyzes the theoretical aspects of DCT in 
learning Chinese abstract and concrete words. In his two experiments he tries to 
understand the difference between learning Chinese abstract and concrete words in a 
situation where the learners are provided only verbal coding instructions and in a 
situation where the learners are provided both verbal and pictorial coding instructions. 
The results are in line with the principles of DCT in the case of learning Chinese 
abstract stimuli and not in the case of Chinese concrete words. This could be due to the 
existence of the pictorial codes of concrete stimuli in the learner’s memory.  
 
The next theory that will be explained in the context of representational difference 
between abstract and concrete words and concepts is Words As social Tools or WAT 
model (Borghi & Binkofsky, 2014). In agreement with this model, abstract words and 
concepts are not different from concrete ones from the embodiment point of view. 
According to WAT, the distinction is rooted in other aspects such as importance of 
linguistic contexts for abstract words, acquisition modality, activation of different 
neural networks, and meaning variability across languages. The last assumption refers 
to the fact that the representation of abstract words and concepts depends more on the 
cultural and linguistic environment. To be able to better understand this account, its 
theoretical aspects will be examined in a series of experiments. Borghi, Flumini, 
Cimatti, Marocco and Scorolli (2010) try to shed light on the cognitive processes and 
components that differ in the acquisition of novel concrete categories and novel abstract 
categories. The results of these experiments illustrate that, in line with WAT model, the 
acquisition of abstract stimuli depends more on the linguistic contexts and associations. 
In addition, in agreement with the expectations of WAT model, in property verification 
task, participants made more mistakes on abstract stimuli in keyboard modality and 
made more mistakes on concrete stimuli in microphone modality.  
 
The last theoretical account in chapter 3 that tries to explain the underlying reason for 
the representational difference between different types of concepts is representational 
pluralism, which is a hybrid theory proposed by Dove (Dove, 2009; Dove, 2011; Dove, 
2014). He claims that the concepts are represented neither completely by using 
sensorimotor information, nor due to the existence of an abstract computational 
mechanism. Therefore, the concepts that are represented in the human cognitive system 
are grounded in both modal and amodal representations. In accordance with Dove, the 
explanations of modal theories could be sufficient for the acquisition of the concepts 
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that are simulated and extracted from our human perceptual experiences, but not for the 
acquisition of the concepts that do not have direct referents in our living environment. 
On the contrary, the amodal accounts do not totally explain how concrete concepts 
could be acquired without using their sensorimotor information. In part 3.5, different 
theoretical aspects of Dove’s account will be discussed. Dove believes that different 
kinds of concepts that are used in human comprehension and production are represented 
in two modalities. These two modalities are sensorimotor simulation of human 
sensorimotor (objective) experiences, and sensorimotor simulation of language and 
linguistic associations. As can be observed, the simulation is present in both modalities. 
This illustrates the importance of this concept in Dove’s account. Owing to this 
importance, in part 3.5.1 the simulation in Dove’s point of view will be explained. In 
this section, I explain why Dove claims that for every simulation humans need a 
simulator. Also, the concept of Convergence Zone and its relationship with simulation 
in Dove’s theory is discussed. In parts 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, the reason for which Dove claims 
that a pure amodal or a pure modal account is unsatisfactory to explain the human 
underlying representational system will be illustrated. Finally, in section 3.5.4, the 
hybrid theory of Dove will be analyzed. In this context, we understand the meanings of 
new terms, such as ungrounded representation, and dis-embodiment, in Dove’s 
viewpoint. 
 
Finally, in the last chapter, supramodality as the underlying representational mechanism 
in the human cognitive system will be discussed (Ricciardi & Pietrini, 2011). In 
accordance with this approach, supramodality does explain the processing of both 
abstract and concrete concepts. In this chapter, in the same manner as the other ones, 
first the theoretical aspects of the account will be analyzed, then these theoretical 
aspects will be studied in several experiments. In section 4.1, the existence of a 
supramodal mechanism in the functional architecture of the human brain will be 
analyzed. One of the most important arguments of this part is the relationship between 
human mirror neurons and the supramodal representational system. First, a brief 
historical background of the discovery of human mirror neurons will be given. Then, 
these neurons will be studied from the topographic point of view. In the theoretical 
explanations of mirror neurons, we understand that in monkeys many of these neurons 
fire either when the action is seen or heard by the animal. This same discovery in the 
homologous area of the Broca area is interpreted in the existence of a supramodal 
representation system, and therefore in the existence of abstract meaning codification. 
After this theoretical part, three experiments with regard to the supramodality account 
will be described. What is common in all these experiments is the presence of blind 
subjects. The reason is that if the supramodal representational system exists, it helps 
blind people to represent the concepts in a similar way that the sighted subjects 
represent them. Comparing the representation of blind and sighted subjects for the same 
concepts—the ones that do need ‘vision’ to be conceptualized— one can understand if 
there is another source of information for the representation of concepts, apart from the 
sensorimotor information that humans obtain from their living environments. Ricciardi, 
et al (2009), in their experiment examine whether the human mirror neurons need vision 
to function and develop, or if there is a supramodal, abstract system related to human 
mirror neurons. They used the fMRI technique to compare neural activity in blind and 
sighted subjects. In the second experiment, Handjaras, et al (2016) studied the 
underlying representational system for concrete words and concepts. They tried to 
understand whether the underlying representational system for concrete words and 
concepts is based on domain specific representation (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994; 
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Kanwisher, 2000; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992) or on modality specific representation 
(Warrington & Shallice, 1984). They performed a behavioral study and an fMRI study 
on both sighted and blind subjects. The modality specificity theory of acquisition is 
derived from the classic debate on performance and competence. The modality 
specificity theory of acquisition claims that performance plays the key role in language 
acquisition. As a result the sensorimotor information which is obtained by human 
sensory modalities and motor functions are considered the most important mechanisms 
to obtain the needed information for the representation of concepts. On the other hand, 
the domain specificity theory claims that a global knowledge structure exists which 
contains all necessary knowledge in an abstract form, internalized from experience. The 
important characteristics of this system are modularity, innateness and brain 
localization, which will be explained in the theoretical part of this experiment. In the 
same section, the procedure of the creation of BLIND dataset, together with the 
performed experiments based on this dataset, will be explained.  
 
The discussion about BLIND dataset is very important because it helps to understand 
the last two studies of the 4th chapter5. In the last part of this chapter, I performed an 
analysis on the behavioral data of the abstract nouns obtained from BLIND dataset. I 
compared the metaphorical extension theory with supramodality theory to illustrate if 
the sensorimotor information and the metaphor mechanisms in the human cognitive 
system are sufficient for humans to represent the abstract words and concepts or if there 
should be a supramodal representational system. In accordance with the conceptual 
metaphor theory, our body and the environment provide humans the needed information 
to conceptualize and understand the stimuli. Conceptualization in this account is based 
on basic metaphors. These metaphors are constructed by mapping from source domains 
to target domains. The results of this analysis and comparison illustrate that 
sensorimotor information and internal metaphor mechanism cannot be the only means 






















                                                          
5 The data and materials used in the last two experiments are from BLIND dataset. 
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2. Concrete words, abstract words and emotion 
words 
 
As we will see in the next chapter, different theoretical approaches exist related to the 
conceptual representation of concrete and abstract words and concepts. In the final 
chapter, the data in some experiments illustrates that emotion words can be distinct 
from concrete and abstract words owing to their distinct representational features. To be 
able to understand either the indicated approaches or the described experiments in the 
last chapter, one needs to know beforehand about concrete, abstract and emotion words. 
To make this possible, the distinction between abstract, concrete and emotion words and 
concepts will be explained from different points of view. In part 2.1, the problematic 
and controversial issue of classifying concepts as ‘concrete’ or ‘abstract’ will be 
discussed. First, the question of having one account or several accounts to distinguish 
between concrete and abstract concepts will be described. Then, with a brief historical 
background, the abstract objects and the possibility of their existence will be explained. 
In the next section, the difference between the classical approach to categorization and 
the prototype category approach will be illustrated.  This enables us to understand 
whether concrete/abstract classification is a dichotomous one or if a continuum from 
abstract concepts to concrete ones exists. The next part of this chapter is dedicated to a 
claim in the realm of embodied cognition theories. The question is if the abstract and 
concrete concepts are both grounded in the embodied experiences, why do abstract 
concepts illustrate different representational features? In the last part of this section, 
emotion words, their properties and the different experimental studies related to them 
will be explained.  
 
2.1. Abstract words and concepts versus concrete 
ones 
 
In this section, a brief historical background related to concrete and abstract words and 
concepts will be provided. This will be very important for the present work, since it can 
give us a broader perspective with regard to what is called in the contemporary literature 
‘abstract words’ and/or ‘concrete words’. It is also very useful for a better understanding 
of the second and the third chapters, namely the different theories that describe the 
conceptual representation of both concrete and abstract words and concepts.  
 
2.1.1. What is the difference between abstract 
words and concrete words: one account or 
several accounts? 
 
It could be claimed that in literature, abstract/concrete distinction is a general overall 
agreement. However, the problem arises from this point; in other words, there is no 
standard account with regard to how this distinction is drawn. Speakers may use their 
intuition to classify the concepts as ‘concrete’ or ‘abstract’. However, there is no 
theoretical framework which explicitly accounts for this distinction. On the other hand, 
there is no need to seek out a single model or definition for resolving this problem. In 
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accordance with Rosen (2014), when a technical terminology is coined totally based on 
examples and not on a theoretical and structured definition, the resulting vocabulary is 
vague and indeterminate. Consequently, it is pointless seeking out a single account and 
definition (in our case a “real” definition of abstract/concrete dichotomy). A better 
approach would be recognizing the vague nature of the term. One must not have a 
predetermined and precise definition of this terminology and should recognize the 
uncertain nature of the possible accounts. Namely, any account that could reach the 
vicinity of the abstract/concrete dichotomy would be useful for this issue. This 
assumption does not mean that the classification of every single concept as ‘abstract’ or 
‘concrete’ is always a problematic issue. In fact, there is a broad agreement about 
identification of many words as abstract or concrete. For instance rocks, apples and 
shoes are concrete words whereas classes, prepositions and concepts are abstract words. 
The letter ‘O’ is an abstract concept whereas the letter ‘O’ in this line is a concrete one.  
 
The word ‘abstract’ comes from Middle English6, which, in turn, is derived from Latin 
‘abstractus’ with the meaning of removed from, drawn of; to remove; to withdraw; to 
take away mentally; epidomize or reduced to a summary  (Longman,1988; Webster, 
1972). The word ‘concrete’, in turn, comes from Middle English,  borrowed from the 
Latin word ‘concretus’, from the past participle of ‘concrescere’ (Longman,1988; 
Webster, 1972). Apart from the indicated meanings, these terms were used in different 
conceptual and semantic contexts by logicians and grammarians. They employed 
‘concrete’ with the meaning of a group of words in natural languages that have a direct 
relationship with their referents in the real world throughout their cognitive 
representations in the minds of speakers. The word ‘abstract’, on the other hand, is used 
as the antonym of ‘concrete’ and refers to a group of words which does not relate 
directly to any referent in the real world. In other words, the crucial difference between 
these terms is the existence of the referents in time and space dimensions; namely, the 
concrete words possess referents in the real world, in a particular temporal and spatial 
point, but the abstract terms lack such referents. The indicated referents for concrete 
terms are sometimes called concrete objects (concreta) and for abstract terms are called 
abstract objects (abstracta)7. The position of concreta is clear. In line with what was 
indicated, it refers to something in the time space world. But what is abstracta? How can 
abstract words have referents? In the following section, abstract objects and the viability 
of the accounts that claim that abstracta exists will be illustrated. 
 
2.1.2. ‘Abstract objects’ 
 
William Van Orman Quine is the person who coined the term ‘abstract object’ for the 
first time (Armstrong, 2010). However, this was an extraordinary use of ‘abstract’. In 
line with Armstrong (2010: 2) one strong claim against these so called ‘abstract objects’ 
is that it would very complicated to find the causal role8 that they play; without the 
                                                          
6Middle English (according to the Longman Dictionary of the English Language [1984] it starts from 
1150 and ends at 1500- according to The New Grolier Webster International Dictionary of the English 
Language this period ends at 1475), is a term that is applied to all of the varieties of spoken English after 
the Norman Conquest (1066) until the late 15th century. It is the stage of evolution of the English 
language between Old English or Anglo-Saxon (5th to 12th century) and Modern English (started in the 
late 15th century and completed in the 17th century).  
7 According to some scientists in metaphysics, abstract concepts do have referents, however they exist in 
a world different from the material world. See part 2.1.2 for a more complete account. 
8 The Cartesian Dualism claims that the ultimate nature of the mental foundation is found in a special 
mental substance. Behaviorism of Skinner highlights the role of stimulus-response. Physicalism connects 
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causal role it will be very difficult to find a reason for their existence. Armstrong 
assumes that different entities in different contexts have different causal roles, however 
if there is no possibility to find any causal role for an item then that item probably does 
not exist at all. According to him, an entity or ‘object’ should be qualified for the state 
of ‘object’ in the space-time world. This causation relationship, in accordance with 
Oddie (1982) is explainable in the Eleatic principle. He describes the Eleatic principle in 
four different versions. First, only the causally active things are real. Second, if a thing 
does not play a role in the causal structure of the world, it is not real. Third, nothing is 
real unless it is at least conceivable that it should play some role in the causal structure 
of the world. Fourth, if it is possible to give a reductive analysis9 of X for all statements 
which are needed for truly describing the world, then X is not real. However this model 
of Armstrong has been criticized by other authors. As an example Oddie (1982) claims 
that the concept of causation is very ambiguous from Armstrong’s viewpoint. Oddie 
argues that for Armstrong this causation is linked directly to a special case of 
necessitation, which could be interpreted in two ways: a) causation is just necessitation, 
a relation between the first-order universals, where the two properties10 are extremely 
complex, b) causation is a relation between state of affairs or events. These two 
interpretations refer to two different kinds of conception in Armstrong’s view. ‘Thick 
conception’ is a particular with all its properties; these properties distinguish our 
particular with respect to other particulars in a scene. The role of the other particular is 
very important, because the particularity of our entity (particular aspects) and its 
properties (non-particular aspects) are considered with respect to the other one. ‘Thin 
conception’ is a different conception of a particular; it is a particular after abstraction 
operation, namely an abstracted thing without its specific properties.  
 
In the same context, abstract object theory or simply abstract theory is a branch of 
metaphysics (Zalta, 2004) that studies abstract entities.  Zelta claims that there are two 
kinds of objects: the concrete entities that exemplify features and properties in a way 
that we can recognize them, and abstract objects (e.g., numbers). Zalta claims that for 
every set of features there is exactly one and only one abstract object that encodes them. 
This allows us to know and recognize the abstract objects.  
 
I. Types and Tokens 
 
In very simple and general terms there is an ontological11 difference between types and 
tokens; namely, between general concepts and their specific concrete instances. From 
the philosophical viewpoint, it refers to the distinction between universals12 and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
mental states to brain states. Functionalism is one of the major proposals for the mind/body problem. 
Functionalism, unlike the indicated models, assumes that mental states are made of their causal 
relationship to one another and to sensory inputs and behavioural outputs (Block, 1996).  
9 See Sarkar (1992) for the reductionism theory and its divisions.  
10 A property is a characteristic of an object; a black object is have the property of blackness. In classical 
Aristotelian terminology, a property is one of the predicables. It is a non-essential quality of a species, but 
a quality which is nevertheless characteristically present in members of that species (and in no others). 
11 Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, existence or reality as well as the 
basic categories of being and their relations. The philosophical debates regarding the existential 
distinction between types and tokens, abstract and concrete objects together with other arguments such as 
the existence or non-existence of abstract entities are also included in ontology. 
12 In Platonic realism, universals have a different kind of nature in comparison with concrete objects. This 
philosophical doctrine claims that universals exist in a broad, abstract sense but not in a specific 
spatiotemporal location. Thus human beings cannot perceive them across sensorimotor mechanisms but 
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particulars13. Pierce14 (1974) introduces ‘type’ and ‘token’ and explained their 
distinction with the following words: “in one there is only one word ‘the’ in the English 
language; in the other, there are numerous words ‘the’ on the physical page you are now 
looking at”. This distinction could be highlighted with some examples. Consider 
blackness and a black t-shirt. The latter term is a specific instance of the former one. A 
black t-shirt is a concrete entity that could be conceptualized with its perceptual 
features. This does not happen in the case of blackness, since it lacks such perceptual 
features. In other words, there is a hyponym and hypernym15 relation between a black t-
shirt and blackness (and generally speaking, between types and tokens). The same thing 
happens between five and five officers in the embassy of Italy or Tornatore’s films and 
Nuovo Cinema Paradiso. The former terms belong to the type category while the latter 
ones to token category.   
 
The distinction between types and tokens somehow could be similar to the distinction 
between abstract and concrete objects. There are two different approaches. Some claim 
that types and universals are totally separate from their concrete instances. Therefore, 
they are abstract entities without having any spatiotemporal location. Others sustain that 
types and universals are in their concrete instances, and therefore lacking a 
spatiotemporal location for such entities is an irrelevant discussion. They possess 
several spatiotemporal locations, hence they are neither abstract nor a-causal (see 
Wetzel, 2014). In accordance to the Platonic version of type realism (Katz, 1981), the 
type is an abstract object, it means that it does not possess any concrete spatiotemporal 
location. However, as we human beings are not able to perceive explicitly an entity 
which does not have any spatiotemporal location, this approach gives rise to several 
problems from the epistemological16 viewpoint; namely, how do human beings 
conceptualize type without perceiving them with their sensorimotor mechanisms? In 
accordance with Bromberger’s Platonic Relationship Principle in “Types and Tokens 
in Linguistics” (1992), a possible answer to this question is that types are hypernyms of 
tokens and have all the essential features of their hyponyms. In this way, humans are 
able to conceive the abstract objects; namely, by perceiving all the sensorimotor 
features in the tokens of a type, the abstract entity of that type is conceived. He argues 
that linguists often specify the characteristics of a type in a natural language by 
observing the concrete features of that type in a principled manner. He claims that as 
this type includes only the features of its tokens therefore one could conceive the type. 
According to Pulgram (1951), phoneme is a class name or type or an abstract entity 
which cannot occur by itself. Its tokens, which are phonetic realizations of that 
phoneme, are what occur. Hence, phonemes, according to Platonic Relationship 
Principle, are conceivable by perceiving all the features of their phones. However, this 
                                                                                                                                                                          
rather they conceive universals. Universals are claimed to be characterized as having instances, being 
repeatable, being abstract, being acausal, lacking a spatiotemporal location and being predicable of things 
(Wetzel, 2014). 
13 In metaphysics, particulars, in contrast with universals, are concrete spatiotemporal entities. Wolfram 
(1989) describes them with the following words: “Particulars include only individuals of a certain kind: as 
a first approximation individuals with a definite place in space and time, such as persons and material 
objects or events, or which must be identified through such individuals, like smiles or thoughts”.  
14 Cited in Wetzel (1998). 
15 Hyponym in linguistics refers to a word or phrase whose semantic field is included in that of hypernym 
(Stede, 2000). 
16 Epistemology studies the nature of knowledge, justification, and the rationality of belief. There are four 
main areas of epistemology: a) the philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and its relation to 
concepts like truth, belief, and justification, b) various problems of skepticism, c) the origin and target of 
knowledge and justified belief, and d) the criteria for knowledge and justification. 
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is not true for all abstract objects, since at least in the case of semantics the Principle 
part of Platonic Relationship Principle will disappear Consider again blackness as a 
type. If Bromberger’s claim is true for all the types then one should be able to collect all 
the semantic features of blackness in her/his mind from its tokens. However, this sounds 
impossible. First, there is an infinite number of tokens that could be originated from 
blackness, and second, even if we perceive all these features, it does not happen in a 
principled way. Therefore, the internal structure of an abstract object is more complex 
than the overall features of its tokens. In line with Wetzel (2014), a type is an abstract 
object whose function is unifying the tokens. In accordance with Platonic Relationship 
Principle, the types have some of their features based on the properties of their tokens 
but in a complex way (and not in a principled way).  
 
2.1.3. Historical background 
 
The indicated dichotomy made of abstract and concrete words and concepts is a 
relatively recent debate in literature. With some exceptions, the 20th century could be 
considered the historical period for the beginning of this debate. This distinction has 
some similarities with Plato’s distinction between forms17 and sensibles (see White, 
1987). However, for Plato, forms were causes while the abstract entities in the modern 
debates are free from the cause discourse. The modern abstract/concrete dichotomy 
stems from the distinction among words in traditional grammar. Namely, it argues that, 
for example, ‘black’ is a concrete noun and ‘blackness’ is an abstract one, with no 
indication of their conceptual or metaphysical origin. In the 17th century, this pure 
linguistic distinction was changed and transferred in the world of ideas.  For example, 
Locke in An essay concerning human understanding (1836) describes the general idea 
of a triangle. He says: “Does it not require some pains and skill to form the general Idea 
of a Triangle.... for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, 
Equicrural, nor Scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something 
imperfect, that cannot exist; an Idea, wherein some parts of several different and 
inconsistent Ideas are put together” (Lennon, 1988: 238). In accordance with this 
example a general idea (or an abstract idea) of a concrete idea is obtained by the 
elimination of its distinguishing (specific) properties. This definition of abstract idea, 
which in modern literature is known with the term ‘generalization’ or ‘abstraction’18 
(Kristensen & Østerbye, 1996), was rejected by Berkley. Berckley’ thesis with his 
argument against Lock’s empiricist principles is briefed as follows: a) The idea of 
material substance involves a contradiction, b) Material substance is utterly 
unknowable, c) The idea of such a substance is vacuous (Beardsley, 1943). 
 
In the 20th century, the focus of this distinction was in the domain of objects and 
entities. It is not clear what the historical origin of this modern type of abstract/concrete 
dichotomy is; however, a crucial aspect of this dichotomy, started from Descartes 
(Baker & Morris, 2002) to modern times, is the difference between the mental and the 
material entities. One of the most peculiar viewpoints in this mind matter dualism is that 
of Frege with regard to mathematical objects. He assumes that mathematical numbers 
neither are material things nor mental ones. He argues: “number is not anything 
physical, but nor is it anything subjective (idea)”, “number does not result from the 
annexing of thing to thing. It makes no difference even if we assign a fresh name after 
                                                          
17 According to Plato, non physical (but οὐσία) things or ideas represent the most accurate reality.  
18 These notions will be explained in the following parts of this chapter.  
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each act of annexation”. If they were material things or the properties of them, the law 
of arithmetic would be some sort of empirical generalization. If they were mental 
entities, we would be affronted with a bigger problem to solve: Whose mind contains 
the number 17? Is there one 17 in your mind and another in mine? In The Foundations 
of Arithmetic (1884), Frege concludes that numbers are neither external ‘concrete’ 
things nor mental entities of any sort. For Frege, thoughts, declarative propositions and 
their constituents (with their senses) have this intermediate position between ‘concrete’ 
thing and ‘mental’ entities; namely, the senses in Frege’s viewpoint pertain to a third 
realm, which is neither the realm of the external sensible entities nor the realm of the 
mental entities or the internal world of consciousness. As the existence of this new third 
realm was accepted, the word ‘abstract’ was used ‘as a super-category of any word or 
concept with the indicated intermediate position. In philosophy, there are philosophers 
who affirm the existence of these ‘abstract’ entities, called Platonists, and the 
nominalists19 who deny the existence of these abstract entities. Consequently, modern 
Platonism claims that there is at least one ‘abstract object’ outside of the time space 
realm while modern nominalism sustains that there is no such ‘abstract object’ outside 
of the space-time world.  
 
I. Lewis: the way of negation and other criteria for the 
distinction between abstract and concrete items 
 
Frege’s abstract/concrete distinction criteria, explained in the previous section, are 
similar to one of Lewis’s principles (1986) in On the Plurality of Worlds. Lewis in his 
book claims that it is not at all clear to him what the difference is between ‘abstract’ and 
‘concrete’. In the principle called The Negative Way, Lewis sustains that if there is a 
division between abstract and concrete entities it means that ‘abstract’ objects and 
‘concrete’ objects are totally alike; namely, abstract objects lack some features of 
concrete items and vice-versa. He argues that it is not possible to distinguish abstract 
and concrete objects in a structured way; however, if anyone wants to do that he/she 
should rely on one (or more) of the following ways: a) the Way of Example, b) the Way 
of Conflation, c) the Negative Way, d) the Way of Abstraction. In the first place, due to 
the theoretical vicinity with Frege’s account, the Negative Way will be explained, then 
Lewis’s other criteria will be discussed.  
 
Lewis’s the Negative Way and Frege’s criteria for concrete/abstract distinction 
 
Lewis (1986:83) defines the Negative Way as follows: “abstract entities have no 
spatiotemporal location; they do not enter into causal interaction; they are never 
indiscernible one from another”. The first two parts of Lewis’s definition of the 
Negative Way are sceptic. He argues that the unlocatedness of the abstract entity adds 
nothing; it is only possible in the case of uninstantiated universals. He sustains that 
maybe one argues that they are unlocated because they are abstract; in this case, one 
should not say that they are abstract since they are unlocated. With regard to causal 
interaction, he objects that: why should not something or a set of causes cause 
something or a set of effects? Many philosophers proposed to identify an event 
                                                          
19 These two terms in a broader sense refer to distinct notions; Platonism in its broader sense refers to the 
philosophy of Plato and the philosophers who follow Platonic realism, while nominalism is a 
philosophical doctrine that denies any existence of universals and things that can be exemplified by 
particular entities (Haack, 1978).    
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(something that can cause and be caused) with one or another kind of set (as an 
example, Lewis proposes an event in ‘Events’ with space-time regions); why should this 
proposal be rejected only due to the fact that the sets are ‘abstract’? In relation to the 
third part Lewis argues that why should universals be indiscernible? What sort of 
benefit does it have? He assumes that if two individuals are indiscernible then their unit 
sets are indiscernible too, consequently two sets differ solely due to the substitution of 
indiscernible individuals.  
 
In line with Frege’s criterion, an item is abstract if and only if it is non mental and non-
sensible. The ‘mind-dependent’ part could be included, in particular, in the 
unlocatedness (and maybe in non-indiscernible) part of Lewis’s account. In a very 
simple definition, an object is ‘mind-dependent’ if its existence depends on the 
existence in the mind, but in this definition, chairs and tables are categorized as ‘mind-
dependent’. However, this is a very superficial account of Frege’s definition, since he 
wants to apply the above terms to the objects in a metaphysical context, not in a 
physical one. A different account of Frege’s definition would be: a ‘mind dependent’ 
entity is the one whose existence relies on the mental activity but not in the strict causal 
sense which considers the normal concrete items (e.g., tables and chairs) as mental 
dependent. A very broad meaning of this mental dependency could refer to the entities 
that exist at a time due to some mental processes or states at that time even if the entity 
is not the object of any single mental act, state or activity20. This would count tables and 
chairs as ‘mind independent’, because their existence in a specific time does not depend 
on some mental states or process. The ‘non-physical’ part of Frege’s account21 could 
refer to unlocatedness and non-causal parts of Lewis’s account, which were 
problematic, according to what was indicated in the previous lines.  
 
Lewis’s the Way of Example  
 
The Way of Example is another of Lewis’s principles which is supposed to solve the 
theoretical problem of the distinction between abstract and concrete objects. Its title 
highlights the role of examples in understanding the difference between concrete and 
abstract objects. However, as Lewis claims, saying that donkeys are concrete objects 
and numbers are abstract entities does not solve anything (at least for the abstract 
entities). The reason is that first, there is no unproblematic account for numbers22 and 
for how they differ from donkeys, and second, theoretically we do not know where 
exactly the border between donkeys and numbers should be put. Lewis sustains that 
from the Way of Example it could be understood that a world is concrete and not 
abstract; it is more donkey-like than number-like. However, as Rosen (2014) claims, the 
distinction between abstract and concrete objects is important because it imposes 
problematic issues in epistemology and philosophy of language. Therefore, the Way of 
Example with its unilateral approach could not be a solution.  
                                                          
20 See Rosen (2014) for the full account.  
21 Due to this ambiguity, in the contemporary interpretations of the Way of Negation, some new versions 
of Frege’s criteria appeared; namely the non-spatiality criterion and the causal inefficacy criterion. The 
general definition for the non-spatiality criterion is that an object is abstract if and only if it is non-spatial 
and causally inefficacious. One the other hand, the definition for the causal inefficacy is that an entity is 
abstract if and only if it is non-spatial.   
22 In this context, Benacerraf (1973) says that the lack of a satisfactory account for both mathematical 
truth and mathematical knowledge is unsatisfactory. However, as the scope is having an overall 
philosophical approach, the lack of an integrative account that includes both a satisfactory account of 




Lewis’s the Way of Conflation 
 
Lewis in this criterion argues that the concrete/abstract distinction is similar to that of 
individuals/sets or that of particular/universals23. Turning back to the previous 
examples, Lewis sustains that donkeys are individuals or particulars and numbers in a 
non-free problem account are universals or sets.  
 
Lewis’s the Way of Abstraction 
 
Lewis’s last criterion is called the Way of Abstraction. It refers to a sort of subtracting 
specificity by which abstract entities will be made from concrete entities. In line with 
Frege (1884:63): “for a thing to be numbered first becomes possible in so far as, for that 
purpose, we disregard or abstract from some of its peculiar characteristics and relations, 
which distinguish it from all other things; this has the effect of turning what was the 
name of the thing into a concept applicable to more than one thing.” For instance, Lewis 
sustains that unit negative charge can be abstracted from a universal common property 
of all particles. Either the negative charge could be a proper intrinsic part (and not every 
part) of a particle (this enables us to abstract it as a universal property), or it is possible 
to do abstraction by imitation from a concrete entity. As an example, he illustrates that 
the direction of a line, considering equivalent classes, can be abstracted from the line 
itself as the class of that line and other lines parallel to it. However, the problematic 
issue here is that there is no possibility to do abstraction from some highly extrinsic 
features of an entity such as its spatiotemporal location. This issue is controversial due 
to its non conformity with the Way of Example, Way of Conflation and (with an inferior 
grade) Negative Way. If the spatiotemporal location of a concrete entity is abstracted, 
then the resulted abstraction by no way will be unlocated. Similarly, if a causal role of a 
concrete entity is abstracted, the abstraction is entered into causal interactions.  
 
2.1.4. Abstract/concrete continuum: classical or 
fuzzy categories? 
 
In agreement with the previous sections, concrete terms refer to the objects and entities 
that are directly available to the human senses. Spoon, table, ragu alla bolognese’s 
taste, hot temperature of my coffee, etc., are examples of the concrete items that can be 
perceived by our senses (sight, touch, taste, etc.).  On the other hand, abstract terms 
refer to the ideas or concepts and not to the referents (at least in accordance with the 
linguists24). Success, freedom, moral, racism, socialism, etc., are some good examples 
of the abstract terms. These terms may seem familiar and unambiguous for us and we 
think that we know exactly what they mean; however, this is not true. In the first place, 
they do not have a fixed meaning. Their meanings change with the improvement and 
growth of our cognitive abilities. For example, love for a 5-year-old child is not the 
same as that of an adult, but spoon is always spoon. In the second place, the meanings 
of abstract terms change with the changing of contexts. For example, if a man wants to 
                                                          
23 It refers to familiar distinctions that exist between these entities in literature, which could be very 
similar or even equal to that of abstract and concrete entities (Quine, 1953). However, as Rosen (2014) 
argues, this sort of conflation is rare in recent literature.   
24 As described in the previous part, in philosophy some researchers claim that there is ‘abstracta’ or 
‘abstract entities’ for the abstract terms.  
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marry a woman and says: “love is good”, both understand what his intention is, 
however the meaning of this sentence is totally different if it is expressed in a campaign 
against the banning of prostitution; in this context perhaps it would mean legalization of 
prostitution. The same thing happens with other abstract terms such as morality: 
morality in work? In your relationship? In society?  
 
Therefore, there is an abstract/concrete continuum that starts from the prototype 
concrete categories with precise boundaries, which could be defined in accordance with 
the classical theory of categorization (see Smith & Medin, 1981; Taylor, 1989). On the 
other extreme of this continuum, there are prototypic abstract categories with very 
imprecise boundaries. In other words, the boundaries of an abstract concept most often 
overlap with those of other abstract categories. For instance, the boundaries of 
diminutives in Italian, as an abstract category, are too imprecise (Taylor, 2003). Italian 
has a vast set of diminutive suffixes such as -ino, -etto, and –ello. There is also the 
iteration of a diminutive (-inello, -ettino, etc.). If the indicated suffixes are considered as 
realizations of a single semantic category (diminutive in Italian), our category can be 
characterized as a category (with fuzzy boundaries) with a central meaning in 
conjunction with the peripheral ones. What is the central meaning of a category? How 
can it be related to peripheral meanings? Why does a prototypic abstract category have 
fuzzy boundaries and a prototypic concrete category does not? To better understand the 
previous example (diminutives in Italian25) and to answer the indicated questions, in the 
next part some theoretical aspects of categorization will be described. In this theoretical 
part, classical approach of categorization and its differences with the prototypic 
categories approach will be explained.  
 
I. Classical approach of categorization  
 
Classical approach of categorization is an approach, whose position in literature in 
many aspects contradicts that of prototype categories. It is called ‘classic’ owing to two 
reasons. First, it dates back to ancient Greek times; second, it was the dominant 
approach in the 19th century. For the first part, Aristotle’s essence and accidents can be 
considered. Essence is all the fundamental aspects of a thing, which are able to form its 
individuality and cannot be separated from the whole. Accidents refer to the specific 
attributes of a thing and are not the fundamental ones. They can be removed from the 
set of features without any problem. For instance, ‘a biped animal’ is a fundamental 
attribute of a man, but ‘being white’ or ‘having blue eyes’ are specific features of it. In 
Aristotle’s words, both the concept of MAN and the meaning of the word man are 
describable by a ‘formula’ of an essence: “if ‘man’ [anthropos] has one meaning, let this 
be ‘two-footed animal’; by ‘has one meaning’ I mean this: -if ‘X’ means ‘man’, then if 
anything is a man, its humanity will consist in being ‘X’” (4.4.8). To understand why an 
entity is a ‘man’, the meaning of the word man has to be known, which leads to 
knowing the meaning of the essence of man. “If anything can be truly said to be man, it 
must be ‘two footed animal’, for this is what ‘man’ is intended to mean”(4.4.14-15)26.  
 
In modern terms, assuming that X is Y is equivalent to assigning entity X to category Y. 
To reach this goal, the features of X can be examined in parallel with the essence of 
category Y, defined by some properties. Returning to the indicated example by 
                                                          
25 This example will be further explained, taking into consideration different theoretical aspects that will 
be illustrated in the following parts.  
26 The indicated words of Aristotle are cited in Taylor (2003).  
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Aristotle, a ‘man’ is a biped animal: it means that the essence of ‘man’ is composed of 
two fundamental features, namely, [animal], [biped]. These features are essential to 
individualize this category from other categories. If an entity does not possess any of 
these essential features, then it does not belong to this category. Considering these 
explanations, the classic approach of categorization has the following characteristics. 
First, the conceptual categories are defined as the sum of the necessary and sufficient 
features. Second, the mentioned features are binary; this means that the essential 
features of a category either exist in an entity or do not exist. Third, categories have 
clear boundaries. This means that the entities in the world are divided into two parts: the 
entities that belong to the category X and the ones that do not. In other words, there is 
no intermediate cases, which have an ambiguous situation or in some extent or in a way 
belong to category X. All members of a category have equal status. This means that if 
category X has essential features f1, f2 and f3, there is no priority in the consideration of 
these features as more essential or less essential. There is no feature that can define 
category X better than other ones. Fourth, they have equal status in the sense that a) all 
of them have to exist in the entities that are identified with X, b) the absence of each of 
these features in an entity cancels the membership of this in category X, and c) from the 
conceptual and definitional viewpoint, all of them have the same level of essentiality.   
 
Classical approach of categorization in linguistics: phonology  
 
Perhaps phonology is the linguistic level which almost completely reflects the 
Aristotelean criteria of categorization27. Phonology in linguistics studies the linguistic 
sounds. It is in phonology that speech can be segmented into the linear sequence of 
sounds. One of the most important theoretical aspects in phonology is phoneme. Each 
language possesses a limited number of phonemes which are the basis of all the 
linguistic sounds in that language. Each phoneme is constructed from a number of 
distinctive features; these are the most basic units of phonological structure in the 
natural languages. Distinctive features in turn are grouped into categories according to 
the natural classes of segments they describe: major class features, laryngeal features, 
manner features, and place features. Features are specified by binary values to illustrate 
whether it is present in a phoneme or phone; the positive value [+] shows the presence 
of a feature, while the negative value [-] illustrates the absence of it. For instance, the /p/ 
in American English is [+Anterior], [+Labial], [-Sonorant] and [-Voiced]; the /a/ is 
[+Low], [+Back], [-Rounded] and [-ATR].  
 
Apart from the described characteristics of essence in the Aristotelean approach of 
categorization (i.e., a) the conceptual categories are defined as the sum of the necessary 
and sufficient features, b) features which structure essence of a thing are binary, c) 
categories have clear boundaries, d) they have equal status), some other properties were 
aggregated by phonologists (Jakobson, Fant & Halle, 1951; Chomsky & Halle, 1968). 
The fifth property is that the features are primitives, in the sense that distinctive features 
are the most basic units in the phonologic level. The sixth property is that they are 
universals, in the sense that there is a universal set of distinctive features that have been 
distributed in all languages in the world. Namely, if the sum of all distinctive features in 
all languages is considered, this universal set will be obtained. There is no phonemic 
feature in any language outside of this universal set. The seventh property is that they 
are abstract, in the sense that the features are not reflected directly and completely in the 
                                                          
27 It refers to distinctive features in phonology, which have binary structure (Jakobson, Fant & Halle, 
1951; Chomsky & Halle, 1968).    
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physical sounds. To understand this characteristic, the example indicated by Taylor 
(2003) can be described. From the phonologic point of view, the difference between 
phonemes /f/ and /v/ is the presence of feature [+VOICED] in the latter. Nevertheless, 
this phonemic difference has a different history in the phonetic world; it refers to an 
almost periodic vibration of the vocal cords. If the phonological structures of leave and 
leaf are considered, the difference stems from the presence of the feature [VOICED] in 
the final segment of the former, /lif/, and the absence of it in the final segment of the 
latter, /liv/. Nevertheless, the physical difference between [f] and [v] in [leaf] and 
[leave] does not reflect the phonemic difference. The [f] in [leaf] is really [-VOICED], 
but the so called [+VOICED] [v] in [leave] is articulated with a partial vibration of 
vocal cords only at the beginning. Therefore, from the phonetic viewpoint the feature 
[VOICED] is not so crucial to categorize [v]. Turning to the seventh property, it could 
be concluded that the features are abstract in the sense that they are not completely and 
directly observable in the articulation process of linguistic sounds or in the acoustic 
signals. They are also abstract due to the fact that the contrast e.g., leaf-leave, changes 
drastically in different English spoken zones, and this abstractness allows the linguists 
to categorize the internal linguistic structures of a language more economically. The 
eighth property is that the distinctive features are innate. This feature originates 
logically from the previous properties. In other words, if the phonemic features are 
abstract and do not have a direct relationship with the physical facts, and if they are 
universal and each language selects its own phonemic features from a fixed, defined and 
limited set of features, as a result the question of acquisition of the phonemic features 
appears. Namely, how does a child acquire all the phonemic features related to his/her 
language? It is obvious that the physical facts in the articulation of sounds and in the 
acoustic signal of linguistic phones cannot be the main resources for the formation of 
the phonologic features. The only reliable response to this question will be the existence 
of a biologically inherited universal knowledge of the distinctive features. 
 
Considering all the properties that characterize distinctive features, it could be argued 
that they reflect the Aristotelean approach of categorization in phonology. First, a 
phoneme is constructed by the sum of its phonemic features. Second, according to 
tradition, in phonology, phonological features of a phoneme are illustrated by binary 
values (e.g., [+VOICED] or [-VOICED]). Third, categories have clear boundaries. For 
instance, there is no phoneme between /f/ and /v/; they are concrete categories. Fourth, 
all the phonemic features of a phoneme have an equal status; namely, the existence of 
all of the features related to a phoneme is necessary to construct that phoneme, and the 
absence of each of them ends in the destruction and elimination of that phoneme. In 
addition to these criteria, as it was indicated, other criteria were added in phonology. 
Nevertheless, they do not have any contradiction with the Aristotelean properties of a 
category.   
 
Classical approach of categorization in linguistics: semantics 
 
After the success of the classical approach of categorization in phonology, linguists in 
the fields of semantics and syntactics adopted an approach based on the classical theory 
or, more specifically, on the distinctive features theory in phonology. This means that 
both the syntactic categories, such as noun, verb and adjective, and the semantic 
categories, which include first of all the meaning of the words, can be represented in 
accordance with the criteria of distinctive features in phonology (binary, primitives, 




One of the analyses based on the indicated criteria in the semantic categories was 
performed by Katz (Katz & Fodor 1963; Katz & Postal, 1964). The famous example in 
literature is bachelor. Katz and Postal, using four distinctive semantic features, 
represented the meaning of this word; namely, [HUMAN], [MALE], [ADULT], 
[NEVER MARRIED]. According to the Aristotelean approach, any entity in the world 
that shows these four semantic features can be designated by bachelor; in addition, if 
one (or more) semantic feature is missing or has negative value in an entity, that entity 
does not belong to the category bachelor. 
 
In line with Taylor (2003), the theoretical approach, which originated from the 
distinctive features in phonology, is adoptable in semantics for three reasons. First, there 
are proportional relations within the lexicon. The words bachelor and spinster are 
related somehow, like the pair /f/ and /v/ are related. In addition, the kind of relationship 
between the bachelor/spinster pair exists between other semantic pairs such as boy/girl 
and husband/wife. In other words, the only difference between two members of these 
pairs is that girl, spinster and wife have the feature [FEMALE], while bachelor, boy and 
husband have the feature [MALE]. Besides, considering the semantic features theory 
there are other types of relationships like inclusion and hyponymy. For example, the 
meaning of man ([HUMAN], [ADULT] and [MALE]) is included in the meaning of 
bachelor; man is superordinate to bachelor and bachelor is hyponym (subordinate) to 
man. Second, as in phonology and the natural classes of segments, with the semantic 
features the natural classes of lexemes can exist. For instance [HUMAN] can define the 
human nouns; [-ANIMATE] refers to the inanimate nouns. These classes can be the 
subject of selectional restrictions28. Third, the semantic features illustrate some kinds of 
sentence meaning and semantic relationships that exist among sentences. For instance, 
they are useful for the analytic and contradictory sentence meaning. “This table is a 
piece of furniture” is a sentence with analytic meaning; the semantic features of table 
and furniture are needed so that one can illustrate the inclusion relationship among 
them. “The book is laughing” is a sentence with contradictory meaning; to laugh needs 
an [ANIMATE] argument as the subject of the sentence, but the book is 
[INANIMATE]. For the semantic relationships among sentences, consider, for example, 
“John is a bachelor”. This implicates a) the following sentence “John is a man”, b) 
“John is a man who has never married”; in addition, it contradicts with “John is 
married”. Kempson (1977)29 claims that a crucial feature of a semantic theory is that it 
can provide general principles to explain: a) the lexical meaning relationships 
(synonymy, hyponymy) and sentence meaning relationships (entailment and 
contradiction). Both of these can be explained using semantic features and it seems that, 
just as in phonology, distinctive features can be useful to define the semantic 
relationships. However, this is not the whole story. The similarities with distinctive 
features in phonology go beyond the indicated properties; linguists claimed that, just as 
in phonology, semantic distinctive features are the smallest units for the construction of 
bigger ones; semantic features are the ultimate atomic units that construct the bigger 
conceptual and semantic units. In other words, there is a finite set of semantic features 
such as [HUMAN], [TIME], [SPACE], [ANIMATE], [INANIMATE], etc., which are 
                                                          
28 Selectional restrictions refer to the restrictions that predicates put to determine the semantic content of 
their arguments. For instance between a) The plant is wilting, and b) The building is wilting, the former 
sentence is correct. This is due to the fact that the argument The building in the latter sentence violates the 
selectional restrictions of the predicate is wilting.  
29 Cited by Taylor (2003). 
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the atomic base of all the semantic categories in all languages of the world30 (Katz & 
Postal: 1964). Other indicated properties for the distinctive features in phonology are 
abstractness and innateness. Similar to phonology, a semantic atomic feature such as 
[HUMAN] is not the same as human. This claim leads to the same conclusion in 
phonology; the semantic atomic constituents are abstract. They are not directly related 
to the properties of the objects and events in the real world (on the contrary of what 
embodied cognition theories claim), and as a result they are innate. Just like in 
phonology, the fact that they are abstract and they do not have any referent in the real 
world explains their innateness. They have an innate biological base, since they cannot 




Perhaps the non functionality of the classical theory of categorization can be illustrated 
by the definitional problem of the GAME32 category, introduced by Wittgenstein 
(Taylor, 2003: 85)33. This category, like other abstract categories, does not have clear 
distinctive features, which are able to differentiate it from NON-GAME categories. This 
is because GAME has fuzzy borders, which could coincide with other categories’ 
borders; hence, the classical theory does not predict the behavior of GAME and similar 
categories. Wittgenstein argues that although all the specific examples of the category 
GAME are structured and characterized in a very similar mode, there is no way to 
define distinctive features for the essence of GAME. He claims that for this category we 
must apply another categorization mechanism, different from the classical approach. 
This new mechanism is called family resemblance34 (Wittgenstein, 2001). In accordance 
with family resemblance, things that could be supposed to be connected by distinctive 
features (according to the classical approach) could be connected by a series of 
overlapping similarities, where no feature (or similarity) is common to all.  
 
The experimental evidence for family resemblance comes from the study of Labov 
(1973). In his study, the subjects identified not only the very typical examples of 
categories, but also the ones that fell in between boundaries of categories. The 
participants identified items as “a cup” or “a bowl” with the items that had features of 
both categories. In summary, the results of Labov’s study demonstrated that no feature 
is more essential than others to differentiate one category from another. Instead, there 
are optimal examples of a category. Similar to the spectrum of colors (Rosch, 1973) that 
are categorized by the optimal examples35 (prototypes), in Labov’s experiment 
participants categorize the item according to the prototypes. These prototypes are 
considered as points of reference for the categorization of the items that are not as 
evident as the prototypes. In the prototype categories, there is not a list of specific 
                                                          
30 There has been a lot of criticism of this claim. First, because the number of semantic categories is much 
higher than the number of phonologic categories. Second, because this huge number is extendible to 
infinite semantic categories. Hence, it seems unrealistic to reduce all the semantic categories in all natural 
languages in the world to a finite set of semantic atomic constituents.  
31 The term prototype has been defined in Eleanor Rosch’s study “Natural language” (1973) and was first 
defined as a stimulus, which takes the most important position in the formation of a category, as it is the 
first stimulus to be associated with that category. Later she defined it as the most central member of a 
category.  
32 In German Spiel.  
33 Cited from Philosophiche Untersuchungen (Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1945).  
34 In German Familienähnlichkeit.  
35 Eleanor Rosch, in the 1970s, is considered to be the person who formulated prototype theory, a radical 
departure from traditional Aristotelean categorization.    
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distinctive features but rather there is a similarity association between the examples of a 
category which comes from the prototypic member of category. As Rosch (1973) 
claims, the color terms do not acquire their denotative spectrum by the distinctive 
features and by drawing fixed categorial boundaries between them, but rather by a 
generalization process which starts from the prototypic examples of categories.  
 
Concrete words versus abstract words: a dichotomy or a continuum? 
 
The discussion about two opposite theoretical approaches of categorization (the 
classical approach of categorization and the prototype categories approach) enables us 
to respond to the following question: do the abstract words and concrete words form 
two dichotomous categories with fixed boundaries, whose essence, in agreement with 
the classical theory, is differentiated by distinctive features; or are they categories with 
fuzzy boundaries without a unique common essence to all members of a category? 
Abstract words and concrete words are two categories that include all words in natural 
languages. Hence, it would be very difficult to specify the boundaries of them. 
However, if less general categories within abstract words and concrete words are 
analyzed, we can somehow demonstrate whether these two categories follow the 
classical approach criteria or the prototype categories criteria. First, the previously 
discussed example of diminutives in Italian will be analyzed, this time with the 
consideration of the theoretical aspects of the classical approach and the prototype 
categories approach. Then, considering the indicated examples, the continuous or 
dichotomous nature of concrete/abstract words will be explained.   
 
In line with the previous discussion of diminutives in Italian (Taylor, 2003), -ino, -etto, 
and -ello are the most frequent members of this category. From the semantic viewpoint, 
these members express various semantic features. In line with the classical approach to 
categorization, some common semantic distinctive features are expected. If this is the 
case, all the indicated suffixes have to possess these semantic features. In addition, these 
semantic features must have equal value; no feature can be excluded or included. This 
cannot be true for diminutives in Italian. When one thinks about the term diminutive, the 
first meaning that comes to mind is smallness. If the different usages of diminutives in 
Italian are considered, different conceptual domains will be illustrated. Namely, the 
smallness indicated by diminutives is not only the smallness in spatial domain; in some 
cases, these diminutives refer to abstract concepts. The non-spatial domain to which 
Italian diminutives refer can be time domain, or when they refer to adjectives and 
adverbs, they could express a reduced extension or intensity.  
 
For instance cenetta36 is a very short dinner, or bellino37 is a reduced beautiful, or 
benino38 is a reduced good, which means that the diminutive –etta is used in the time 
domain, and the diminutive –ino expresses smallness in the domain of abstract concepts 
(in this case in the beauty domain and the goodness domain) (Taylor, 2003). These 
examples illustrate that there is not any fixed set of semantic features for the diminutives 
in Italian category, but rather, according to the prototype category approach, there is a 
central semantic feature related to spatial smallness which extends to smallness in the 
time domain and other abstract domains. However, this is not the whole story. The 
Italian diminutives can be used in domains that apparently do not have any semantic 
                                                          
36 Cena> Cenetta (Dinner> Small dinner) 
37 Bello> Bellino (Beautiful>  Reduced beautiful) 
38 Bene> Benino (Good > Reduced good) 
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relationship with the central meaning. For instance, -ina in Mammina does not seem to 
express any meaning related to smallness. It does not refer to physical smallness of 
Mamma. In this example, the speaker uses –ina to add affective value to semantic 
features of Mamma. There are, however, other cases that designate both meanings 
(smallness and affective meaning). For instance vestito e casella could refer to the literal 
meanings (small dress and small house) or they can refer to the affective meanings (nice 
little dress and nice little house)39. Another meaning that can be associated with 
smallness is little value. For instance, tesina could refer to either a small thesis or a 
thesis that does not have high scientific value40. There are other peripheral meanings. 
For instance, a diminutive in Italian can mean a thing that lacks importance: fatterello (a 
thing without any importance) or storiella (lie)41.  
 
In line with the indicated explanations, it could be said that the classical approach to 
categorization does not fit with the discussed category. This claim is derived from the 
fact that we could not find central semantic features with the same weight for the 
essence of this category. In addition, some important aspects of the classical approach 
are rejected when one considers some peripheral meanings of it, such as affective 
meaning and low value meaning, since these meanings are derived from the metonymic 
relationship between the central meaning and the peripheral ones. Hence, these semantic 
features are neither abstract nor innate, but rather they are derived from human 
experiences in the living environment. They are not acquired by means of a biologically 
inherited cognitive mechanism. Therefore, if the described meanings contrast with the 
basic principles of the classical approach, they can be related with the prototype 
categories approach. If the distinct semantic features of the diminutives in Italian are 
considered, the diversity of meanings, the different weight of meanings, and the unclear 
boundaries between the semantic categories will be illustrated. In line with the 
prototype categories approach, there is a central meaning that is the base of other 
meanings. Namely, other less central and more peripheral meanings are derived from 
the central meaning (or prototypic meaning). This principle was observed in our 
example. The central meaning ‘smallness’ is the meaning from which other more 
peripheral meanings are derived by metonymy. From the viewpoint of having clear 
boundaries, again the classical approach does not win. If the different meanings of 
diminutives in Italian are considered, we understand that the boundaries are too fuzzy. 
In agreement with the discussed example, the central meaning is rooted in the spatial 
domain. This means that one can perceive it by his/her sensorimotor mechanisms. From 
the central meaning, affective value is derived. This meaning is rooted neither in the 
sensorimotor realm nor in the linguistic and abstract meanings. In accordance with 
2.1.6, emotions are located between concrete and abstract words. They are derived from 
                                                          
39 There is a metonymic relationship between smallness and affective meaning. In other words, by means 
of metonymy, human beings assign affective meaning to the diminutives (in our case, diminutives in 
Italian). In our living environment, we always consider small creatures as lovable things (contrary to big 
creatures). Therefore, by means of metonymy, the central meaning of the indicated diminutives, in some 
contexts, is associated with affective meaning and this latter meaning becomes the central meaning in 
these contexts.  
40 Similar to the previous case, in this case there is also a metonymic relationship between smallness and 
low value meanings. Human beings associate high value with high quantity or with an increase in the 
amount of things. For example, $200 has a higher value with respect to $100. Hence, the meaning of low 
value is derived from the metonymic relationship between smallness and low value in our living 
environment.   
41 There are some other more peripheral meanings for diminutives in Italian. However, due to space 
contraints, this discussion will concentrate only on the indicated meanings.   
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human experiences42. A more abstract semantic domain to which diminutives in Italian 
refers is low value. This refers neither to the sensorimotor realm nor to the emotions 
realm. It means that it relates neither to the objective experiences nor to the kind of 
experiences that one has with emotions. This is related to a type of conceptual domain 
that is more abstract than the ones indicated before; namely, it is formed by linguistic 
associations. Hence, considering only these three meanings of diminutives in Italian, 
there are no fixed boundaries between the categories in this example; since, for instance, 
the abstract meaning of low value can share some semantic features with the category 
badness in some contexts.  In some cases, badness can be the hypernym of low value. 
Thus, it is not an atomic semantic feature; in addition, it does not have clear boundaries. 
In summary, the semantic domains to which diminutives in Italian refers, extend from 
the concrete semantic domain (spatial smallness), to the emotional concepts domain 
(affective value), and finally ends in its most abstract domain (low value). These same 
characteristics exist for all abstract categories. There is no fixed semantic features for 
defining their essence, and the semantic boundaries are too fuzzy.  
 
If the indicated characteristics of the above example are extended to other categories, 
the concrete/abstract dichotomy will be rejected. This is because, in very general terms, 
if every category has fuzzy boundaries43, and many abstract and concrete categories 
share some parts of their conceptual domains, there will not be concrete and abstract 
categories from the classical point of view. Therefore, concrete/abstract dichotomy does 
not have any sense; in fact, there is a continuum of different types of concepts, which 
starts from prototypic concrete categories, then arrives at emotion categories, and finally 
ends at prototypic abstract categories. According to what was explained, prototypic 
concrete categories are rooted in the human experiences in the living environment, 
which in turn have sensorimotor features. Emotion categories are somehow between 
prototypic concrete categories and prototypic abstract categories, since humans 
experience them, but the type of experience on which they are based is different from 
our normal objective experiences. Finally, prototypic abstract categories are not directly 
rooted in either the normal objective experiences or in the experiences related to 
emotional categories. With the exception of prototypic concrete words and concepts, the 
concepts in the indicated three conceptual categories do not have clear boundaries. They 
can have some features of concrete categories and some features of abstract categories, 
similar to diminutives in Italian that have features in all three mentioned categories.  
 
 
2.1.5. Content differences between concrete and 
abstract concepts 
 
Some proponents of embodiment and grounding approaches claim that abstract 
concepts are grounded, similar to concrete concepts; however, they admit that abstract 
concepts are represented differently with respect to concrete concepts. The question is if 
both types of concepts are grounded in human experiences, how do they differ from the 
representational viewpoint? They argue that the difference is not in the modality of 
representation; namely, modal and grounded representation for the concrete concepts 
versus amodal and ungrounded representation for the abstract concepts. Rather, the 
                                                          
42 In part 2.1.6, the explanations with regard to this type of experience and its differences with objective 
experience will be provided.  
43 This is true particularly for all abstract categories.  
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difference is in the content of representation, which refers to the different properties and 
features in the abstract concepts in comparison with the concrete concepts. In the 
following lines, two proponent approaches of this viewpoint will be explained. First, in 
accordance to Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005), concrete concepts evoke more 
perceptual features and properties while the abstract concepts evoke more situational 
and introspective features and properties. Second, Vigliocco, Kousta and Della Rosa 
(2014) claim that the abstract concepts activate more emotion related zones in the neural 
architecture of the human brain compared to the concrete concepts.  
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) in their study demonstrated that abstract 
concepts focused on the situational and introspective features. They used three abstract 
words, three concrete words and three intermediate words44. The subjects had to 
describe the properties of the concepts. Concepts were presented either in isolation or 
preceded by a short context to simulate a situation. The results illustrated that both 
concrete and abstract concepts were grounded in situations. However, there was a very 
significant difference in this common aspect: the concrete concepts were grounded in 
the physical aspects of the situations while the abstract concepts were grounded in the 
social, event-based, and introspective aspects of the situations (e.g., cultural aspects, 
people, communication, etc.). This finding of Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings is 
partially in line with the contextual strength. According to Context availability theory45 
(Schwanenflugel, 1991; Schwanenflugel, 2013), concrete concepts have a higher rate of 
word retrieval, recognition, comprehension and production due to the availability of 
more contexts as compared to abstract words. One of the assumptions in this approach 
is that concrete concepts are strongly linked to a small number of contexts, but abstract 
words are weakly linked to a large number of contexts. It is logical that abstract 
concepts have more situational and introspective features if the finding of Barsalou and 
Wiemer-Hastings (2005) is linked with Schwanenflugel’s approach. In this context, a 
study performed by Roversi, Borghi and Tummolini (2013) can be considered. Their 
study was not focused in the first place on the abstract/concrete dichotomy but rather 
they tried to understand how different kinds of artifacts (in contrast with natural kinds) 
are conceived by humans. They performed a feature generation task46 to shed light on 
the conceptualization differences between four types of concepts. To reach these 
categories they mixed abstract/concrete dichotomy with institutional/standard artifacts 
and obtained four categories as follows: a) Concrete standard artifacts, b) Abstract 
standard artifacts, c) Concrete institutional artifacts, d) Abstract institutional artifacts. 
The results showed that institutional artifacts are typically against social objects 
(abstract or concrete). The generated features for institutional artifacts and for social 
concepts indicated the exemplification and normative relations for the former group and 
the situational relations for the latter group. However, the point that is relevant to the 
present discussion is that the situational relations were more relevant in the case of 
abstract social concepts and not concrete ones. These results in conjunction with the 
CAT approach, which claims that abstract concepts are related to a higher number of 
contexts but with a weaker link, illustrate that on the one hand, perceptual strength is 
                                                          
44 Abstract words were freedom, truth, and invention; concrete words were bird, sofa and car; 
intermediate words were cook, farm, and carpet.  
45 It will be discussed in part 3.2. 
46 It is a task based on some approaches in lexical semantics, which assume that the meaning of a word is 
explained by its associations with other words. To reach such a goal, they analyze the internal semantic 
structure of a word supposing that it has a number of distinct and minimal components of meaning 
(Palmer, 1982). This approach is called componential analysis or semantic decomposition (O'Grady, 
Archibald, Aronoff & Rees-Miller, 2010).  
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more important for concrete words and, on the other hand, situational relations are more 
important in the case of abstract words. However, this claim causes problematic issues 
for the embodied cognition theories, which argue that abstract concepts are grounded in 
sensorimotor features. In line with Borghi and Binkofski (2014), abstract concepts have 
situational complexity47, which is not against perceptual strength. According to them, 
concrete concepts are highly related to simple contexts, while abstract words are 
embedded in a network of complex contexts and relations. This complexity of contexts 
justifies the fact that first, abstract concepts are less characterized by perceptual 
strength, and second, they are related to a higher number of situations.  
The second approach is the one that highlights the role of emotions in characterizing 
conceptual content of abstract concepts (Vigliocco, Kousta and Della Rosa, 2014). Their 
hypothesis is based on the findings in literature that emphasize the more important role 
of emotions in abstract concepts in comparison with concrete ones. In several studies, 
abstract concepts and words have higher ratings for affective associations (both valence 
and arousal) than concrete words; this and similar findings support the hypothesis that 
the engagement of emotional processing is generally required for processing abstract 
words (Vigliocco, Kousta, Della Rosa, Vinson, Tettamanti, Devlin & Cappa, 2014: 
1767). In literature there are many studies which illustrate that emotional valence has 
some role in the conceptual structure of the abstract concepts (Borghi & Binkofski, 
2014). As an example, in lexical decision tasks, when context availability and 
imageability are controlled, the concreteness effect (processing advantage of concrete 
over abstract words) disappears. However, in some studies the opposite effect is found 
(abstractness effect); the authors in further experiments found that this abstractness 
effect is owing to the emotional valence48 in the abstract words compared to the 
concrete words (Della Rosa, Catricalà, Vigliocco & Cappa, 2010). The processing 
superiority in accuracy for the abstract words continued even after removing the effect 
of emotional valence, which could be due to a more highlighted role of language for the 
processing of abstract words. The authors, based on the indicated data, developed an 
embodied theory to characterize abstract and concrete words from the processing point 
of view. While concrete words are grounded primarily in sensorimotor information, 
abstract words are formed based on the language-based associations and emotional 
valence in their conceptual structure.  
 
In accordance with the previous part, emotional valence may play a significant role in 
the processing of the abstract words and concepts. How are the emotion words 
themselves categorized? Certainly emotion words such as anger or happiness have 
emotional valence in their conceptual structure. The question is whether having the 
emotional valence, in conjunction with other features, characterizes emotion words as 
abstract words or not. In the next part, the emotion words, their position in the 
abstract/concrete continuum, and different experimental studies will be described. 
 
2.1.6. Emotion words and concepts 
 
It seems that words such as happiness, love, passion, desire, etc., are not like prototype 
concrete categories with determined boundaries; they have fuzzy boundaries with each 
                                                          
47 They cited this from Connell and Lynnot (2012). 
48 Measuring emotional valence of the words means whether they have a positive, a negative, or no 
emotional connotation.  
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other. Namely, they are mutually related and their meanings overlap to a very 
significant extent. For instance, love could be a specific type of desire: sexual desire or 
emotional desire or a mixture of both. Sometimes it could result in happiness. It could 
be translated into passion toward another person. It is also clear, unlike concrete terms, 
that the meanings of these concepts are related to the opposite terms like unhappiness, 
since it is only in the context of the lack of the latter that we can have a good experience 
of the former. One could claim that if the emotional words, including the basic ones49 
(Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992), are defined in a precise way, with all the similarities 
and differences between that concept and the concepts that are supposed to have some 
common conceptual domain with it, it is possible to precisely illustrate its boundaries 
(Ekman, 1980). Nevertheless, this ends the definitional problem (Borghi & Binkofski, 
2014) and the imprecise conceptual boundaries of these terms; although, some scientists 
claim that it would be possible. For example, Wierzbicka (1992) claims that it is 
possible to define these concepts using a metalanguage which includes semantic 
primitives50. On the other hand, they are not as abstract as the prototypic abstract words, 
since they are derived from our experiences. However, it is not the case of objective 
experiences with the sensorimotor information, which are very important for the 
conceptualization of concrete entities, but rather, it is a different kind of experience 
called subjective experience (Matsumoto & Ekman, 2010). This kind of experience 
happens in the psychological and mental mechanism of humans. Consequently, the 
categorization of emotion words would be a problematic issue, since from the 
definitional problem it is understood that they are similar to abstract words and from 
having an embodied experience they are categorized as concrete terms. This 
controversial issue may be solved by answering the following questions: a) do the 
emotion words have fixed conceptual boundaries, and b) do the emotion words have 
sensorimotor referents (similar to concrete terms) or not (similar to abstract words)? 
 
I. Emotion words and emotion states: is there a one-to-one 
correspondence or not?  
 
In accordance with Shiota and Keltner (2005), some psychologists believe that every 
emotion word in a given natural language corresponds to a specific mental state. This 
claim is somewhat in accordance with the concreteness of emotion words; if an emotion 
word refers only to one mental state, and not to the others, there is no possibility to link 
different mental states to a single word. In fact, this claim would specify specific 
conceptual boundaries for emotion words, which is against the conceptual fuzziness of 
abstract words such as good, bad, etc., and could be considered a key argument to 
respond to the questions in the previous part. However, Shiota and Keltner argue that 
there is no one-to-one correspondence between emotion words and emotional states. 
Therefore, the conceptual boundaries between them are not concrete. According to 
them, the indicated claim in psychology could be derived from the strong version of the 
                                                          
49 Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1992:539) in Basic emotions, rationality, and folk theory function, folk theory 
and empirical study define the basic emotions as follows: “a small finite set of distinguishable emotions 
that are the bases of all emotional experiences. This is the hypothesis of basic emotions as primitive 
unanalysable elements at the psychological level of the system”.  
50 The semantic primitives for Wierzbicka are indefinable elements. These items must be intuitively 
intelligible and self-explanatory. As an example she refers to Pascal’s words about light: “As pointed out 
by Pascal (1667/1963, p. 350) three hundred years ago, if we define light (lumikre) as “a luminary 
movement of luminous bodies” we have defined nothing at all, because the concepts ‘luminary’ and 
‘luminous’ are neither clearer nor simpler than ‘light’ itself”.  
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Whorf-Sapir hypothesis51 (Sapir, 1921; Whorf, 1956). Namely, this claim would be 
based on the fact that the speakers do not experience emotional states for which they 
have no word; if they experience an emotional state it would be due to the existence of 
its correlated word. However, not only is the strong version of the Whorfianism 
approach not demonstrated scientifically, but rather there are many studies against this 
version (Bing, 1992; Hunt & Agnoli, 1991; Wardhaugh, 1970). Contrary to the strong 
version of the Whorfianism approach, sociolinguists claim that words reflects the social 
selection of the experiential prototypes, which means that some salient contexts with 
high communicative values will be chosen and new terms in language will be coined to 
highlight them (Hymes, 1972; Pinker, 1999). These selections and coinages depend 
totally on sociocultural contexts in linguistic communities. Namely, different contexts 
and experiences are experiential prototypes in different linguistic communities. In 
agreement with Shiota and Keltner (2005), this approach was also employed in emotion 
research and was preferred to the Whorf-Sapir approach (Smith & Ellthworth, 1985). 
This approach is against the viewpoint of the existence of different emotional states for 
different emotion words (concrete words). It claims that each emotion word could be the 
experiential prototype with the communicative value in a society; however, there are 
other emotional states, without different emotion words, linked to distinct conceptual 
domains of the indicated word. In this way, the emotion words have a very similar 
behavior to the abstract words. Namely, as abstract words do not have any specific and 
fixed meaning and their meaning changes in different spatiotemporal and cultural 
contexts, there is not any one-to-one correspondence between emotion words and 
emotional states.  
 
II. Embodied cognition and emotions 
 
Are emotions grounded in human embodiment? If the response is positive, can emotion 
words be categorized as concrete words? In this section, describing the basic theoretical 
aspects of embodiment theory and its relation with emotions, the viability of this 
proposal will be scrutinized. First, modal and amodal processing models will be 
explained, then modal processing of emotions and different arguments correlated to this 
topic will be discussed, and finally emotion words and concepts and their relationship 
with embodied cognition will be illustrated.  
 
Amodal processing: Associative Network Models 
 
Traditionally speaking, in cognitive psychology, Associative Network Models have 
been proposed as amodal processing models (Bower, 1981). The procedure of 
conceptualization in the ANM is as follows: in the first place, the sensorimotor 
information of a stimulus, such as mother, activates the sensorimotor modality-specific 
systems in the cognitive system (e.g., visual, auditory and maybe affective systems). 
The information indicated in the next step is abstracted and symbolized. Finally, the 
resulting symbol is stored as a node. The node ‘mother’ is stored not as a fine-grained 
                                                          
51This is known as the principle of linguistic relativity, which concerns the relationship between the 
structure of the language that a speaker uses and his/her functional architecture of cognition. The Sapir–
Whorf hypothesis, or Whorfianism, has two versions: strong version and weak version. The former 
sustains that language determines thought; as a result, linguistic categories limit cognitive categories. 
Whereas, in the weak version the word ‘limit’ is substituted by the term ‘influence’; this means that 
cognitive categories have their self-independence but can be influenced by the structure of the language 
that a speaker uses.              
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item but rather as a symbol linked to its features (loud, athletic, black hair, funny, 
emotional, etc.). These features, similar to the node ‘mother’, are initially encoded in the 
modality-specific systems and then are stored as nodes. As a result, in accordance with 
ANM, when one thinks about the concept MOTHER, what is activated in the memory 
to understand MOTHER is at least the node ‘mother’ together with other nodes, which 
compose its features. Associative links between the nodes could represent a type of 
relationship such as property (has), or inheritance (is part of), etc. In agreement with 
Winkielman, Niedenthal, Wielgosz, Eelen and Kavanagh (2015), the activation of a 
conceptual node triggers off the activation of the associated nodes via spreading 
activation. The more a node is interconnected, the more its activation by the activation 
of other nodes will be possible. In accordance with the ANM, all the nodes or the units 
of information available in the associated network compose a person’s conceptual 
system. However, accepting such models as the underlying structure of the human 
conceptual system involves two presumptions: a) mental activities are unconstrained by 
the specific structure of the body and brain (disembodied concepts), and b) a higher-
level processing system works on the abstract nodes; at the lower levels there is 
modality-specific information but in line with ANM, it must be abstracted, converted 
and stored in an amodal way to be able to become the subject of thought. In agreement 
with recent findings (Barsalou, 2008), both presumptions are questionable. According to 
Barsalou (2008) in Grounded Cognition, all the concepts are linked somehow to the 
sensorimotor information52.  
 
Modal processing model 
 
In generic terms, embodied cognition sustains that many features, structures and 
properties in the human cognition are shaped by aspects of the body beyond the brain. 
These features are high-level mental constructs such as concepts and categories together 
with the human cognitive performance on different tasks (recall, reasoning, 
understanding, judgment, etc.). The relevant embodied aspects are the motor system, the 
perceptual system, and the interactions between the human body and the environment. 
Generally speaking, thinking (offline processing) involves partial reproduction or 
simulation of the stimuli with sensorimotor features (Barsalou, 2008). As an example, in 
a recall task, even in a recall task of the abstract words such as blackness, one tries to 
reproduce or simulate the sensorimotor features of the stimulus; subjects in the 
memorizing and retrieval process of blackness utilize the concrete stimuli with 
sensorimotor features like blackboard, a black wallet, black cat, etc.  
 
Embodiment in emotional processing 
 
William James (1994) proposed one of the first theories53 of emotion based on the 
relationship between experience of the emotion and physiological functions. He argues 
(Redding, 2011): “If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our 
consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we 
have nothing left behind, no "mind-stuff" out of which the emotion can be constituted, 
and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains. … What 
                                                          
52 This is an extremist viewpoint. As it will be explained in the next chapter, there are three main 
theoretical approaches with regard to the conceptual processing models: modal processing models, 
amodal processing models and hybrid models.  
53 The theory is called James-Lange theory after two scientists who developed it independently in the 19th 
century. These scientists were James Williams and Carl Lange.  
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kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heart-beats 
nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of 
goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think. Can 
one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition of it in the chest, no flushing of the 
face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous 
action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face? The present 
writer, for one, certainly cannot. The rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation 
of its so-called manifestations”. Modern theories, however, do not consider the presence 
of actual changes in bodily states to be vital; instead, they put emphasis on brain 
representation of somatosensory and motor processes (e.g., Damasio, 1999). The 
modern embodied cognition theories, in turn, highlight the role of the human body in 
perception of the sensorimotor information. In the case of emotions, instead of emphasis 
on the physiological symptoms, they focus on the embodied representations of 
emotions.   
 
In line with Winkielman, et al (2015), when people think about joyful moments, they 
perform partial reproduction and simulation of the joyful state. This reconstruction 
maybe considered crucial to reasoning, mindreading and interpreting language (e.g., the 
difference between love and like). This reconstruction and simulation are not a 
conscious process but rather it involves partial re-instantiation of the original experience 
for the conceptual processing in the cognitive tasks. The two main lines of research54 on 
embodied emotional cognition have established that: a) somatosensory-motor aspects of 
emotional experience are related to higher order emotional processing, b) when people 
use emotional metaphors (e.g., emotional engagement understood in terms of physical 
distance, or emotional engagement in terms of temperature) they simulate real 
experiences; they simulate the heat or physical distance. In the following lines, different 
experiments related to the embodiment of emotional language in conjunction with some 
other aspects will be explained.  
 
Embodiment of emotional language 
 
Recent studies have demonstrated the link between motor aspects of facial feedback of 
emotions and the processing of emotional language. Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, 
Lucarelli and Davidson (2010) proved that involuntary facial expression plays a causal 
role in the processing of emotional language, at least in the speed of processing. They 
utilized subcutaneous injections of botulinum toxin-A (BTX) to temporarily paralyze 
the facial muscles used in frowning. They understood that the subjects were slower to 
understand and read the sentences that evoked emotional contexts related to the 
paralyzed muscles. Namely, when a sentence evoked a situation in which they needed to 
utilize the muscles related to frowning, they could not understand and read it at the 
normal pace. Therefore, the possible mental simulation of emotional language in the 
human cognitive system is based on, at least partially, the information related to the 
motor aspects of the human body in the real emotional contexts. In another study, 
Halberstadt, Winkielman, Niedenthal and Dalle (2009) focused on the link between 
                                                          
54 In line with Winkielman, et al. (2015), the core research lines in the indicated research areas are: a) 
Emotional Processing and Embodied Simulation, b) Somatic Involvement in Valence Processing, c) 
Affect as a Type of Modality, d) Embodiment of Facial Emotions, e) Emotional Language, f) 
Conditional-, Context-, and ResourceDependent Simulation of Emotion Concepts, g) Specificity and 
Appropriateness of Embodied Resources, h) Embodied Emotion Metaphors. In this section some aspects 
of Emotional Language and Embodied Emotion Metaphors will be described.  
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embodiment processing of emotional facial expressions and emotion words. In their 
study, they shed light on the influence of embodiment on the representation and 
processing of emotional information. In addition, they illustrated the role of emotional 
language in the perception of emotional facial expressions; namely, how embodied 
emotion concepts guide perception and facial action. They assessed embodied 
simulation via electromyography (EMG)55. The participants first encoded the 
ambiguous faces with emotion concepts such as angry and happy. Then, they viewed 
the faces without the concepts. Memory for the faces was also measured. In the first 
encoding step, subjects displayed more smiling-related EMG activity for the faces 
paired with happy than for those paired with angry. In the absence of concepts, subjects 
remembered the faces encoded as happy instead ofthose encoded as angry. Furthermore, 
during passive re-exposure to the ambiguous faces, subjects’ EMG displayed 
spontaneous emotion-specific mimicry; namely, the previously stored information in 
their memory affected their facial expressions. The indicated results display a very close 
relationship between facial emotional expressions processing and emotion words and 
concepts processing. In other words, the perception affects the conception and the 
conception affects the perception.  
 
Embodied Emotion Metaphors 
 
Another language-related research line in the embodiment of emotion processing is the 
relation between metaphors and emotions. In agreement with Winkielman, et al 
(2015:162), one can use nonemotional perceptual input to process emotions. Metaphor 
is understanding one concept in terms of another concept; it is understanding a more 
complicated word in terms of a less complicated one (e.g., an abstract concept without 
sensorimotor features in terms of a concrete concept with sensorimotor features). In 
different emotional metaphors, there are different distance-related terms or temperature-
related ones that can be interpreted in different ways. In different studies, the 
relationship between thinking about emotions and temperature/physical distance is 
analyzed; if there is a logical relationship between emotions and distance/warmth there 
is also a logical reason for the existence of the emotion metaphors with the indicated 
concepts.  
 
William and Bargh (2008b) in their study demonstrated that there was a relationship 
between the conception of physical distance and that of emotional distance. In four 
experiments, the subjects were primed56 with spatial closeness and spatial distance. That 
was made by plotting points on a two dimensional space. The distance prime in 
comparison with the closeness prime produced greater enjoyment of media depicting 
embarrassment in the first experiment, less emotional distress from violent media in the 
second experiment, lower estimates of the number of calories in unhealthy food in the 
third experiment and weaker reports of emotional attachments to family members and 
hometowns in the last experiment. The results of these studies demonstrated a very 
crucial effect of distance-related concepts on judgements and affects.  
                                                          
55 It is an electrodiagnostic medicine technique, which is employed to evaluate and record the electrical 
activity of the skeletal muscles. It has a instrument called electromyograph that produces a recored called 
electromyogram (Karmen, 2004).  
56 Priming in psychology is a technique, which influences the response to the target stimulus. In a task 
that involves priming step, first the subjects are presented the primes and then they perform their task 
with the target stimuli. As a result of priming, the subjects are faster in their responses to the target stimuli 
(if the primes are relevant to the target stimuli). It is derived from the experiments of Meyer and 




In another study, William and Barghi (2008a) illustrated the relationship between 
thinking about emotions and warmth. According to them (2008a: 606), insula area is 
involved in the processing of both physical temperature and interpersonal warmth (trust) 
information. They performed two studies. In the first study they studied the possible 
relationship between the physical warmth (or coldness) and the subjects’ judgement 
about the personality of a target person. Interestingly, the subjects who briefly held a 
cup of coffee, in comparison with the subjects who briefly held a cup of iced coffee, 
judged a target person as having a warmer, more generous/caring personality. In the 
second study subjects held a hot (versus cold) therapeutic pad. The subjects with a hot 
therapeutic pad were more likely to choose a gift for a friend than for themselves. In 
another study, Zhong and Leonardelli (2008) analyzed the underlying embodied reasons 
for metaphors such as icy stare that refer to social exclusion. They performed two 
experiments, which demonstrated the existence of a relationship between physical 
temperature and social exclusion. In the first experiment, the subjects had to give 
judgments regarding the room temperature. The participants who recalled a social 
exclusion estimated the room temperature lower than the ones who recalled an inclusive 
experience. In the second experiment, the subjects participated in an online virtual 
interaction. The subjects who were excluded had a greater desire for warm food and 
drink than the subjects who were included. These results are in line with the embodied 
theories of emotion. The physical coldness (or warmth) not only helps understanding of 
social interaction but also is an integral part of social exclusion (inclusion). This means 
that social interactions contain sensorimotor information that helps the human cognitive 
system to simulate and conceptualize them. In a related study, Ijzerman, Gallucci, 
Pouw, Weissgerber, Van Doesum and Williams (2012) demonstrated a relationship 
between body temperature and social relations. Their hypothesis was that social 
relations caused literal changes in body temperature. In the first experiment, the 
excluded subjects in an online game consequently had lower finger temperature. In the 
second experiment, they understood that the negative effect remaining in the indicated 
subjects was alleviated when they held a cup of warm tea for a while. All these results 
display a direct relationship between social interaction (exclusion or inclusion) and 
physical temperature. Hence, the linguistic metaphors which describe social inclusion or 
social exclusion in terms of warmth or coldness could be based on the relationship 
between body temperature and social inclusion/exclusion.  
 
In line with Winkielman et al (2015:163), there is another line of research regarding the 
relationship between metaphors and embodied cognition. In accordance with conceptual 
metaphor theory (Lakoff, 1993), the metaphors are conceptual mapping between two 
conceptual domains. The human cognitive system uses this mapping to understand a 
conceptual domain in terms of another57. However, for every emotional state there is 
more than one metaphor with a very similar meaning (if not identical). The question is 
why is a specific metaphor used in a specific context (and not others)? How does that 
metaphor help the cognizer to understand the emotional material? And how do the 
metaphors contribute to the human cognitive system to use a specific word to describe 
an emotional state? Tseng, Hu, Han, and Bergen (2007) in their study analyzed the 
contribution that metaphorical language could make so that human cognitive system 
selects one abstract word in a set with extremely similar meanings. More specifically, 
they tried to illustrate whether the lexical selection is influenced by the difference in the 
patterns of metaphor structures in which the selected words appear. They addressed this 
                                                          
57 This approach will be explained briefly in part 3.5.3.  
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hypothesis in the emotion words such as joy and happiness; namely, they studied the 
influence that the different metaphor patterns, in which joy and happiness appeared, 
could have on the lexical selection to describe an emotional state. Two examples of 
metaphors in English for these two emotional words are: searching for happiness and 
full of joy. In their experiment, they did not directly use the metaphors as primes but 
rather they used examples of source domain58. In other words, one group of subjects had 
to search for books in a library (they used this instead of using the verbal metaphor 
searching for happiness) and another group of subjects had to drink something from a 
container (they used this instead of using the full of joy verbal metaphor). Subsequently, 
they were shown a picture of a delighted person; they had to describe the emotional 
state in the picture with joy or happiness. In line with their expectations, the subjects 
who were searching for books selected happiness based on the searching for happiness 
metaphor and the subjects who were drinking something in a container selected joy 
based on the full of joy metaphor.  
 
Another line of research in the embodied emotional metaphors concerns the embodied 
moral metaphors. There are some studies in literature, which demonstrate that 
apparently the physical act of washing hands removes the negative feelings of a moral 
transgression ( Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006; Lee and Schwarz, 2010; Schnall, Benton, 
& Harvey, 2008; Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010). Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) 
studied the embodied basis for the existence of some metaphors which connect physical 
purity with moral purity. In three experiments, they studied whether what violates 
somebody’s moral purity leads to a need to do physical cleaning or not (Macbeth effect). 
This effect revealed an increase in the subjects’ mental tendency for cleaning (related 
concepts, cleaning products, taking antiseptic wipes). They demonstrated that there is a 
relationship between physical purity and moral purity. Namely, physical cleaning can 
reduce the negative feeling about an unethical behavior and improve somebody’s image 
of himself/herself. In other words, physical cleaning can be considered an antidote to 
negative feelings, which appear as a result of committing a moral sin. In the same line 
of research, Lee and Schwartz (2010) performed a study to analyze whether the moral-
purity metaphor is grounded in concrete experiences of physical cleanliness; namely, 
whether the abstract thought of morality is grounded in concrete experience of physical 
cleanliness (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In all natural languages there exists an 
association between the moral purity metaphor and specific body parts (e.g., dirty 
hands, dirty mouth); as a result, a person who performs a moral transgression prefers 
cleaning the specific body part involved in the moral transgression, as opposed to other 
body parts. This suggests that the motor modality involved in a moral transgression may 
always be present as the embodied basis of the moral purity concept and as the source 
domain in the moral purity metaphor. The subjects in the mentioned study were asked to 
perform the same immoral/moral act (conveying a malevolent lie/conveying a 
benevolent message) by mouth (voice mail) or hands (writing an email); thus, there are 
two dependent variables (washing hands or mouth). Their hypothesis was composed of 
two parts. First, similar to the indicated experiments, if the concept of moral purity was 
grounded in physical cleaning, the subjects who performed the immoral act had to have 
an inclination for cleaning products, more so than the other group. Second, if the 
embodied basis of the moral purity concept is independent of motor modality, both 
cleaning activities (cleaning hands/mouth) could be attractive for the subjects who 
performed the immoral act. But, if the embodied basis of the moral purity metaphor was 
sensitive to the motor modality involved, then the subjects who lied in a voice message 
                                                          
58 See section 3.5.3.  
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could be interested in mouth washing and the subjects who lied in a written email could 
be interested in hand washing. The results confirmed their hypothesis. The subjects who 
performed a malevolent moral act tended to use washing products more than the 
subjects who performed a benevolent moral act. The second part of the hypothesis was 
confirmed as well; namely, in agreement with the results, the embodied basis of the 
moral purity metaphor was sensitive to the motor modality involved in the moral 
transgression. In other words, the subjects who told a lie by voice mail preferred to 
wash their mouths and the subjects who told a lie in a written email tended to wash their 
hands.  
 
Synesthesia and Pseudo-synesthesia    
 
Two concepts that are closely related to the indicated experiments in the modal 
processing model are synesthesia and pseudo-synesthesia. Synesthesia is a condition in 
which a person activates one modality when a second modality is stimulated. For 
instance, one might experience a specific color whenever he/she encounters a particular 
tone (e.g., C-sharp may be blue), or may always see a given number in association with 
a certain color (e.g., ‘5’ may be green) (Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001). This kind of 
connection between different modalities is seen frequently in natural languages (e.g., a 
warm voice or a cold light) (Marotta, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, pseudo-synesthesia (Ullmann, 1957) is a term which refers to a 
specific type of synesthesia, which is different from the classic one. The difference is 
that there is an association between a sensorial modality and a psycho-emotive part in 
the human mind (Marotta, 2012). Considering the fact that the emotional concepts are in 
the middle of the concrete-abstract continuum, it could be said that there is an 
association between a primary sensorial modality and a more abstract one, which is 
totally different from the direct association that exists between two primary sensorial 
modalities in classic synesthesia. For instance, a linguistic expression such as cold 
person (Marotta, 2012) expresses the lack of ‘heat’, which illustrates that this person 
lacks salient emotive reactions in his/her body and behavior. Therefore, here there is an 
association between a primary sensorial modality (tact) and the psycho-emotive sphere. 
Hence, this could be evidence for the fact that emotions are based, to a certain point, on 
the perceptual information. The similarities that exist between prototypical concrete 
concepts and emotional concepts might be due to this fact.  
 
In agreement with what Marotta claims (2012), this association could be another 
dimension, the strongest one, of human perception. This claim is based on the fact that 
the majority of humans have the ability of intentional seeing, hearing, touching, tasting 
and smelling without using their preceptors (Lindauer, 1969); however, they cannot 
have emotional states without having the related perceptual information. To 
differentiate this sixth dimension of human perception, Marotta proposes some semantic 
binary distinctive features which distinguish them from the primary human senses. 
These are [Abstract vs Concrete], [Proximal vs Distal], [Kinesthetic vs Static], and 
[Exocentric vs Endocentric].   
 
III. Which category do emotion words belong to: concrete or 




In this part, the argument about the position of emotion words in the abstract-concrete 
continuum will be re-discussed. Do emotion words such as love, anger and rage belong 
to concrete words or to abstract words? In line with what was indicated, emotion words 
can be experienced through our senses in an indirect way; they may have an embodied 
basis (this notion is clearer considering the discussed experiments in the embodied 
emotion metaphors part). In agreement with the discussion in the beginning of part 
2.1.6, there are two problematic issues with the emotion words and concepts; these 
issues complicate the decision about either the concrete or the abstract essence of 
emotion words.  First, emotion words encounter the definitional problem, which is a 
feature in common with abstract words. Second, they are grounded in the sensorimotor 
information. The first issue tends to associate emotion words as abstract words, while 
the second issue approximates them to concrete words. However, psycholinguistic 
literature has a greater tendency to correlate emotion words with abstract words. This 
may be due to the indirect link between emotion words and sensorimotor information, 
which according to some embodied cognition theories exists also in the case of abstract 
words (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In accordance with Borghi and Binkofsky (2014), the 
inclusion of emotion words among abstract words in psycholinguistic literature is not 
straightforward owing to the theoretical and experimental reasons.  
 
For the empirical part, they refer to a study performed by Altarriba, Bauer and 
Benvenuto (1999). In their study, 78 subjects had to rate abstract, concrete and emotion 
words59 on concreteness, context availability, and imageability. Word-associations were 
also measured for abstract, concrete, and emotion words60. The results illustrated that 
the common hypothesis in psycholinguistic literature is erroneous due to the differences  
between the ratings of concreteness and context availability of emotion words and 
abstract words; they understood that on scales of concreteness and context availability 
effects, emotion words were rated lower in comparison with the abstract words, while 
on the scale of imageability, the emotion words were rated higher compared to abstract 
words. Altarriba et al. (1999) discovered for the first time the existence of positive 
correlations between context availability and concreteness. In addition, the correlation 
between the indicated items and imageability were not noticeable for the concrete and 
abstract words, while they were very salient in the case of emotion words. The 
difference between abstract words and emotion words also appeared in the experiment 
for word association. The results illustrated that the highest rating for the word 
association experiment was related to emotion words, followed by abstract words and 
concrete words. According to CAT, a higher word association network of a word leads 
to its more complicated retrieval; this is due to the less contextual strength of a concept 
when its conceptual associations include a high variety of contexts. Hence, emotion 
words have a more complicated retrieval, followed by abstract words, and then concrete 
words. The indicated results on the concreteness, context availability and imageability, 
in conjunction with the results on the word association for emotion, abstract and 
                                                          
59 Some  examples of abstract words are ability, advice, aid, allow, answer, area, art; examples of 
concrete words are acre, airplane, animal, apartment, apple, arm, asphalt, baby; and examples of 
emotion words are affection, affectionate, afraid, aggravated, aggressive, alert,  angry, annoyed, anxiety, 
anxious.   
60 The gathered data could be utilized to understand the feature differences, association strengths, and 
number of associations between the indicated word types; namely, they could be used in studies on 
concreteness effects, word type effects, and word recognition for abstract, concrete, and emotion words 





concrete words show that, on the contrary of what is claimed in psycholinguistic 
literature, emotion words are not identified as abstract words.  
 
Aside from the empirical part, Borghi and Binkofsky (2014) refer to some theoretical 
differences between these two classes of concepts, which could further separate emotion 
words from abstract words. In line with the discussion in the beginning of this part, 
emotion words are grounded in bodily experiences; although, the type of these 
experiences (subjective experiences) is different from the experiences in which the 
concrete concepts are grounded (objective experiences). The other important feature of 
emotion words is that the characteristics of these bodily experiences, in which they are 
grounded, remain constant across different events and situations, and form what is 
called emotional states. In agreement with Borghi and Binkofsky, these two important 
characteristics situate emotion words exactly in the opposite direction of abstract words. 
Namely, the most important features of abstract words are: a) the difficulty in grounding 
b) the inter-subjective and intra-subjective variability of meaning. The two indicated 
features do not exist in all emotion words at the same level. More complex and less 
embodied emotion words such as envy, compared to basic emotion words like anger, 
may be closer to prototypic abstract words such as truth. Therefore, if there are 
significant theoretical (and empirical) differences between abstract words and emotion 
words, what is the reason why emotion words are considered as abstract words in 
literature? 
 
One of the most influential studies for the inclusion of emotion words in abstract words 
is the one that was discussed in Content differences between abstract and concrete 
concepts, in part 2.1.5. Della Rosa, Catricalà, Vigliocco and Cappa (2010) found that 
emotional valence plays a more crucial role in the internal conceptual structure of 
abstract words. Their study demonstrated that in a controlled situation for imageability, 
emotional valence is an important predictor for the concreteness effect. Namely, they 
showed the opposite effect: the higher emotional valence rating a word received, the 
less concrete the word was rated. Another interesting finding regarded the positive or 
negative emotional valence. The more positive the emotional valence of a word was, the 
more abstract the word was rated. In their study, they controlled imageability and 
context availability, and as a result, the concreteness effect disappeared and was 
substituted by the abstractness effect; this last effect was generated owing to the 
emotional valence/content of the words. They concluded that emotional content is a 
very important item for the representation of the abstract words. 
 
However, there is a crucial point: how are emotion words categorized with respect to 
abstract words without emotional valence. The prototypic abstract words are grounded 
neither in objective experiences nor in subjective ones. Hence, they are without 
emotional valence. Abstract words such as two, thought, socialism, etc., are not 
grounded in objective or subjective experiences; how are emotion words different from 
this type of abstract words? In line with the argument of categorization, in which fuzzy 
categories are opposed to classical categories, abstract and concrete words are not two 
opposite concrete categories; concrete/abstract words is not a dichotomous 
classification, but rather the abstract/concrete words are better understood if the idea of 
a continuum between abstract and concrete words is adopted. In agreement with Borghi 
and Binkofsky (2014), if the idea of continuum is adopted, then emotional concepts 
could be considered as a sub-domain, the members of which are more abstract than 





In this chapter the basic theoretical aspects of what will be discussed in the next two 
chapters was described. First, the question of one theoretical account or several 
theoretical accounts to differentiate between abstract and concrete words was asked. In 
line with Rosen (2014), the better account is the one that recognizes the vague nature of 
the discussion; hence, one does not have to choose a previously-made account to 
distinguish abstract from concrete words, but rather this vague nature requires different 
accounts so that each of them can reach the vicinity of the definition of abstract and 
concrete words and the principal differential features between them. In part 2.1.2, 
abstract objects and the possibility of their existence was explained. Namely, similar to 
concrete words that have referents in the world (material world), the possibility of the 
existence of referents in the world (metaphysic world) for the abstract words was 
described. In 2.1.3, a historical background for the distinction between abstract and 
concrete words was described. In line with the same argument, Lewis’s criteria (1986) 
to distinguish between abstract and concrete items were explained. In 2.1.4 by means of 
differences between the classical approach to categorization and the prototype 
categories approach, a response to the following question was attempted: do concrete 
and abstract concepts form a dichotomous classification or are they two extreme points 
in the continuum of concepts61? After a brief theoretical part about the classical 
approach to categorization and the prototype approach, the example of diminutives in 
Italian attempted to illustrate how far and unrelated62 the semantic domains related to a 
word can be. In 2.1.5, a claim correlated to some embodied accounts was discussed. The 
main argument was that abstract concepts, similar to concrete concepts, were grounded 
in embodied experiences and the representational differences between abstract and 
concrete concepts derive from their differences in the conceptual contents. In line with 
this claim, two embodied cognition approaches were described. First, in accordance 
with Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005), concrete concepts evoke more perceptual 
features and properties while the abstract concepts evoke more situational and 
introspective features and properties. Second, Vigliocco, Kousta and Della Rosa (2014) 
claim that the abstract concepts activate more emotion related zones in the neural 
architecture of the human brain compared to the concrete concepts. In the last part, 
2.1.6, emotion words in conjunction with different correlated theoretical and 
experimental studies was explained. 
 
In summary, in this chapter, very important aspects about concrete, abstract and 
emotionwords were revealed. Perhaps the most important thing was that there is no 
concrete and clear boundary between abstract and concrete categories; they do not form 
a dichotomous classification. In accordance with the prototype categories approach, 
there is always a central member that shapes other ones. In other words, other members 
can share one or more feature with the central member. This is the main reason for not 
having a concrete/abstract dichotomous classification, since if any single category is 
formed in accordance with its central member, there will be a lot of liberty to move 
between the semantic domains. Hence, in agreement with diminutives in Italian that is 
                                                          
61 Obviously, in accordance with what we studied, abstract and concrete words do not appear only at the 
extreme points. Here I refer to prototypic concrete and abstract words. 
62 They are unrelated from the viewpoint of remaining in a fixed and clear category. Namely, as indicated, 
diminutives in Italian were related to both concrete and abstract semantic domains, which contrasts with 
the concrete/abstract dichotomy.  
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formed on the basis of ‘smallness in the spatial domain’, there are many categories that 
do not have clear semantic boundaries. This makes it clear that concrete and abstract 















































3. Different theoretical approaches corresponding 
with the processing of abstract and concrete 
concepts and words in the human cognitive 
system 
 
3.1. Introduction: modal versus amodal theories63 
 
From the traditional viewpoint of cognitive sciences, perception and cognition are 
represented by distinct underlying systems, which means that the concepts are pinned to 
a modular amodal abstract representational system that is dissimilar to the 
representational system related to perceptions. In contemporary literature, there are 
three types of approaches corresponding to the conceptual representation system. The 
first hypothesis argues that all the concepts in the human cognitive system are linked to 
perceptual and motor representations: modal view (see Barsalou, 2008; Barsalou 2010). 
In accordance with this view, cognition is not computation on abstract symbols with no 
intervention of modality specific systems. The second hypothesis, which is in line with 
the traditional point of view, sustains that the concepts are couched solely into amodal 
representations (see Pylyshyn, 197364). Finally, the last theoretical stream does not 
account for either grounded observations of modal view or for the abstract ungrounded 
views of amodal approach. This final view is situated in a point between the modal and 
amodal positions and argues that concepts are couched in both modal and amodal 
representational systems (see Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Dove, 2011). This hypothesis 
accounts for a partial modal and partial amodal model in which the amodal part enables 
us to acquire the semantic contents that are beyond our perceptual experience.  
 
In this chapter, four theories corresponding to the conceptual representation will be 
described. First, context availability theory65 and its theoretical principles with some 
associated experiments will be explained (see Schwanenflugel, 1991; Schwanenflugel, 
2013). Then Paivio’s approach (Dual coding theory66) together with some correlated 
experiments are described (see Paivio, 1986; Paivio, 1991). These two theories help us 
to better approach the following questions: why does the human cognitive system 
experience more complexities for the understanding of the abstract concepts in 
comparison with the concrete ones? Is this due to the availability (and conceptual 
connectivity) of contexts in which people perceive the concrete items, or is it due to the 
concreteness effect? In the subsequent part, WAT model (Borghi & Binkofsky, 2014) 
together with the correlated experiments will be described. In this model, a highlighted 
role of language in the representation of the abstract words is the representational 
                                                          
63 In the previous chapter, the general differences between modal and amodal theories were illustrated. In 
this part, the representational difference between them is discussed.  
64In his paper he criticizes the notion of “mental image” as a main underlying structure of “what we 
know” that, according to him, requires abstract mental structures to which we do not have conscious 
access and which are essentially conceptual and prepositional, rather than sensory or pictorial, in nature 





difference between concrete and abstract categories. It is the role of language in the 
representation of abstract words and concepts, in comparison with concrete words and 
concepts, that causes differences in their acquisition modality, mental representation and 
patterns of neural activation.  In the last part, Dove’s model (Dove, 2009; Dove, 2011; 
Dove, 2014) will be discussed. His model has a hybrid representational mechanism. 
This model benefits from both modal and amodal representations in the 
conceptualization process. Dove claims that in the representation of abstract concepts, 
the human cognitive system, by linking linguistic associations, creates inferential 
relationships and makes abstractions to extend their conceptual possibilities.  
 
3.2. Context availability theory 
 
Context availability theory (CAT) is a theory in the camp of language and cognition 
which tries to explain comprehension, elaboration, cognitive processing of abstract and 
concrete concepts and the differences that exist between them from the viewpoint of 
conceptual representation. In particular, this approach aims to answer questions such as: 
why are abstract concepts harder to memorize, retrieve and produce in comparison with 
concrete concepts? Shall we consider this difference as a result of the concreteness 
effect, as many theories like dual coding theory claim, or is there another underlying 
reason, like the richness and availability of contexts in which a concept is learned and 
used? In this section, in the first part, I briefly describe CAT and its fundamental aspects 
and then in the second part, different experimental works in relation with CAT will be 
described.  
 
3.2.1. Context availability theory, its bases and 
principles 
 
According to CAT, we take advantage of both our subjective internal contextual 
knowledge and the external contextual information, which help us to enrich our internal 
knowledge. These two sources of contextual information enable us to elaborate, process, 
and retrieve different types of concepts with unequal pace; in our case, we understand 
and retrieve concrete words and concepts more easily owing to their contextual 
advantages. However, this cognitive simplicity does not correlate with concreteness and 
imageability67; in other words this theory does not argue that the concrete concepts are 
easier to retrieve because the sensorimotor information comes to our mind easier and 
faster, but rather it tries to explain that the concrete concepts are easier to retrieve 
because of our richer internal and external linguistic and conceptual information related 
to them. We can illustrate this difference with an example. When we think of a 
prototypical concrete word such as apple and we want to distinguish it from a non-
word, we are aided internally and subjectively by the generation of a linguistic context 
                                                          
67 Concreteness effect and imagery effect are two different phenomenons. Concreteness effect refers to 
the fact that concrete nouns in comparison with abstract ones have faster and more accurate cognitive 
processing. The two most cited theoretical models, which describe the cognitive mechanism related to 
concreteness effect, are dual coding theory and context availability theory. On the other hand, the words 
and concepts that have a high rating of imageability (easily imageable words) are processed and 
memorized more efficiently than the words that are difficult to imagine (see Paivio 1972; Paivio, 1991). 
However, concreteness effect and imageability are not two isolated phenomenons. Indeed, with higher 
imageable words that are faster in recall tasks, there will be a higher concreteness effect rating (Borghi & 
Binkofsky, 2014).  
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(linguistic and internal context). Equally, we could show a written sentence or a visual 
scene to a speaker (external context) so that he/she can retrieve it faster and easier. 
Thus, in accordance with CAT, as the contextual information increases, our 
comprehension, elaboration and retrieval of a concept increase accordingly. 
 
The context availability theory can be considered as an antithesis of dual coding theory, 
which claims that concreteness and imageability are vital for our cognitive system. In 
fact, according to DCT, concreteness and imageability enable our cognitive system to 
process, elaborate and retrieve the concepts faster and more accurately. In line with 
DCT, the concreteness and imageability are more likely included in the more 
prototypical concrete concepts in comparison with the prototypical abstract concepts. 
The explanation that context availability theory provides for the concreteness effect and 
against a large amount of studies that consider the concreteness effect as the main 
reason for the processing difference between concrete and abstract words (Hamilton & 
Rajaram, 2001; Zhang, et al., 2006) is that in a situation in which the context 
availability rating is controlled for both concrete and abstract concepts, the concreteness 
effect disappears (Schwanenflugel and Shoben 1983). Similar to other experiments, it 
has been demonstrated that in a controlled contextual availability rating situation for 
both concrete and abstract concepts, subjects react identically in lexical decision and 
memory tasks (Akin 1989; Akin and Schwanenflugel 1990; Schwanenflugel, 
Harnishfeger, and Stowe 1988). Another experiment (Holmes & Langford, 1976) shows 
the important role that contextual availability plays in the comprehension of concepts. 
In this experiment, the comprehension rate of concrete concepts in isolation is not 
higher than the comprehension rate of abstract concepts in isolation. The reason, in 
agreement with the context availability theory, is that concepts in isolation lack most of 
their contextual information and, without the contextual availability rating difference, 
subjects are not able to comprehend the concrete concepts faster. 
 
In spite of this powerful part of context availability theory, it suffers from a very 
considerable weakness based on two problems. First, the mechanism of context 
generation is not clear and CAT does not offer a structural approach that explains 
theoretically this gap.  Second, it is not clear whether the weaker (or stronger) 
connection to associated contextual information  appears due to the different ways by 
which concepts are employed in a given natural language (linguistic contexts), or if 
there is a qualitative difference between concrete and abstract concepts (that is the 
existence of sensorimotor features for the concrete concepts). Schwanenflugel (1991: 
243) proposes two solutions for this ambiguity. His first proposal is that the stronger 
connection to associated contextual information for concrete words is due to their higher 
frequency (they appear more frequently) in the natural languages. The second proposal 
is that the abstract concepts and words appear in contexts with a higher variety. In other 
words, the concrete words have higher contextual constraints. In the following section, I 
try to analyze all the theoretical aspects of context availability theory by illustrating the 
results of various experimental works related to this model.   
 
3.2.2. Experimental works related to context 
availability theory 
 
In this part, two experiments with regard to CAT will be described. The first experiment 
is the study of Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1983), in which they want to demonstrate 
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that contextual information plays a crucial role in the comprehension of concepts. They 
analyze the comprehension rates of concrete and abstract words in context and in 
isolation. The second experiment is that of Schwanenflugel, Akin and Luh (1992). They 
studied the viability of CAT in comparison with two models of dual coding theory; 
namely, they compared CAT with the strong version of DCT, automatic imagery 
hypothesis, and the weak version of DCT, strategic imagery hypothesis. 
 
I. Could the availability of contexts be the reason for which the 
processing of concrete concepts is performed faster than that 
of abstract concepts? 
 
As I mentioned in the previous part, Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1983) in an 
experiment demonstrated that contextual information plays a very important role in the 
comprehension of concepts. Namely, it enables human beings to have an easier and 
faster comprehension. In their experiment,68 they tried to compare the comprehension 
rate of abstract and concrete concepts in linguistic contexts with the comprehension rate 
of abstract and concrete concepts in isolation. Hence, we have very strong evidence in 
favor of context availability theory if their results show the equal comprehension rate of 
concrete and abstract words in isolation. On the opposite side, we have very strong 
evidence against contextual availability theory and in favor of DCT if their results 




In this study, Schwanenflugel and Shoben used the same sentences69 that Holmes and 
Langford (1976)70 employed. Each context trial in their experiment had three parts. In 
the first part, the subjects read the first three sentences of a paragraph (context)71. In the 
next step, subjects pressed a button to erase the contextual information and to see the 
target sentence (abstract or concrete) of the paragraph. After reading the target sentence, 
                                                          
68 They did three tests to obtain their objectives but in this paper, I briefly describe the first two, which are 
more relevant to the discussion. 
69 Mutual distrust dominated the sessions.  
Armed soldiers surrounded the barracks.  
The point of the argument was forgotten in time.  
The crest of the mountain was blanketed in snow.  
Many factors affected the crucial choice.  
Many sailors deserted the sinking vessel.  
Large companies are regulated by strict rules.  
Adult elephants are protected by strong skins.  
70 Holmes and Langford performed an experiment on abstract and concrete sentences (the term ‘concrete 
sentences’ refers to the sentences that have plausible and predictable meanings, as opposed to ‘abstract 
sentences’, which refers to the sentences that have implausible and unpredictable meanings. Holmes and 
Langford, as examples for these terms, compared a ‘concrete sentence’ that was “John smoked cigars 
throughout the dreary play” with an ‘abstract sentence’ that was “Mary chewed spears throughout the 
corrupt talk”). In their experiment, the subjects’ performances were evaluated based on two tasks: a 
sentence meaning classification task and a free recall task. They found that in the sentence meaning 
classification task the concrete sentences were classified significantly faster than the abstract sentences. In 
the second experiment, the complete omission of the abstract sentences was much more frequent than the 
omission of the concrete ones, and even if the subject had success in recalling an abstract sentence, he/she 
omitted some words of the sentence, which again was much more frequent than the omission of words in 
the concrete sentences. 
71 In the non context trials, the subjects saw the first two sentences without any paragraphs. 
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the subjects again pressed a button and erased the target sentence. Then, they saw a final 
verification statement and decided whether the statement was true with respect to what 
they read in the first two steps72 (step a) three sentences in the context, and step b) the 
target sentence). The non-context trials had a similar design with the exception of the 
first step. Namely, in the non-context trials, subjects in the first step only read two 
sentences without having any contextual guide, then they pressed a button to erase the 
sentences so that they could read the target sentence, then they pressed the button again 
to see the final verification statement which was designed exclusively on the basis of 
the target sentence. 
 
The results illustrated that the comprehension time for abstract sentences in isolation 
(reading time and deciding about the final verification statement) was significantly 
higher than for the concrete sentences, but this difference disappeared when both 
concrete and abstract sentences were situated in the appropriate contexts and an equal 
amount of contextual information correlating to the sentences was given to the subjects. 
This could be strong evidence in favor of CAT and against the simple reading of DCT. 
CAT explains the concreteness effect observed in the non-context trials in terms of 
availability of contextual information. According to this theory, our cognitive system 
processes concepts by finding them both internal (linguistic) and external contexts. This 
process is more difficult for abstract concepts in comparison with concrete ones. 
Therefore, in line with CAT, the main reason for which the subjects’ comprehension 
time of abstract concepts in the non-context trials is higher than comprehension time of 
concrete concepts is due to the indicated difficulty (finding contextual information for 
the abstract concepts). The proof of this claim appears in the context trials part of the 
experiment where, providing the equal contextual information for both concrete and 
abstract sentences to the subjects, the concreteness effect disappears and there is no 
significant difference of comprehension time for concrete and abstract sentences. 
 
However, it is not possible to interpret the results of this experiment as easily as 
evidence against DCT. Dual coding theory predicts that the concepts are more difficult 
to process and understand only when the imaginal information is not accessible, which, 
in turn, prevents our representational system to make imaginal representations. 
However, the proponents of DCT can claim that in the context trials part of this 
experiment, the provided contexts for the abstract sentences aided the subjects to collect 
imaginal information so that they could make imaginal representations. In other words, 
they had sufficient information to access both logogen and imagen73 units in the verbal 
                                                          
72 An example of this procedure is:  
Context: A company was quickly beginning to go bankrupt. The managers realized that something had to 
be done soon. After several weeks, they developed a new way to attract customers.  
Abstract sentence: The policy's ultimate goal was to double the profits. 
Verification statement: The company was failing. 
Context: Amos's garden crops were being eaten by the animals. He developed several ways of keeping 
them out. The fence was intended to keep out the horses. 
Concrete sentence: The farmer's concealed trap was to catch the rabbits. » 
Verification statement: Animals were destroying the crops. 
73 These units are modality-specific perceptual-motor analogues (Paivio, 1991). The original terms for 
them were verbal representations and imaginal representations (Paivio, 1972), however in his later book 
(Paivio, 1978), due to a more detailed structural and functional description of verbal and non-verbal 
subsystems, he changed these terms to logogens and imagens. The term logogen in turn is borrowed from 
Morton (1969), who used this term to refer to a different mechanism. According to his model, logogens 
are “devices which accept information relevant to a particular word response irrespective of the source of 
this information... Each logogen is in effect defined by the information which it can accept and by the 
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and non-verbal subsystems of our representational system for both concrete and abstract 
sentences in the context trials. Hence, these results could not be considered evidence 
against DCT when we interpret them in these terms. In the next experiment, 




In line with the discussion in the previous part, the results of experiment 1 cannot be 
interpreted against DCT because having concrete contexts, or some concrete elements in 
the contexts, subjects could benefit from imaginal representations for abstract sentences. 
In agreement with what was explained, the focus of this model is on the availability of 
contexts in a controlled situation for imageability. In other words, if the imageability is 
controlled and the same results are obtained, it can be claimed that these results may be 
considered as strong evidence against DCT. 
 
In this experiment, Schwanenflugel and Shoben used a lexical decision task74 where 
abstract and concrete lexical items were either preceded by a sentence frame75 or 
presented in isolation. In this experiment, the concrete sentence frame was used for 
concrete sentences and the abstract sentence frame was used for abstract sentences. 
Hence, if the results are repeated then the new model of DCT is rejected. In other 
words, with the replicated results in the new experiment, it could be concluded that 
context has a role beyond providing imaginal information in our comprehension 
mechanism. 
 
The design of experiment 2 was similar to experiment 1 with some exceptions. In this 
experiment, the subjects had a sentence frame instead of contexts for both abstract and 
concrete concepts. This sentence frame was followed by the last word of the sentence. 
Another difference was that there was no verification statement; instead, the subjects 
were asked to report the sentence frame to ensure that they were reading the context. 
The procedure was composed of these steps: first, they pressed the start button and read 
the sentence frame or a string of “X” s appeared in the upper left hand corner of the 
screen. After that, they pressed a button and saw a fixation point in the middle of the 
screen (an “X”). Then, the lexical decision item appeared, where subjects had to make a 
decision with regard to the word or non-word status of the shown lexical item. After 
that, the fixation point reappeared, and this time subjects were given error feedback. In 
the middle of the experiment, subjects were occasionally asked to report the sentence 
frame to ensure that they read it. 
 
The results were again far from the predictions of DCT. In the non-context lexical 
decision test, the subjects’ decision took a longer time for the abstract items, which was 
                                                                                                                                                                          
response it makes available. Relevant information can be described as the members of the sets of 
attributes [Si], [Vi], and [Ai], these being semantic, visual, and acoustic sets, respectively”, (Morton, 
1969: 165).  
74 The lexical decision task (LDT) is a kind of test employed in psychology and psycholinguistics 
experiments. The most basic example is measuring how fast subjects classify stimuli as words or non-
words. The term was coined by David E. Meyer and Roger W. Schvaneveldt (1971).  
75 An example of the lexical items and the the sentence frames that they used is:  
Concrete sentence frame: The nurse had divorced her original 
Concrete target word: husband. 
Abstract sentence frame: The tradition had lost its original 
Abstract target word: meaning. 
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predicted. In the context lexical decision test, contrary to DCT predictions, subjects’ 
lexical decision time both for the abstract target words and concrete target words was 
equal. These results in terms of CAT are linked with the availability of contexts for the 
abstract target words. Namely, according to CAT, the difficulty of our cognitive system 
to process, retrieve and elaborate abstract concepts is due to the lack of sufficient 
contexts for them. However, when the sufficient contextual information is provided, 
such as in this experiment, they could be processed, elaborated and retrieved as easily 
and quickly as concrete concepts. In terms of DCT, the only way of interpreting these 
results is thinking of imageability as a result of providing contexts for abstract words. In 
other words, in spite of having abstract contexts, maybe the imageability appears and 
activates the imaginal representation of the target word. This claim may be derived from 
the fact that all abstract concepts according to some theories (see Evans and Green 
2006; Langacker 2008) are rooted in concrete concepts. Schwanenflugel and Shoben 
selected another 12 subjects to test the possibility of this model with the obtained 
results. The subjects had to rate the concreteness of the target words in isolation and 
after reading its associated context. Again, the results went against the predictions of 
DCT76. The other possibility of DCT is claiming that a lexical decision task is a very 
simple task that hardly activates the imaginal representation for concrete words. Thus, 
both concrete and abstract words in the lexical decision task are processed without 
imaginal representation; however, this model is contrary to DCT internal principles. 
Therefore, DCT should offer an explanation to the question: if concrete words are 
comprehended faster due to their imaginal representations, why does this not happen 
when the subjects read both abstract and concrete target words in the appropriate 
contexts? 
 
II. Context availability theory versus strong and weak versions of 
dual coding theory (automatic imagery hypothesis and 
strategic imagery hypothesis) 
 
Schwanenflugel, Akin and Luh (1992) performed a study related to context availability 
model and its viability compared to dual coding theory. They compared CAT with two 
versions of DCT; namely, the strong version, automatic imagery hypothesis, and the 
weak version, strategic imagery hypothesis. The former predicts that our 
comprehension mechanism uses the imaginal information of concrete words and 
concepts to benefit from imaginal representation in all verbal tasks even in isolation. 
The latter claims that our cognitive system does not automatically activate the imaginal 
representation for concrete concepts in all situations, but rather it invokes the imaginal 
representation when a strategy is needed to perform the necessary procedure of a verbal 
task. Hence, to give an example, in some types of verbal tasks, which are directly linked 
to our episodic memory, the subjects are asked to memorize an unrelated word list; thus, 
subjects probably use strategic imagery hypothesis. In the following paragraphs, three 
experiments involved in the indicated study will be described so that the viability of 




                                                          
76 In isolation, the subjects’ rate for the concreteness of abstract words was 3.50. This value increased 
only to 3.68 after providing the context. 
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In the first experiment, the subjects were asked to recall words in two types of 
situations: first, in a situation in which the context availability rating was controlled for 
both concrete and abstract words77, and then in a situation in which the context 
availability and the concreteness were confounded. From the viewpoint of CAT, it was 
expected that subjects would display concreteness effect only in the situation in which 
context availability was confounded with the concreteness. On the contrary, from the 
viewpoint of DCT (weak or strong version), subjects would display concreteness effect 
independently from the fact that the context availability was controlled or confounded 
with concreteness.  
 
The results of experiment one, were far beyond the predictions of CAT. This theory 
predicts that when accessibility of contextual information is controlled for both concrete 
and abstract concepts, there should be no concreteness effect at all between these two 
conceptual types. However, the results displayed a significant superiority of recall for 
concrete concepts78 in a controlled contextual information situation. Thus, the observed 
concreteness effect is more related to the imageability of the recalled words than to 
contextual information, both in the controlled condition and in the condition in which 




Despite the fact that Schwanenflugel et al, managed to find imageability as the 
determining element in the two indicated situations in experiment 1, they did not know 
whether the subjects employed imageability as an automatic reaction of their cognitive 
mechanism, which is linked to the concreteness of the individual words (strong version 
of DCT), or whether the subjects used imageability as a strategy in the conditions where 
it  helped them to memorize and recall the single words easier and faster (weak version). 
To understand this, they could employ specific designs for the tests to prevent subjects 
from using imagery strategies. The option that Schwanenflugel et al proposed to 
accomplish this was to control the activities that subjects engage in to encode the word 
lists by employing incidental rather than intentional recall79 following various encoding 
operations. To do this so-called incidental recall, subjects were asked to perform one of 
the following tasks: 1) an image rating orienting task 2) a context availability rating 
orienting task 3) a no-orienting task condition80. If the concreteness effect was present 
                                                          
77 The stimuli used in this experiment were derived from the norms and instructions designed in a study 
performed by Schwanenflugel and colleagues  (1988), and used in the experiment 1 of that study, (see 
Table 1, in Schwanenflugel (1992: 98) for the characteristics of the utilized words).  
78  12.1% 
79 In accordance with Craik and Lockhart (1972) and Eysenck (1982), incidental and intentional learning 
can be described in terms of the use of pre-learning instructions that do, or do not, forewarn subjects 
about the existence of a subsequent recall test. In line with the argument of the present section 
(vocabulary learning) Hulstijn (2001) argues: “incidental vocabulary learning refers to the learning of 
vocabulary as the by-product of any activity not explicitly geared to vocabulary learning, with intentional 
vocabulary learning referring to any activity aiming at committing lexical information to memory”. 
80 The design of the tasks was as follows: in the context availability orienting task, subjects were given 
the appropriate instructions (Schwanenflugel et al., 1988). After the instructions a list of words were read 
to the subjects with the interval of 5 seconds for each word, in which they had to associate the word with 
a context and rate it (they were not informed about the later free recall). In the imagery-rating orienting 
task, subjects were given the correlating instructions (Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan: 1968).The rest of 
procedure was similar to that of the context availability orienting task. In the no-orienting task condition, 
the participants had to memorise, by a strategy they preferred, the words in a list read to them during the 
5second intervals. In all conditions, there was a free recall task. 
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in all three tasks then such results were on the side of automatic imagery hypothesis, but 
if the imagery strategies were present only in the first and third tasks, then the results 
lean towards strategic imagery hypothesis. 
 
A 2 (concreteness: abstract vs. concrete) × 2 (context availability relation: controlled 
vs. confounded) × 3 (orienting task: context-availability-rating, or no-orienting task) 
design was used.  Concreteness and context availability relation were within subject 
factors, while orienting task was a between-subject factor. For the stimuli used in this 
experiment, there were some changes in comparison with the previous experiment: a) 
list length was increased, and b) a particular word appeared on only one word list. 
Subjects participated in only one of three orienting task conditions. In the context 
availability orienting task condition, the instructions related to context availability rating 
were given to the participants (Schwanenflugel, Harnishfeger, and Stow, 1988). A list 
of words was read to them (one word every 5 seconds). During these 5 seconds, they 
had to rate the word according to ease with which they were able to imagine an 
associated context. The participants were not informed about the following free recall. 
In the imagery-rating orienting task condition, subjects read the imagery instructions 
used by Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan (1968). The rest of the procedure was similar to 
the context availability orienting task. In the no-orienting task condition, the subjects 
had to memorize the words read to them in any manner they preferred during the 5-
second interval. In all conditions, subjects were asked to recall the list immediately after 
the list was read to them.  
 
The results were consistent with the strategic imagery hypothesis. Namely, when 
subjects were forced to focus on the prior contextual information, and not imagery 
information, linked to a concept, the concreteness effect observed in experiment one 
vanished and they performed equally on context availability rating for abstract and 
concrete words. On the other hand, the superiority of concrete over abstract words 
reappeared both in the image rating orienting task and in the task with directed 
intentional memory instructions which was predicted beforehand. In other words, when 
the subjects processed the imagery information through its rating of imagery, the 
superiority of concrete words over abstract ones reappeared. Another point in these 
results is the similar rating of the concreteness effect in intentional recall and imagery-
rating tasks, which could mean that subjects used imagery strategy to encode the word 
list when there were no other encoding instructions.  
 
In agreement with what was indicated in the previous paragraph, there were similar 
recall patterns of concreteness effect in directed intentional recall and imagery-rating 
tasks for the items controlled for the context availability, which could be due to the 
employment of the imagery strategy on the indicated conditions. However, this 
hypothesis is not tested directly in the previous experiments, and it would be an indirect 
conclusion from the similarity of recall patterns on both imagery orienting conditions 
and undirected free recall tests. Due to this reason, it was also possible that the subjects 
employed other strategies other than the imagery strategy to reach those concreteness 
effect patterns. In experiment 3, Schwanenflugel, et al aimed to find more direct 
evidence for the use of strategic imagery strategy on a recall condition without any 








In experiment 3, Schwanenflugel, et al tried to find more direct evidence to ensure that 
the concreteness effect, displayed in recall for items controlled for context availability, 
is linked to our strategic imagery mechanism. To do so, they required the subjects to 
report the strategy they employed directly following the encoding of the words in the 
list. A 2 (concreteness: abstract vs. concrete) × 2 (context availability relation: 
controlled vs. confounded) × 2 (strategy type: reported imagery strategy or did not) 
design was used. At the beginning, subjects were given the instructions used in the 
intentional-recall conditions of the previous two experiments. They were also given a 
sheet of paper face down with further instructions81 (figure 2.1). After the words were 
read to participants, the experimenter told them to flip over the page and check off the 
strategies they used to learn the words. The results of this experiment again were on the 
side of strategic imagery hypothesis. When subjects reported that they employed 
imagery strategy, a significant concreteness effect rate was displayed both in the 
controlled context availability condition and in the non-controlled one. On the contrary, 
when an imagery strategy was not reported, the concreteness was displayed only in the 
context availability confounded with concreteness condition.  
 
Hence, these experiments could be considered as evidence to reject both the strict CAT 
and the strict DCT. On the one hand, as it was demonstrated in the results of experiment 
one, there was a significant difference between recall ratings of concrete words and 
abstract words in the controlled condition for context availability. Therefore, these 
results were in total conflict with the strict CAT position which claims that our 
cognitive system benefits from a mono-dimensional representational system composed 
of only one main section that is responsible for representing all types of concepts by the 
use of the internal/external contextual information available to them. On the other hand, 
the results are an antithesis of the strict DCT which claims that our cognitive system 
analyzes, processes, and retrieves concrete and abstract words by the use of two 
different representational subsystems: the imagery subsystem and the linguistic 
subsystem. The imagery subsystem is activated for all the concepts, which have, at least 
in part, some sensorimotor features in their conceptual structure82. The linguistic 
subsystem in turn is activated when the concepts lack these types of sensorimotor 
features. To process and elaborate them, our cognitive system, with the use of the 
indicated linguistic subsystem, relies on their usages in the linguistic contexts preserved 
mainly in our semantic memory.  
 
                                                          
81 Below you will find a list of potential strategies that you might have used to try to help you memorize 
the list of words as it was being read. 
Please check as many of these strategies that you remember using: 
_ I tried to form mental pictures or images while the list was being read. 
_ I repeated each word several times to myself. 
_ I tried to relate each word to other things that I already knew about (such as a context, circumstance, or 
some kind of general knowledge associated with each word). 
_ I listened very carefully to the experimenter say the words. 
_ I tried to make up a story that would connect all the words together. 
_ I tried to categorize the words based on groups of words of similar meaning. 
_ I didn't do anything in particular. 
_ Other (please elaborate) 
82 According to this theory, the concrete concepts are represented by both imagery and linguistic 




III. Other experiments related to context availability theory  
 
Apart from the described experiments, in literature there is a large amount of studies 
with regard to the different aspects of CAT. The principal aim in this section is to give a 
schematic picture of these studies. A similar study to the ones mentioned in the above 
section was done by Van Hell and De Groot (1998) to analyze the relationship between 
concreteness effect and context availability in the concrete and abstract concepts. They 
performed three experiments on bilingual (Dutch: L1, English: L2) subjects. The first 
two experiments were composed of lexical decision tasks in their L1 (experiment 1) and 
L2 (experiment 2). In the last experiment, the subjects’ task was translation from L1 to 
L2 or vice versa. In all the experiments, the concreteness effect was observed in the 
conditions in which concreteness was confounded with context availability, on the 
contrary of the controlled context availability condition, in which the concreteness 
effect disappeared. These results are a replication of the results obtained in the 
experiment performed by Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1983), which were in favor of 
CAT and against DCT. In another experiment, Schwanenflugel and Noyes (1996) 
studied the relationship between the meaning of a word and its processing in our 
cognitive mechanism. They performed two experiments on 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th grade 
subjects with high and low reading skills, in which they examined the relationship 
between word concreteness together with the factors that underlie it (such as 
imageability and context availability), in addition to lexical processing speed and 
accuracy. The results displayed a significant role of context availability for both lexical 
decision time and reading accuracy; however, the context availability effect was larger 
in young and low skilled readers, namely, the low context availability words were 
complicated to retrieve for young and low skilled readers. Schwanenflugel and Noyes 
proposed that this could be resolved by concentrating on the reading program, providing 
associated contexts for these low context availability words, and their usages in the 
contexts. Hence, again in this experiment, context availability was considered as a main 
reason for which the concrete words are retrieved faster and with more accuracy beyond 
the imageability; thus, it can be counted as another replication for the previous results 
on the side of CAT. In another experiment, Levy-Dori and Henik (2006) performed 
three experiments. The first experiment was a replication of the study done by 
Schwanenflugel et al., (1988) and Van Hell and De Groot (1998). In this experiment, 
Levy-Dori and Henik incorporated the familiarity83 factor in the test. This element was 
not incorporated in the previous experiments, but a regression analysis and the negative 
correlation, between concreteness and familiarity in the groups of words controlled for 
context availability, showed that uncontrolled familiarity could explain the 
disappearance of the concreteness effect in the previous tests. In the second experiment, 
they controlled familiarity and context availability. As a result, and in line with their 
expectations, the concreteness effect again appeared. In the third and last experiment, 
they controlled concreteness and familiarity and obtained the context availability effect. 
These results, just like the experiments performed by Schwanenflugel, Akin and Luh 
(1992), are somehow against the strict CAT position, which claims that the only means 
                                                          
83Recognition memory can be subdivided into two components: recollection and familiarity (Medina, 
2008). On the one hand, recollection is retrieval of information correlating to events experienced in the 
past; on the other hand, familiarity is some sort of internal feeling that an event was experienced 
previously. Dual process theories consider the indicated components as two separate categories of 
recognition memory. A very common criticism with regard to this division is that recollection is regarded 
as simply a stronger version of familiarity. On the opposite side, single process theories regard memory as 
a continuum from strong memories to weak memories (Medina, 2008). Using familiarity tasks, like the 
indicated experiment, is due to testing some aspects of recognition memory.  
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that the human cognitive system possesses to retrieve the concrete and abstract concepts 




In this section, context availability theory, its principles and its position with regard to 
the representation, processing and retrieval differences between concrete and abstract 
concepts was briefly described. In agreement with what was explained in this part, this 
theory claims that our cognitive system comprehends, processes and retrieves both 
concrete and abstract words by the correlating conceptual representations based on the 
available internal and external contextual information. This position is against some 
other theories such as dual coding theory, which sustains that our cognitive system 
makes use of two different representational subsystems to be able to comprehend 
process and retrieve concrete and abstract words. The imagery subsystem is dedicated to 
analyze sensorimotor features of concrete concepts and the linguistic subsystem 
analyzes the linguistic contextual information related to concrete and abstract concepts.  
 
In the experiments described in this chapter, the position of CAT remains unclear. It has 
some advantages and other disadvantages. Some results like the ones obtained by 
Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1983) are on the side of CAT; however, other results, such 
as the experiments performed by Schwanenflugel, Akin and Luh (1991) are almost in 
favor of DCT (at least the weak version). Other experiments are needed in future studies 
to illustrate if the context availability is the main underlying reason for which concrete 
and abstract items are processed and retrieved differently, or if it is concreteness84which 
makes the concrete concepts different from abstract items. 
 
3.3. Dual coding theory  
 
In the previous section, dual coding theory and its principal aspects were briefly 
described. In particular, it discussed the aspects which were in conflict with context 
availability theory, namely the different theoretical viewpoints of these approaches in 
relation with the representation, processing and retrieval of the concrete and abstract 
concepts. In this section, this theory and its fundamental aspects will be scrutinized. 
Further, its opposition with the context availability theory will be questioned 
considering different experimental works. 
 
DCT is not a descriptive experimental theory of mind from the neuropsychological 
point of view, because many structural and functional details related to the brain are not 
analyzable from the experimental point of view at this point in time. Instead, Paivio 
(2008) claims that his model is a psychological theory of mind, which uses 
experimental brain data to demonstrate or reject some of its aspects. In other words, 
DCT is not a neuropsychological model that constructs its basis and structure only by 
making use of experimental brain data. In fact, although DCT does benefit from the 
experimental facts and data, it does not exclude the biological functions and 
mechanisms of the human brain. It concentrates on the experimental facts simply 
because in this model, language processing can vary from individual to individual, and 
                                                          
84 As illustrated in the experiments performed by Levy-Dori and Henik (2006), it is possible that, in a 
controlled condition for familiarity and context availability, we could find concreteness as the underlying 
difference between concrete and abstract concepts. 
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depending on the verbal and imaginal information stored in the individuals’ long-term 
memory, they could have different imaginal and verbal representations of concepts. 
This is in line with Ryu, Lie, Colaric, Cawley and Aldag (2000) who sustain that 
although the theory does not deny the human brain as a product of a biological 
evolution with species-specific functional properties, the main focus of the theory is 
based on specific experiences. The functionality of useful content of language and 
imagery can vary enormously, depending on specific experiences of each individual. 
 
3.3.1. History of dual coding theory 
 
The existence of verbal and non-verbal subsystems in DCT is supported by historical 
data in the 19th century, in which Paul Broca performed an autopsy on the brain of a 
dead subject85 who could not speak during his life, although his tongue and lip 
movements were not impaired. In that autopsy, Broca discovered huge damage in the 
frontal lobe of the left cerebral hemisphere. This finding, together with other discoveries 
which reported that in spite of injuries in the right hemisphere the subjects did not have 
problems with speech (Dronkers, et al., 2007), ended in the conclusion that our speech 
ability is derived from the specific structural and functional mechanism in the left 
hemisphere of the brain. Approximately a decade later Karl Wernicke observed an 
injury in a region farther back from the Broca area in the temporal-parietal area of the 
left hemisphere. The subject did not show the same symptoms; namely, contrary to 
Broca’s injury, he was capable of fluent speech but his speech was not meaningful. 
Thus, he concluded that the left hemisphere is not responsible only for expressiveness 
but also for linguistic reception (Eggert, 1977). Imagery deficit was reported in 1883 by 
John Martin Charcot; however, in major parts of the discussions in the neuropsychology 
and cognitive sciences, the imagery factor was ignored even in the presence of clear 
linguistic deficits (Goldenberg, 1993). For example, in 1976 Eric Lenneberg, on the 
basis of neurological data, distinguished language from cognition without mentioning 
that imagery could be the possible principle for cognition. Electroencephalographic and 
other studies between 1940 and 1960 did not change this linguistic bias. The 
neurological path to imagery was reopened in 1960 when Brenda Milner and her group 
at the Montreal Neurological Institute discovered that lesions in the right hemisphere 
impaired performance for some non-verbal performance such as memorizing faces and 
nonsense figures (Paivio, 2008). After this discovery and several other studies, it was 
assumed that the right hemisphere controlled non-verbal imagery, and that language 
with all its verbal components was controlled by the left hemisphere (Paivio, 2008). We 
can see the traces of all these discoveries in DCT. Similar to the conclusion mentioned 
above, in DCT a verbal and a non-verbal system is observed. Each of them is 
responsible for different processing tasks. According to the findings in literature 
(Paivio, 2008), with regard to the imagery and verbal processing, the DCT claims: a) 
both hemispheres are activated in some imagery tasks, b) the left hemisphere dominance 
for word recognition is stronger for abstract words, c) in the familiarity task, for the 
picture of objects, both hemispheres are activated, which demonstrates that imaginal 
representations are present in both hemispheres, and d) different areas of each 
hemisphere are activated for distinct tasks (temporal lobes and hippocampus for 
                                                          
85 His name was Leborgne. Although he was not able to produce any words or phrases, he was able to 
repetitively produce “tan”, which was the only word that he could produce. Due to this fact, he was 
nicknamed “tan” (Broca, 1861).  
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memory tasks, parietal area of the right hemisphere in mental rotation and some other 
cognitive tasks, etc.) 
 




The DCT is based on the assumption that our cognitive mechanism activity is linked to 
the symbolic representational subsystems, which are responsible for performing 
symbolic representations based on verbal and non-verbal information. The human 
cognitive system is unique compared to all other animals due to the fact that it is able to 
activate its cognitive mechanisms by the information that it receives both from the 
linguistic internal system (verbal) and non-linguistic events-objects in our living 
environment (non-verbal). This would be the most significant presupposition of DCT, 
which claims that our cognitive mechanism deals with two different types of 
information: a) the information which is obtained from the objects and events in our 
living environment (sensorimotor information), and b) the information which is 
obtained from our linguistic input stored in our memory. These two types of 
information86 are processed in two different subsystems: the imagery subsystem and the 
linguistic (verbal) subsystem. These two subsystems (for imagery and verbal 
representational subsystems) logically differ from the structural and functional points of 
view. They differ structurally because the representational units are organized according 
to distinct orders and their organization with respect to higher order structures. They are 
functionally different in the sense that they can be activated in separation or in 
conjunction; however, at the same time, they are interconnected, and the initiation of 
activity in one subsystem can cause the processing activity in the other subsystem.  
 
The structural organization of dual coding theory refers to the conceptual structure in 
the long-term memory and the hierarchical order of conceptual information (verbal and 
non-verbal). At the most generic level, there is a symbolic representational cognitive 
system which, as could be understood from the title, has a representational function both 
for verbal and non-verbal information. This system, in accordance with the previous 
explanations, is partitioned into two subsystems of verbal and non-verbal subsystems. 
These subsystems in turn, in the next organizational level, are divided into sensorimotor 
(visual, auditory and haptic) subsystems. Finally, at the lowest level, there are 
representational units for each subsystems called imagens (for the non-verbal 
subsystem) and logogens (for the verbal subsystem). They are not two concrete 
structural elements, but rather, two conceptual categories; namely, they differ in size 
and complexity. More complicated and bigger imagens and logogens are constructed 
from the less complicated and smaller logogens and imagens. In other words, there are 
componential relations between more complicated and less complicated units. These 
componential relations could be hierarchical or linear. As Paivio (1991: 259) assumes, 
more complex units are constructed from smaller ones, hierarchically (a face consists of 
                                                          
86 “Two types of information” does not refer to two concrete fine grained level categories of information 
but refers to two types which in turn arrive in our cognitive system in distinct modalities. As Paivio 
maintains (1991:257): “Verbal and nonverbal systems symbolically represent the structural and functional 
properties of language and the nonlinguistic world, respectively. However, both classes of events come in 
different modalities — visual (printed words vs. visual objects), auditory (spoken words vs. 
environmental sounds), haptic (tactual and motor feedback from writing vs. manipulation of objects) — 
and the internal symbolic systems presumably retain these distinctions”. 
54 
 
eyes, nose, lips; eyes of iris and pupils; etc.) or linearly (a word is a concatenation of 
sounds). This is a componential approach in which the components are concrete, 
modality-specific, holistic analogues rather than abstract, amodal features. The very 
general assumption of this theory is that the representations of these subsystems are 
grounded in perceptual, motor and affective experiences. Hence, the representations 
have a multi-modal structure instead of an abstract unimodal structure, which in turn 
means that there is a continuity between behavior and cognition.  
 
There are two types of relations between these two subsystems and their components: 
between-system relationship and within-system relationship (Paivio, 1991). The 
between-system relationship assumes that the two subsystems are independent, in the 
sense that one can be activated without the other or they can be activated in parallel. 
However, the activity in one subsystem triggers the activity in the other one (it does not 
mean that the activity in one flows from the activity in the other). To do so, there should 
be a sort of partial interconnection between the two subsystems. It is partial because 
there is not a complete interconnection between the two subsystems and it may exist for 
some conceptual representations but not for others. The point of this interconnection is 
between logogens in the verbal system and imagens in the non-verbal system. This 
interconnection occurs when our cognitive system activate two representations in the 
verbal and non-verbal system for the same concept. For instance, when we name an 
object at the same time as pointing to it. The within-system relationship describes the 
relationships that exist between the components of each subsystem to perform an 
imaginal representation or a verbal one. The verbal subsystem possesses an associative 
organization, which means that the logogens are organized in a probabilistic network 
according to the associative experiences of the subjects. It is a probabilistic network 
because there is not an equal probability of the activation of each logogen by the ones to 
which it is linked via a specific context or a target word. These associative organizations 
have hierarchical structure; that is, there are connections between a category label and 
the specific examples of that category. The indicated associative hierarchies can be 
totally linguistic or not, which means that the referents of the represented words could 
be verbal materials or real objects. For example, we can imagine an associative network 
composed of clothes as the category label and shirt, jacket, etc., as the specific examples 
of this category; or we can imagine a totally linguistic network (with a linguistic 
referent), like diminutives in Italian, as the category title and -ino, -etto, etc., as the 
examples. Whereas the verbal subsystem is organized according to the relations 
between the concrete units (logogens), the non-verbal subsystem functions in a different 
way. In fact, the most important factor to be considered in the non-verbal subsystem is 
continuity, which refers to the fact that this subsystem represents objects and events as 
they are in the real world and the organization is beyond the relations between symbolic 
units. For example, as an imaginal representation of coffee, we can imagine a cafe with 
the person who drinks coffee, or we can imagine ourselves in the kitchen with coffee, or 
packets of coffee in a supermarket. As we can see, the continuity in these 
representations with what exists in the real world is the difference between imaginal 
representations and verbal representations. However, there is also an associative 
organization between the imagens that is the common functional point with the verbal 
subsystem. In figure 3.1,87 this common point of the two representational subsystems, 
together with other details, correlated to the mechanism of DCT, are illustrated.  
                                                          






There are three different types of processing in the DCT model (Paivio, 1991). 
Representational processing, which is the activation of the verbal representations by 
linguistic stimuli and that of the non-verbal representations by non-linguistic stimuli. 
Referential processing, which is the activation of the verbal subsystem and its verbal 
representations by non-linguistic stimuli and/or the activation of the non-verbal 
subsystem by linguistic stimuli. As seen in figure 3.1, the referential processing is more 
indirect in comparison with the representational processing, which is due to the transfer 
of activity from one subsystem to the other one. Associative processing is the activation 
of the representations in a subsystem by other representations in the same subsystem. 
For example, when a verbal stimulus activates the associated words in the verbal 
subsystem, or similarly in the non-verbal subsystem, an imaginal representation 
activates the associated memories of that representation. 
 
A given task to the subjects in an experiment can include any or all types of 
representations; for example, the familiarity judgment of perceptual recognition of 
stimuli activates only the representational processing. To give other examples, naming 
pictures and imaging words activate both representational processing and referential 
processing. In addition, free verbal associating activates both verbal representational 
processing and verbal associative processing, but as Paivio (1991:71) maintains, it could 
also activate the referential processing by retrieving imaginal memories of verbal 
stimuli. For example, the word MOUSE in the free verbal associating task could 
activate some salient relevant scenes of it in our memory. For instance, it could retrieve 
verbal memories like white mice in scientific experiments, mice are harmful for our 
health, and so on (representational processing). On the other hand, it could activate the 
imaginal representation of these logogens in the non-verbal system (referential 
processing). In addition, the representation of one of these logogens or imagens could 
result in the representations of other units in the same system, e.g., it could activate the 








Figure 3.1. As can be observed in this diagram, the minimal units in imaginal and verbal subsystems 
are imagens and logogens, which are the connection points between two subsystems. There are within-
system relationships, which in the case of the verbal subsystem are the concrete relations between 
logogens; on the other hand, there are continuous relations in the case of imagens in the non-verbal 
subsystem. In addition, there are between-system relations that occur between the smallest units of 
representations in both systems, namely between logogens and imagens. 
 
Another important aspect of DCT is the organizational and transformational processes 
that it refers to: first, the organization of received verbal and non-verbal information, 
and second, how the mentioned information could be transformed into the standard 
mental units for our representational system. Obviously, with two different 
representational systems (verbal and non-verbal) there is no expectation to have a 
similar organizational and transformational procedure. As these two systems are 
different from the structural and functional viewpoints, there are two organizational and 
transformational processes for the received verbal and non-verbal information. The 
verbal system organizes the verbal information in the sequential orders of different 
levels of complexity (such as phrases, sentences, etc.) that in turn will be the basis for 
the subsequent transformations. In other words, the transformations are constrained by 
the temporal frame, in a mode that the temporal order of elements can be changed, or 
that some elements that have occupied a specific time slot in a structure can be 
substituted by others. On the other hand, non-verbal transformations are made on the 
basis of non-verbal information; namely, these transformations could include the size, 
shape, color, components of an event, and so on. 
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Bever, Fodor, and Garrett (1968) claim that, due to significant formal deficiencies in 
associative theories, they are not able to account for human cognition. This fatal 
limitation of associationistic theories, in agreement with the proponents of the terminal 
meta postulate proposal, could result in many theoretical incapabilities (Paivio: 1991); 
namely, in many cases they are unable to foresee the behavioral productions. In line 
with Anderson and Bower (1973:12), 89this postulate is divided into three associative 
metafeatures. The sensationalist statement assumes that all explanatory parts are 
adaptable with the potential observable factors (stimuli and responses) and the elements 
which are derived from these observable factors (sensations, perceptions, images, ideas, 
etc.). The connectionist statement maintains that only those potential observable factors 
that occur contiguously are associable. The mechanistic statement, which is the final 
meta feature of this postulate, stresses that all the behavioral mechanisms can be 
explained by concatenating all those observable elements that occur in contiguity and 
them together.  
 
According to Paivio (1986: 11), the general argument against this criticism is that there 
are many learnable behaviors, which are not describable with such principles, since 
these principles are only in grade of describing the contiguous elements of a behavior 
chain. The example for this would be an embedded phrase within a sentence: "Luca, 
who lives near my house, studies psychology". The associative dependency in this 
sentence is between the subject and the verb; namely between Luca and the verb 
studies. Although the terminal meta postulate does not account for centrally embedded 
phrases, owing to contradiction with connectionist and mechanistic statements, humans 
are able to learn these structures. According to the opponents of the terminal meta 
postulate, limitations such as this compel rationalis t researchers to account for the 
internalized mechanisms and processes which could be indirectly linked and related to 
the external, observable elements only in an abstract mode. 
 
In accordance with Paivio (1986:81-82), the terminal meta postulate, as the rationalism's 
argument against the empiristic theories, is not applicable to DCT. This is because 
according to DCT, some particular behaviors are explained in terms of collaboration 
and interconnection of both imaginal and verbal systems, with a higher activation of the 
imaginal system for some behaviors and a higher activation of the verbal one for others. 
Hence, a certain verbal behavior is not explicable by the internalized verbal stimuli and 
responses which possess a sequential one-to-one relationship (contiguity relationship). 
Instead, it maintains that in such behavior, humans make use of both internal and 
external contextual information in the imaginal system, in addition to profiting from the 
external verbal contextual information and its subsequent activation of internal verbal 
information in the verbal system. Only the internal activation of the verbal system and 
the external verbal contexts are in the same language as the terminal behavioral 
                                                          
88 The term terminal meta postulate is derived from Bever, Fodor and Garrots' work (1968). According to 
them, associationism must define its principles in terms of "terminal vocabulary of a theory, i.e., over the 
vocabulary in which behaviour is described" (Bever, Fodor, and Garrett, 1968: 583). They argue that 
these principles are such that associationism is not able to to prove or reject the languages that have 
recursive clausal structure. 
89 Cited by Paivio (1986:11) 
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elements, hence the contiguity relationship is not applicable to DCT due to its different 
nature.  
 
To mention a more specific reason to reject the Bever, Fodor, and Garrett model against 
DCT, it can be argued that there are some principles in DCT that violate the 
connectionist and mechanistic statements in the terminal meta postulate. In line with 
what was indicated, the connectionist statement stressed contiguity as the central 
element; this element has to be accounted for in associative theories when they aim to 
describe a cognitive behavior. The mechanistic statement, in turn, sustains that 
description of a cognitive behavior would be the sequential consideration of the 
relations between all contiguous elements. However, we can have certain imaginal and 
verbal representations which do not correspond directly to the contiguous elements 
(memories) in the imaginal and verbal systems. As an example, we can imagine a 
gigantic ant, which eats humans; this can be represented in our imaginal system, 
although we have not experienced it. Therefore, the similarity certainly can result in 
new imaginal and verbal representations, independently from the fact that these 
representations have the contiguity element. In other words, by the existence of 
similarity elements between the stimuli and some representations in memory, human 
beings can perform certain imaginal and verbal representations that do not have any 
contiguous relation with those in our memory.  
 
In summary, the rationalism’s terminal meta postulate critique is not applicable against 
DCT due to a general reason and a specific reason. The general reason would be, as I 
argued, the structural nature of DCT and the activation of both imaginal and verbal 
systems for some tasks, which is in conflict with the contiguity criteria. The specific 
reason is that some postulates of DCT directly violate the connectionist and mechanistic 
statements of the terminal meta postulate. 
 
3.3.4.  Experimental works in line with dual 
coding theory 
 
Following the theoretical discussion of DCT, in this section some correlated 
experimental studies are explained. In this part, two studies of DCT are described. In the 
first one, Paivio and Csapo (1973) tried to analyze the functional relationship between 
picture superiority effect90 and DCT. In other words, they want to shed light on the 
question of whether the higher verbal recall for the pictures in comparison with the 
printed words is due to the presence of two coding systems for them and employment of 
two types of representations in the time of retrieval. Or do other reasons exist for this 
so-called picture superiority effect? In the second experiment, Shen (2010) tried to 
analyze DCT in the learning of Chinese abstract and concrete words. 
 
I. Picture superiority effect and dual coding theory 
 
                                                          
90 In literature, there are two explanations for the picture superiority effect. The first one is DCT proposed 
by Allan Paivio (1972). He argues that this advantage originated from the fact that pictures in comparison 
with words are coded and retrieved more easily since they are coded and retrieved in the pictorial mode. 
The second explanation is based on the familiarity concept. In line with Asch and Ebenholtz (1962), the 
higher familiarity or frequency of pictured objects is the main reason of this picture superiority effect. 
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The picture superiority effect has been studied a lot in literature as evidence to support 
or reject the DCT model (see Paivio, Rogers & Smythe, 1968; Mintzer & Sondgrass, 
1999; Ritchey, 1980). In agreement with the picture superiority effect, free verbal recall 
generally has a higher rate for pictures than for printed words. In accordance with 
Paivio and Csapo (1973), this superiority effect could be the result of differential verbal 
elaboration, superiority of non-verbal imagery as a memory code, and dual encoding 
favoring pictures. Paivio and Csapo in their experiments attempt to shed light on 
questions such as: is the usual superiority of pictures in free recall explained by dual 
encoding for the pictures91? Or does this effect appear due to the superiority of images 
as a memory code? The theoretical aspects corresponding to the first question have 
already been indicated in the previous parts. The second question includes the 
hypothesis, which argues that physical properties of pictures, such as vividness or 
multiplicity of cues, may increase their recall rate (Bousfield, Esterson & Whitmarsh, 
1957)92. The alternative hypothesis that they examined is the verbal elaboration, which 
claims that the pictures provoke more verbal elaboration in comparison with the words, 
on the condition that our cognitive system possesses sufficient time to do such verbal 
elaboration. As a result, this verbal elaboration for the pictorial stimuli increases the 
memorability of the pictures' label and subsequently they will have a faster recall. 
Hence, in this hypothesis, the imaginal representations do not have any role and do not 
influence the recall rate of pictures' labels. 
   
They performed five experiments. In the first three experiments, they asked the subjects 
to encode words and pictures verbally and imaginally (in the first case the subjects had 
to write or pronounce the picture labels or the words, and in the second case they had to 
draw or imagine the pictures or things that were suggested by the words). The other two 
experiments were probability learning tasks. The subjects were provided word-word, 
picture-picture and picture-word (or word-picture) repetitions, which were followed by 
a free recall test. In the following part, the procedure and the details relevant to the first 
three experiments will be described. The results exhibit either the superiority of the 
imagery model or a mixture between superiority of imagery code and DCT; the results 
of these experiments reject a strong version of the DCT model. This is because DCT 
does not account for any coding superiority (pictorial or verbal), contrary to the results 
of the first three experiments, which stress the superiority of the imaginal code and the 




Method and design 
 
This experiment had a 3×3 independent-measures factorial design. The variables were 
stimuli (pictures, concrete words, abstract words) and learning set (incidental, 
intentional control, standard free recall)93. The stimuli were 72 concrete and 72 abstract 
                                                          
91 According to what was indicated in the theoretical section of DCT, the pictures as the environmental 
stimuli could benefit from both imaginal and verbal representations. 
92 Cited by Paivio & Csapo (1973). 
93 In all five experiments, the subjects had incidental free recall tasks. The incidental orienting tasks were 
designed to control or influence the subjects' coding strategies (verbal and non-verbal ones). Such a 
control was absent in the standard free recall and they could do the task by their past representations 
stored in memory or using the situational information and effects. In summary, they could use both 
external and internal information to do the task. 
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words which were selected from the Paivio, Yuille and Madigan (1968)94 norms.  The 
subjects were 42 undergraduate students chosen from summer school university 
students. In this experiment, the subjects were examined in groups of 10-12 students, 
and in every group half of the subjects received the items in one order and the rest in the 
reverse order. All of the participants received basic instructions, according to which 
they understood that their task was to identify pictures and words that were shown to 
them for a short time. They were also told that the showing time for every item (printed 
words or the pictures that were shown on a monitor) was 1/16 of a second and they had 
another five seconds to record the words or the labels of the pictures. The interval 
between the items’ presentation and the recall task was five minutes. After that, the 
subjects had another five minutes to do a written recall on the recall sheets. The subjects 
in the incidental learning condition had to identify words and pictures without any 
instruction; however, in the intentional control condition they were informed that later 
they would be asked to recall the items.  
 
Results and discussion 
 
The results showed that the recall rate increased from abstract words to concrete words 
and from concrete words to pictures. The recall rate was also highest in the standard free 
call, intermediate for the intentional control and lowest in the incidental group. They 
can be observed in figure 3.295. 
 
As can be observed in figure 3.2, the experimental condition has no influence on the 
picture recall results in any of the three learning sets, while the recall rate of both 
concrete and abstract words has decreased from standard to incidental condition. That 
can be understandable in terms of DCT and the existence of two different processing 
systems for the pictures. In the orienting task of the pictures, the subjects were asked to 
name the pictures both under the incidental and intentional conditions. As a result of 
these tasks, both verbal and non-verbal codes were stored in the relevant systems. As a 
result, the verbal recall rate was enhanced because the subjects had the possibility to 
access both verbal and non-verbal representations of the displayed pictures. It seems 
that the instructions with regard to the following free recall task did not influence the 
performance of the intentional group. This story is different in the case of words. 
Apparently, the incidental orienting task limited the attention of the subjects only on the 
verbal code and as a result they did not access imaginal representation, even in the case 
of concrete words. In addition, the instructions in the intentional condition did not offset 
the distracting effect of the intentional orienting task completely, in comparison with the 
free standard recall task.  
 
 
                                                          
94 Cited by Paivio & Csapo (1973). 





Figure 3.2. In this diagram, the mean proportions of P (pictures), C (concrete nouns) and A (abstract 
nouns) have been illustrated. The mentioned categories of items were recalled under the incidental 
intentional controlled and standard free recall conditions. 
 
The other aspect which should be taken into consideration is the different rate of recall 
between concrete and abstract words. In accordance with the DCT, concrete words, due 
to having a dual representational access (to verbal and non-verbal systems), must have a 
higher recall rate. In line with what was indicated in the previous paragraph, the 
incidental orienting task (even in the case of concrete words) concentrates the attention 
of the subjects on the verbal code. However, this concentration would be less in the 
intentional control condition, since the subjects' attention is on the meaning aspects of 
the word. Hence, the recall rate of concrete words is influenced by the incidental-
intentional manipulation. This story is different for abstract words. As imaginal 
representation is absent in the case of abstract words, there is no incidental-intentional 
effect and the intentional orienting task, concentrated on the meaning aspects of the 
words, does not activate the imaginal representation of the words. As figure 3.2 
illustrates, the results are consistent with this hypothesis of DCT, namely, that the 
incidental-intentional effects are higher for concrete words compared to abstract words.  
 
Although these results are consistent with DCT, they do not completely eliminate the 
possibility of other interpretations. While the approximately equal verbal encoding 
(naming) for both verbal and non-verbal stimuli could be evidence against the fact that 
pictures are recalled faster due to their more elaborated verbal code, these results do not 
give us an option between DCT and imagery interpretations. Considering the fact that 
the subjects can transform non-verbal memory representations into verbal ones during 
the recall process, the concreteness effect could be interpreted in terms of different rates 
of availability of images during storage and encoding. Therefore, in these terms there is 






Method and design 
 
In this experiment, Paivio and Csapo decided to eliminate abstract word stimuli, since 
the results of the previous experiment indicated that the incidental orienting task would 
be the differential basis for the recall rate between words and pictures. However, this 
task was not as decisive in differentiating between abstract and concrete words. As a 
result, and to decrease the complexity of the study, they eliminated abstract words from 
the stimuli. 
 
The subjects were 81 students from an introductory psychology course clustered in four 
groups, of which 28 students were males. The orienting task for two groups of the 
subjects was writing the names of the pictures or the printed concrete words, and for the 
other two groups the task was drawing the sketch of the flashed pictures or the concrete 
printed words. This illustrates that the tasks included verbal coding with the verbal and 
imaginal representations, and non-verbal coding with the verbal and imaginal 
representations. Hence, there were two single coding conditions that were word writing 
and picture drawing. In addition, there were two other dual coding conditions that were 
word drawing and picture writing. In accordance with DCT in the single coding 
conditions, the tasks activated the representational processing, and in the dual coding 
conditions, the tasks activated the referential processing. According to DCT, recall rate 
should be higher in the case of dual coding than in single coding conditions, since the 
information is provided from two different sources and there are imaginal and verbal 
representations for the recall.  
 
The only difference between this experiment and experiment 1 (apart from the 
elimination of 72 abstract words) was the instructions that were given to the drawing 
groups. They were told that it was an item recognition task and in the intervals, they had 
to draw a general sketch of the presented pictures or objects that were suggested by the 
printed concrete words. Subsequently, the response sheets were collected and the 
subjects were asked to recall as many pictures or words as possible.  
 
Results and discussion 
 
The results of experiment 2 have been shown in figure 3.3. There are some similarities 
and differences between these results and the results of experiment 2. As can be 
observed, the mean proportion of correct recall in the case of written concrete words is 
almost the same as their recall rate in experiment 196. In addition, the mean proportions 
of the correct recall for the written labels of the pictures in both experiments are very 
close97. Despite these similarities, there was a significant finding, which contrasts with 
the basic principles of DCT and is considered as evidence for the superiority of imagery 
code. In accordance with the results, the mean proportion of correct recall for both 
picture drawing and word drawing is higher than what was expected from DCT. The 
mean proportion of correct recalls for word drawing and picture drawing is almost twice 
the recall rate of word writing which is an evidence against DCT. In other words, the 
pictures, both as an input and as the subjects' drawing, resulted in a high recall rate that 
is very good evidence in favor of the superiority of imaginal code over verbal code in 
                                                          
96 0.212 vs 0.205 
97 0.450 vs 0.486 
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our memory. However, one possible objection against this hypothesis could be the 
possible implicit labelings by the subjects in the picture drawing task. This means that 
the subjects employed verbal information to represent the stimuli in the verbal 
subsystem. In this condition, the subjects used both systems to draw the sketches, and 
consequently, the results would not be evidence against DCT. In the next experiment, 




Figure 3.398. Mean proportion of correct incidental recall for the verbal and pictorial 




Items, item presentations and general task instructions were almost the same as those of 
experiment 1. However, there were some differences in the design of orienting tasks and 
in the instructions given to the subjects. The subjects were told that they had to 
participate in two different types of coding tasks (verbal and imaginal). In other words, 
the subjects had to pronounce the words shown in the word pronunciation condition and 
the labels of displayed pictures in the picture pronunciation condition. In addition, they 
had to image the displayed pictures in the picture image condition and the suggested 
objects by the printed words in the word image condition. In the next step, they had to 
rate (from 1 to 7)99 the difficulty of this coding (the difficulty of pronounceability or 
imaging) for each presented item. Subsequently, the subjects were asked to recall as 
many items as they could on the recall sheets during five minutes. Finally, stimuli were 
                                                          
98 Paivio and Csapo (1973:188). 




again displayed to the subjects in the picture group, and they were asked to label them 
on new sheets, which served to score their verbal recall100.  
 
Results and discussion 
 
The proportion of correct recall for picture pronunciation, picture imaging, word 
pronunciation and word imaging can be observed in figure 3.4101. It is clear that there is 
no significant difference between these results and those in experiment 2. Similar to 
experiment 2, the lowest recall rate was for the word pronunciation group and was 
almost equal for the remaining groups. The most important conclusion which can be 
drawn from these two experiments is that first, we cannot consider the verbal encoding 
hypothesis as the main reason for the superiority of the pictorial stimulus correct recall 
rate over the recall rate of verbal stimulus. This is because in both experiments the recall 
rate of picture drawing or imaging is almost twice the recall rate of word pronunciation 
or writing. Secondly, these results and those obtained in experiment 1 do not suggest 
any evidence in favor of DCT; instead, they are strong evidence in favor of imagery 
hypothesis. In both experiments, the results showed that the existence of imaginal 
representations created both by the pictorial stimuli and by the instructions could be the 
main reason for the superiority of the recall rate for the pictorial stimuli and the imaged 
words in comparison with the verbally encoded words. In particular, the recall rate of 
imaged words were salient, since when subjects imaged the suggested words, their 
mental system accessed the imaginal representations in the non-verbal subsystem. This 
means that the difference of recall rate between words and pictures would be eliminated 





Figure 3.4. Mean proportion of correct incidental recall of pictures and words encoded by imaging (Im) 
the items or pronouncing (Pr) their labels. 
                                                          
100 The responses of the picture stimulus group were scored by their post experimental labelling that 
helped to normalise the verbal recall of the pictures where the labels differed from the normal ones. 




II. Learning Chinese concrete and abstract words with verbal and 
imaginal instructions 
 
In line with other experimental works corresponding to the relationship between 
learning and DCT (see Sadowski 2005; Boers et al., 2007), Shen (2010) performed two 
experiments. In the first experiment, he analyzed the differences in learning Chinese 
concrete words in a situation where the subjects were provided only verbal coding 
instructions versus a situation where the subjects were given both verbal and imaginal 
coding instructions. In the second experiment, he examined the differences in learning 
Chinese abstract words in the same situations (verbal instructions versus verbal and 
imaginal instructions). In these two experiments, Shen sought to respond to this 
question: does the learning of Chinese abstract and concrete words differ in the verbal 
instruction situation in comparison with the imaginal plus verbal instructions situation? 
Namely, is there any difference in the activation of the verbal and non-verbal 
subsystems? 
 
Design and Methodology 
 
Both experiments had a 2 × 2 (instructional conditions × performance on vocabulary 
tests) design. Hence, two types of tests existed: the first test was taken immediately after 
the instructions were received and the second one was taken 24 hours after. Twenty 
concrete and twenty abstract words were chosen for the experiments. The selection of 
the words was performed from the integrated Chinese textbook. Concrete words are the 
ones which have direct access to sensory referents (e.g. 黄瓜 cucumber); on the other 
hand, abstract words are the words that do not have this direct access (e.g. 安全 safe). 
To be assured that there was a significant difference of abstractness between the abstract 
group and the concrete group, they mixed the words together and performed a word 
abstractness rating analysis. The t test demonstrated a noticeable statistical difference 
between concrete and abstract words102. The subjects were 45 students, of which five 
were not present either in the instruction part or in the test part of the concrete words 
part. In addition, ten were not present in the first or second day of the tests for the 
abstract words. Hence, the total number of the participants was 40 students for both 
tests of concrete words and 35 students in the case of abstract words.  
 
Results and discussion 
 
The results obtained from the two tests performed on concrete words are observable in 
tables 3.1 and 3.2103. In line with these results, it could be concluded that the subjects’ 
performance either on the first day or on the second day did not have any interaction 
with the type of instructions received (verbal or imaginal method used to encode 
stimulus). In agreement with these results, it can be deduced that the verbal encoding 
alone or verbal plus imaginal encoding do have the same results regarding the storage of 
concrete words in memory.  
 
                                                          
102 Mean rating for concrete words was 23.55 and for abstract words was 67.90, (t = 14.34, p < .000). 




























Table 3.5. Independent t-tests for retention of abstract words under two coding conditions 
 
The results achieved in both experiments performed on abstract words are displayed in 
tables 3.3 and 3.4104. According to these results, and contrary to the previous results, 
there was an interaction between the type of encoding method in the instructions for 
abstract words and the subjects’ performance on the abstract vocabulary testing. In 
addition, independent t-tests for recall of abstract words under two coding conditions 
(Table 3.5105) demonstrated that there was a significant difference for the recall of 
words’ meaning in the first day and for the recall of both words’ shape and meaning in 
the second day of abstract words testing.   
 
The results reveal that there was no interaction between the type of applied encoding 
method for the given instructions and the subjects’ performance in both tests conducted 
on concrete words. This is contrary to the results in both tests on abstract Chinese 
words, which manifested interactions between type of employed encoding method and 
the subjects’ performance. In the case of abstract words, the indicated tables are in 
agreement with the DCT; however, this is not true for the concrete tests results. The 
reason for this discrepancy would be the sensory nature of the chosen concrete words 
and their pre-existing imaginal representations in the memory of the subjects. In DCT 
terms, in the tests conducted on concrete words, when the subjects were provided only 
                                                          
104 Shen (2010:495).  
105 Shen (2010:495). 
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verbal instructions, they activated both imaginal and verbal representations. This is 
because in their long-term semantic memory they had stored the imaginal information 
correlating to those words. Namely, in order to accomplish an activation of the non-
verbal subsystem and to activate imaginal representations, the subjects did not need 
pictorial instructions. Hence, the very close statistical results in both applied encoding 
methods would be due to this hypothetical aspect of DCT.  
 
On the other hand, in keeping with the results achieved in the test conducted on abstract 
words, the question remains:  why did the verbal plus non-verbal encoding instructions 
result in a superior recall rate of meaning and shape of abstract words and not in a 
superior recall rate of their sound? In accordance with Shen (2010: 496), Chinese lacks 
sound-to-spelling correspondence. Chinese is also a tonal language in which four tones 
based on pitch levels are used. The written form of a word, however, indicates neither 
pronunciation nor tone. As a result, the employed imaginal encoding method in the 
non-verbal instructions did not provide the subjects the necessary acoustic information 
that enabled them to have a better recall rate in comparison with the tests that included 
only the verbal instructions.  
 
3.4. Words As social Tools or WAT theory 
 
Borghi and Binkofsky (2014) proposed the WAT model for the representation of 
concrete and abstract words and concepts in the human cognitive system. In their 
model, abstract words and concepts are not different from concrete words from the 
embodiment point of view, although they do differ from concrete words in other 
viewpoints such as importance of linguistic contexts and associations for abstract 
words, acquisition modality, activation of neural networks in the human brain and 
meaning variability across languages.  In the following section, WAT model and its 
theoretical aspects, together with some related experimental works, will be discussed.  
 
3.4.1. The theoretical basis of WAT theory 
 
Borghi and Binkofsky in their work (2014: 19-21) account for five principles as the 
basis of WAT theory. The first assumption is the centrality of embodiment for all the 
concepts. Namely, they state that not only concrete words and concepts but also abstract 
ones are grounded in our perception system, action system and emotional system. The 
second assumption is that the language and the linguistic contexts and associations are 
more important for the representation of abstract words and concepts than for the 
representation of concrete words and concepts. By this, Borghi and Binkofsky intend 
that abstract concepts and words activate linguistic areas in the human brain more than 
concrete words and concepts. This is rooted in two reasons: first, the members of an 
abstract category (and the experiences associated with them), like religion, differ 
drastically in comparison with the members in a concrete category, like cat, from the 
viewpoint of having sensorimotor features. Second, since they do not have any direct 
concrete referent, they need the linguistic associations and structures which connect 
them to our perception system, action system and emotional system. In other words, the 
language and linguistic structures play a mediator role between abstract words and our 
embodied experiences. By mediator role, Borghi and Binkofsky do not intend solely a 
linguistic label but also sometimes humans need some descriptions and explanations of 
a certain abstract concept (linguistically labeled) given by the members of their 
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linguistic cultural community. This enables us to assemble and put together sparse and 
variable experiences, and consequently comprehend it better. The third assumption is 
concerned with the modality of acquisition of abstract words. On the basis of the second 
part of assumption number two, Borghi and Binkofsky argue that the modality of the 
acquisition of abstract words and concepts relies more on the language and the linguistic 
associations than the modality of the acquisition of concrete ones. In the fourth 
assumption, in line with considerable neurolinguistic studies, they claim that while 
sensorimotor networks in the human brain are activated by both concrete and abstract 
words and concepts, the linguistic networks are activated more by abstract words and 
concepts (see Kiehl, Liddle, Smith, Mendrek, Forster & Hare, 1999; Jefferies, Patterson, 
Jones & Lambon Ralph, 2009). The last assumption is concerned with the linguistic 
diversity of abstract words and concepts and the fact that their representation depends 
more on the cultural and linguistic environment. In other words, abstract words may 
differ in different languages, cultures and/or in different linguistic cultural contexts 
between the members of the same linguistic community. In summary, WAT theory does 
not distinguish abstract words from concrete words according to the embodiment point 
of view. However, it does differentiate them from concrete words according to other 
viewpoints, such as importance of linguistic contexts and associations for the abstract 
words, acquisition modality, activation of neural networks in the human brain and 
meaning variability across languages.  
 
In a more generic view, a highlighted role of language in the representation of the 
abstract words is the difference between these two linguistic conceptual categories. It is 
the role of language in abstract words and concepts representations that causes 
differences in their acquisition modality, brain representation and activation of neural 
networks and so on. The question is what is the origin of this language centrality for the 
abstract words and concepts and why does WAT assign this crucial role to language?  
 
I. Why does WAT theory designate a crucial role in language for 
the representation of abstract concepts and words? 
 
Borghi and Binkofsky explain the importance of language for abstract words under 
three labels: language as glue, language as social tool and language as material thing. 
In the previous part, it was indicated that the members and the experiences associated to 
the members of an abstract category are too divergent. When our cognitive system is 
confronted with this grade of diversity, by the use of language it can categorize all of 
these members under a linguistic label. This linguistic label serves for the acquisition of 
all the meanings related to the label experienced in distinct contexts. Considering the 
fact that there is no direct referent for the abstract concepts, every individual would 
consider one of the experiences associated to a given abstract concept as more central. 
Therefore, it is impossible to account for an abstract word with one object (like concrete 
words) or with one experience. This diversity is not only inter-individual but also intra-
individual; namely, we may have a different and/or new sense of an abstract word in the 
future. In terms of Borghi and Binkofsky (2014: 22), language in this sense serves as a 
glue that collects all the heterogeneous experiences under the same label. Consider, as 
an example, an abstract word such as difficulty. If we ponder the experiences associated 
with it, we notice that the contexts in which this linguistic label is employed are too 





The nominal kinds that are usually considered abstract concepts could be exempted 
from this heterogeneity (Kloos & Sloutsky, 2004106). A concept like university 
professor is attached to a dictionary-like definition which in turn is rooted in our 
culture. For example, in accordance with the Merriam-Webster dictionary, it could be a 
teacher especially of the highest rank at a college or university. These concepts are also 
distinct from abstract concepts due to the fact that their referents are perceivable 
through the senses. In some cultures, a university professor could be a person who 
employs a sort of formal language and his/her image is associated with an academic 
environment, books, classes and so on. This is contrary to abstract words, which employ 
language as scaffolding structure that help us understand the meaning. In other words, 
having in possession a linguistic label, which glues together all the sparse but associated 
experiences of an abstract concept and makes a category, is what lacks in the nominal 
kind concepts.  
 
The social dimension of language or language as social tool illustrates the fact that we 
need a linguistic community and verbal explanations given by authentic members of 
this community to understand abstract concepts. This characteristic could be generic for 
all the concepts and linguistic structures (see Tomasello, 1992), although it is more 
crucial for the comprehension of abstract concepts. This fact could be shown by 
comparing some conceptual aspects of a concrete verb such as to eat and an abstract 
verb like to believe. To understand the meaning of this concrete word, we do not need 
verbal explanations of some members in our linguistic community. Its meaning is 
perceivable solely by the fact that our visual ability can track the act of eating by other 
individuals or our taste sense permits us to discover some aspects of eating. This would 
not happen in the case of to believe. We inevitably need some authorized members of 
our linguistic community to explain to us the meaning of this abstract verb. Contrary to 
the mentioned concrete verb, we are not able to perceive its meaning solely by our 
senses. Hence acquiring new abstract words implies a sophisticated social cognition 
ability that has less importance in acquiring new concrete words.  
 
Language as material thing concerns the fact that abstract words do not have direct 
perceivable referents, but the linguistic labels that glue together the experiences 
associated to an abstract concept can be perceived by distinct human senses. These 
words can be perceived by our vision and audition when we read or write abstract words 
or by both our audition and touch/proprioception when we produce them. The other 
aspect related to these words is that they are actively produced and received; thus, they 
contain action. In line with language as material thing hypothesis, the probability that 
the sensorimotor dimension, contained in the materiality of the perceived words, 
influences the representation of abstract words and concepts is much more than the 
representation of concrete words and concepts.  
 
                                                          
106 Kloos & Sloutsky, in their study, examined the prevalent assumption in literature which claims that 
most concepts are fundamentally similar. They performed three experiments in which they analyzed the 
acquisition and representation of natural-kind concepts versus nominal-kinds. They utilized two learning 
methods. In the first one, the subjects were shown instances of the concept without its verbal definition 
being provided (implicit learning regime). In the next learning method, the subjects were provided the 
verbal definition of the concept without its individual instances being shown (explicit learning regime). 
The results supported a physiological difference between natural-kind concepts and nominal kinds. The 
natural-kind concepts were best learned in the implicit learning regime, and on the other hand, the 
nominal kinds were best learned in the explicit learning regime.  
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II. The crucial role for language in the acquisition of novel 
concrete and abstract categories 
 
In line with the theoretical aspects of WAT theory, explained in the previous part, in 
this section a series of experiments are described in order to understand to what extent 
language influences the acquisition of abstract words and concepts. Borghi, et al (2010) 
in these experiments study the novel linguistic categories and try to understand what 
cognitive processes and components differ in acquisition of novel concrete categories 




In this experiment Borghi, et al., attempt to simulate the acquisition of concrete and 
abstract categories in the real world by creating novel concrete and abstract 
categories107, which serve them to understand if the same processes in concrete and 
abstract category acquisition are reproduced or not. The experiment was composed of 
three tests: test 1 contained categorical recognition and word acquisition trainings. In 
this training, the participants had to associate a linguistic label to the learned exemplars 
in the previous part. Test 2 consisted of word-object matching and test 3 was a 
production task. The subjects were 18 students from the University of Bologna who 
were native speakers of Italian. They were both males and females, and there were also 
both right-handed and left-handed participants.  
 
In these experiments, for concrete objects and words, Borghi, et al., created four novel 
objects and their related verbal labels108. These verbal labels all had the same number of 
letters and syllables. Two of these new words ended with a (feminine gender in Italian) 
and the remaining two ended with the letter o (masculine gender in Italian). The new 
words corresponded to four new categories composed of 12 members. For example 
FUSAPO, figure 3.5109, was a 3D figure with five protuberances. The colors used were 
blue and yellow. In the case of abstract words110 and figures, they followed the same 
criteria applied to create the concrete objects and their verbal labels (Borghi, et al., 
2010: 4). The invented verbal labels referred to new categories of relations between two 
3D figures. Consistent with the concrete categories, each of these new relational 
categories was composed of 12 members. As an example of the criteria111 used to make 
new relations, the one used to make PANIFA can be observed (figure 3.6112): two 3D 
moving figures. After contact, one of them moved in a straight line; the other one 
executed a turning movement with a different velocity.  
 
                                                          
107 Abstract categories did not refer to a single object but to a complex interaction between different 
objects. In addition, the entities to which abstract categories refer are not manipulable. In this experiment, 
they cannot analyze the reaction of participants’ mental cognitive systems with regard to all types of 
abstract and concrete categories in the concrete-abstract continuum, but rather they study solely two 
distinct types. 
108 Calona, fusapo, norolo, tocesa 
109 Borghi et al. (2010:4) 
110 Cofiro, latofo, panifa, rodela 
111 See Borghi et al. (2010:4) to study all the criteria used to make three new relations.  






Figure 3.5. FUSAPO, an example of a novel concrete category. The remaining category members were 
similar to figure 1.5 from the perceptual point of view.  
 
Figure 3.6. All the 3D figures were sky-blue cylinders; the PANIFA figure shows three phases. The 
initial, intermediate and final phases of the interacting movement. Other members of the category were 
not similar from the perceptual viewpoint, although they had the same grade of complexity in their 
interactive movements.  
 
 
The results of experiment 1, in particular the categorical recognition and word 
acquisition trainings, indicated that Borghi, et al, were able to simulate the acquisition 
of concrete and abstract categories in the real world. The results in tests 1 (forming 
categories) and 3 (property generation task) show that forming abstract categories is 
more difficult and they are represented in a different manner in comparison with 
concrete categories, since they possess less sensorimotor and perceptual features and are 




In experiment 2, Borghi, et al., added verbal descriptions for the linguistic labels 
referring to the abstract items in experiment 1. In line with what was explained in this 
chapter, abstract items differ from concrete items due to the lack of sensorimotor and 
perceptual features, which deprives them from having direct concrete referents in the 
real world. In agreement with the theoretical aspects of WAT, language, linguistic 
structures, associations, and definitions would be more relevant for the acquisition of 
abstract items. In experiment 2, this hypothesis was examined to understand to what 
extent providing linguistic definitions for the linguistic labels associated to abstract 
items facilitates their acquisition in comparison with experiment 1. Another objective in 
this experiment was discovering if the new acquisition modality had any impact on the 
response modality. For this reason, the subjects were provided a property verification 
task in test 3 that was substituted for the property generation task in experiment 1. The 
property verification task was performed in two modalities: by keyboards and 
microphones. The fact that manual information is more relevant to concrete items that 
contain sensorimotor features and verbal information is more relevant for abstract items 
(see Borghi & Cimatti, 2009) would support the expectations of faster results in the 
property verification task for concrete items in the keyboard modality and for abstract 
items in the microphone modality. 
 
The results of experiment 2 confirmed and extended the results obtained in experiment 
1. The results of the recognition test, in agreement with the results of the recognition 
test of experiment 1, confirmed that forming an abstract category is more difficult than 
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forming a concrete category. In the second test113 (words-objects matching), in 
accordance with the expectations, again it was more complicated to associate a novel 
abstract word to an already learned exemplar in comparison with associating a novel 
concrete word to a learned exemplar. The subjects had greater difficulty and a higher 
frequency of errors in associating the novel abstract words without verbal explanations 
(group A) to the exemplars. This manifested that the categorical boundaries (choosing 
between exemplars) for the abstract words were not as clear as the categorical 
boundaries for the concrete words. This gap between concrete and abstract words was 
filled by adding the verbal explanation for the abstract words (group B), which reduced 
the frequency of errors and, as a result, the categorical boundaries for the abstract words 
became as marked as the categorical boundaries for the concrete words. In the last test 
of experiment 2 (property verification task), as it was predicted, abstract words obtained 
faster results in the microphone test than in the keyboard test. These results can be 
observed in figure 3.7114. This difference was even more salient with group B (abstract 
words with verbal explanations). On the other hand, the concrete words obtained faster 
results in the keyboard test. These results are in agreement with the WAT theory, which 
sustains that concrete words and concepts contain more sensorimotor features, and 
abstract words and concepts rely more on the relational features, language, linguistic 





Figure.3.7. Results of test 3 (property verification task) in experiment 2 for both keyboard and 
microphone modalities and the obtained results for the concrete and abstract words. 
 
The problem in the previous experiment was that the property verification task was 
performed separately for the abstract and concrete words. Due to the fact that abstract 
items always referred to blue objects115, the subjects could respond without retrieving 
the conceptual features of abstract categories, which could not happen in the case of 
                                                          
113 In the second test of experiment 2 (words-objects matching) two different ANOVAs were performed 
on the errors, the first one was for the No Explanation group (A) and another was for the Explanation 
group (B). 
114 Borghi et al. (2010:8). 
115 In test 3, participants performed a color verification task. They responded to questions such as “Is 
LATOFO yellow?” There were two modalities of responding. Press “yes” or “no” keys on a keyboard 
(keyboard modality) or pronounce “yes” or “no” with a microphone (microphone modality). “Yes” 
responses corresponded to questions about five different colors (blue, red, violet, yellow for concrete 
words and sky-blue for abstract), and “no” responses corresponded to questions about five wrong colors 
(black, brown, green, orange, white).They used color as the target property because color was not 
relevant to the motor response and to the response device that they used.  
74 
 
concrete categories. In this case, the subjects inevitably had to retrieve the conceptual 
features. This problematic aspect in the design of abstract objects could be the main 





In this experiment, apart from the color of abstract objects, Borghi et al performed other 
modifications. First, due to the interesting results in the previous experiment, they 
decided to utilize solely the abstract sample with the verbal explanations. Second, as 
mentioned, they balanced the color information in the abstract objects by adding other 
colors. Third, in order to control the influence of learning new verbal labels of 
categories, they performed the category recognition task both before and after learning 
the novel labels116. 
 
Considering the results obtained in this experiment (figure 3.8117), the results of the 
previous experiments are confirmed. In the category recognition task, there was not a 
different rate between concrete and abstract words, which can be interpreted as a result 
of adding new colors to the abstract objects (the referents of the verbal labels). The 
results also illustrated that adding verbal labels facilitated the categorical recognition 
task. In the word object matching test, approximately the same results of the previous 
experiments were replicated. The subjects made more errors in associating the abstract 
words to the exemplars than in associating the concrete ones, which is because of their 
higher conceptual complexity and the fact that their boundaries are not as clearly 
marked as the concrete categories. In test 3, the observed superiority of the abstract 
words over concrete ones disappeared (figure 3.8). This confirmed the indicated 
hypothesis; the lack of variety of colors employed in experiment 2 for the referents of 
the abstract words was the main reason for the RTs advantage for the abstract words in 
comparison with the concrete words. The results of the property verification test 
indicated that, for both concrete and abstract words, the subjects had higher RTs in the 
keyboard modality. However, the discrepancy of RTs between two modalities is more 
significant in the case of abstract items. Finally, in the property verification task, the 
subjects committed errors in both the keyboard and microphone modalities for both 
concrete and abstract categories. According to expectations, subjects committed more 
errors regarding abstract words in the keyboard modality and more errors regarding 
concrete words in the microphone modality.  
 
 
                                                          
116 Taking into consideration these new modifications, the experiment was composed of two training 
phases (experience and word acquisition), which were followed by four different tests (category 
recognition without labels, category recognition with labels, word object matching, property verification).  
117 Borghi et al. (2010:10). 
75 
 
Figure 3.8. Results of test 3 (property verification task) in experiment 3 for both keyboard and 




In experiments 2 and 3, Borghi, et al., added linguistic explanations solely for the 
abstract words; this was due to the WAT theory acquisition hypothesis of abstract words 
and concepts. However, adding verbal explanations only for the abstract words did not 
illustrate whether the acquisition of concrete words was similarly influenced by the 
verbal explanations or not. To make this point clearer, they employed verbal labels or 
verbal labels plus linguistic explanations for both abstract and concrete words. Another 
important modification in this experiment was a sort of informational segregation. 
Namely, they decided to separate the perceptual information from the verbal labels plus 
explanations. Therefore, they applied different colors for the members of abstract 
categories so that the subjects categorized them on the basis of the color. However, the 
labels and linguistic explanations were based on the reciprocal interaction of the 
members instead of their perceptual feature. Hence, the linguistic labels and 
descriptions were matched with the concrete objects, contrary to the abstract verbal 
labels and explanations that were not matched with the perceptual features of the 
objects. This modification was designed to understand if the superiority of abstract 
words in the microphone modality in test 3 was due to the phonological/articulatory 
aspects of the examined abstract words or if their conceptual features played some role 
in that superiority as well. If the results obtained in the microphone modality are 
replicated in experiment 4, they will interpret this superiority as a result of superficial 
linguistic structure plus verbal explanations of both concrete and abstract words. On the 
other hand, if the superiority in the microphone modality in test 3 relates somehow to 
the conceptual contents, then it will be adapted with the information received by 
perception and action (concrete categories in experiment 4118 ) and will not contrast 
with them (abstract categories in experiment 4). 
 
The results of the categorical recognition task demonstrated that the difference between 
labeled and non-labeled categories increased when the verbal explanations were added. 
However, this happened solely for the concrete categories because the verbal 
explanations were relevant to their perceptual features, contrary to verbal explanations 
for the abstract categories that were in contrast with the perceptual information. The 
                                                          
118 To do the mentioned modifications, the procedure was different in two aspects with respect to the 
previous experiments. First, they divided subjects into two parts for both concrete and abstract words, 
then one group in the acquisition training learned the linguistic labels and the other group learned the 
linguistic labels plus verbal explanations. Second, they used different colors for category members for 
both concrete and abstract categories. In addition, two members of each category had the same colors as 
the other category (e.g., The surface of FUSAPO could be yellow, blue, red, or sky-blue; its thickness was 
always the same, i.e., dark blue. The surface of NOROLO shared yellow and blue colors with the surface 
of FUSAPO, but it could also be green or violet; the color of its thickness was always dark blue.). 
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most important aspect of the results could be seen in the property verification test. In 
accordance with figure 4.9119, RTs in the microphone modality are better for both the 
concrete and abstract words. This illustrates the fact that phonological and articulatory 
aspects of words (concrete or abstract) affect the performance of participants. The more 
important thing is that the discrepancy between microphone RTs and keyboard RTs is 
more salient in the case of concrete words, which illustrates that the verbal labels and 
explanations decrease RTs in the property verification test when they are relevant to the 
perceptual information. Therefore, the subjects’ performance in the microphone 
modality both in experiment 3 and 4 is on the basis of: a) the phonological/articulatory 
aspects of the examined words, and b) conceptual contents whenever the verbal 
explanations are in line with the perceptual features of the objects (better RTs of 







Figure 3.9. Experiment 4: interaction between Word (Abstract, Concrete) and Response Device 
(Keyboard, Microphone). 
 
The results obtained in experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4 are in agreement with the embodiment 
and grounded theories of language processing (see Clark, 2006; Glenberg, et al., 2008) 
since both types of utilized categories had either direct perceptual referents (concrete 
categories) or relational referents (abstract categories). In the experiments, it was 
observed that, to form abstract and concrete categories and to acquire them, the 
participants needed not only the indicated direct perceptual and relational referents but 
also language, which had a more highlighted role in the case of abstract categories. The 
results are also in line with the predictions of WAT theory; namely, WAT theory 
concedes a very important role to language and linguistic structures in the representation 
of abstract categories. This study, in addition, illustrated that, on the one hand, motor 
linguistic information was more important for the representation of abstract words and, 
on the other hand, the manual120 information was more significant for the representation 
of concrete words. One aspect of this study which was not predicted by WAT theory is 
                                                          
119 Borghi et al. (2010:12). 
120 In experiments 2, 3, and 4, there was a property verification task in both keyboard and microphone 




that the linguistic label was an advantage for learning both concrete and abstract 
categories. Generally speaking, the present study showed that verbal labels help 
categorization independently from the type and conceptual complexity of the category 
(concrete category or abstract one). However, abstract categories in their representation 
benefit from language more than concrete categories, which is due to the fact that they 
do not refer to manipulable objects but rather (in this study) to the relational referents. 
 
3.5.  Dove’s theory: modal plus amodal 
representation 
 
In line with the introduction of this chapter, there is a theoretical stream corresponding 
to the representational system(s) and the processing of different types of concepts in our 
mind, which argues that the represented concepts in our cognitive system are neither 
completely embedded in the perceptual and sensorimotor features nor derived from an 
abstract computational mechanism (the mechanism that is responsible for originating 
amodal representations of the concepts that we use). In accordance with this theoretical 
stream, the concepts that are represented in our cognitive system are grounded in both 
modal and amodal representations. Although many concepts in agreement with the 
modal theories of conceptual representation (Barsalou, 2008; Barsalou; 2010, 
Langacker, 2008) may be embedded in perception and action, amodal representations 
could be an explanation for the acquisition of the concepts which are not extracted and 
simulated from our perceptual experiences. One of the theories in the indicated 
theoretical approach is Dove’s theory (Dove, 2009; Dove, 2011; Dove, 2014). In short, 
Dove sustains that the different kinds of concepts that we use daily in our thoughts and 
linguistic productions and comprehensions are represented in the human cognitive 
system in two modalities121:  a) through sensorimotor simulations of our sensorimotor 
experiences with the surrounding objects and events, and b) through sensorimotor 
simulations of language and linguistic associations. Linguistic representations are 
multimodal and/or supramodal122, however, contrary to prototypic concrete categories, 
they do not inherit their properties from direct referents in our living environment. 
Language in the second case plays a crucial role in our cognitive system. Our cognitive 
system can generalize and extract concepts across linguistic associations and structures. 
Namely, by linking linguistic associations, which are not correlated directly, our 
cognitive mechanism could create inferential relationships and make abstractions. 
Through these abstractions (based on language and linguistic associations), we could 
reach beyond what can be found in single linguistic associations. 
 
According to what is indicated in the above lines, Dove highlights the role of simulation 
both in the conceptual representation of the concepts with the direct perceptual referents 
and in the one corresponding to the concepts without this type of referents. In the 
                                                          
121 This theory and its main lines have some similarities with dual coding theory proposed by A.Paivio 
(1986). Both consider two kinds of representations in the human cognitive system; in the DCT, Paivio 
considers imagens as the fundamental constructive units in the imaginal representational system and 
logogens as the fundamental units in the verbal representational system. The representations in the first 
system are grounded in the sensorimotor experiences (modal representations); instead, the ones in the 
verbal system are grounded in language and linguistic associations (amodal representations).   
122 These two terms are sometimes used as synonyms and sometimes not. To understand the difference 
between them, see Mahon and Caramazza (2005: 482). 
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following section, simulation and what Dove intends by this term will be briefly 
explained. 
 
3.5.1. What is simulation in Dove’s viewpoint? 
 
In accordance with what was indicated, for Dove the key point for the representations of 
both types of concepts123 is sensorimotor simulation. The human cognitive system 
converts real experiences to perceptual symbols124, which contain simulations of 
experiences (i.e., our conceptualization of a category is formed by the simulation of our 
experiences with the specific members of that category). These simulations of 
experiences have some important characteristics. First, simulations could be done 
unconsciously; in other words, they could contain unconscious representations referring 
to introspective or subjective experiences. Second, they could be schematic, meaning 
that they can contain only some part of the perceptual information of the simulated 
experiences. Third, they are multimodal, in the sense that they reactivate the 
representation of perceptual experiences from several modalities. In agreement with 
Barsalou (1999) and Prinz (2002; 2005), Dove argues that our conceptual system should 
have both simulator and simulation. A simulator is a complicated system with 
associative relationships between perceptions plus perceptual areas that originates 
simulation. In other words, a simulator is a distributed system spanning association and 
sensorimotor areas (Dove, 2011: 2). The simulations created by the simulator are 
context-sensitive, which means that a given context in distinct situations has different 
simulations. However this may not be the whole story, since if the perceptual 
experiences are simulated partially, how can we generalize and categorize from 
particular exemplars and create different kinds of categories in our mind? This would 
happen with the support of long-term memory and adding the stored information 
relevant to our generalization and categorization in a specific moment of 
conceptualization. This would transfer some important aspects of conceptualization into 
non-perceptual areas in the brain. In these non-perceptual areas, the category knowledge 
is linked with multimodal information. This type of information will be automatically 
involved in creating simulations of perceptual experience. Convergence zones, in 
accordance with Damasio (1989),125 are hypothetical zones that are involved in the 
                                                          
123 The concepts with direct perceptual referents and the ones without direct perceptual referents.  
124 Dove got this idea from Barsalou (1999) and Prinz (2002; 2005).  
125 As Lakoff, G., (1993a) assumes, a Convergence Zone (CZ) is a hypothesised neural control structure 
that gathers and unifies operations that take place in different locations. Namely, CZH (convergence zone 
hypothesis) is about a specific type of architecture in the human brain constituted by: a) neuron ensembles 
located in primary and first-order association cortices (“early cortices”) and motor cortices. They include 
representational information of perceptuomotor interactions; b) neuron ensembles located downstream 
from the indicated neuron ensembles throughout single modality cortices (local convergence zone). They 
contain amodal representational information of the combinatorial fragmented features that occur 
synchronously during an experience of an event or entity; c) neuron ensembles located downstream from 
the indicated neuron ensembles throughout higher-order association cortices (non-local convergence 
zones); d) feed-forward and feedback projections reciprocally interlocking the neuron ensembles in (a) 
with those in (b) according to a many-to-one (feed-forward) and one-to-many (feedback) principle 
(Damasio, 1989:25).These, contain amodal representational information of combinatorial local 
convergence zones that happen synchronously during the experience of entities and events. The 
integration is done by temporal binding that is controling the temporally blocked activations of neural 
patterns in different locations. This activity gathers the computed features of the controlled locations into 
a single unified whole. Depending on the topographic distinction between them, CZs with the same neural 
architecture have different functions. CZs are connected both in the hierarchical and heterarchical ways. 
There is a hypothesis that argues that the cognitive deficits corresponding to brain damage appear due to 
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conceptualization process. They could include amodal symbols. If this theory is true 
then the embodied theories deal with a very serious challenge in handling the existence 
of amodal symbols in the conceptual representations. In the next section, an important 
challenge corresponding to the presence of amodal representation together with the 
modal representation in the conceptual representation is discussed. 
 
3.5.2. A significant challenge for embodied 
theories  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the fact that CZs or connections between them are lesioned. Lakoff (1993a) in “Convergence Zones and 
Conceptual Structure” with the example of a familiar face illustrates the properties of CZs and the types 
of patients who suffer from CZ lesions. He sheds light on the three major cases of patients who, according 
to the hypothesis, have different types of CZ lesions: 
1) The face should be perceived as a whole with different details such as eyes, hair, etc. There are patients 
who have problems with the integration of the low level features in the gestalt. CZH claims that CZs that 
integrate low-level facial features (the ones that are perceived and detected in other locations) do not 
function.  
2) The face, detected as a whole with all its features, must then activate knowledge about a particular 
person. There are patients who can detect a face as a gestalt; however, they are not able to correspond this 
gestalt with the information related to the person to identify him/her. They need some other information 
from the person to recognize his/her face (i.e., voice, manner of walking). Again, this is not a general 
case, because there are also patients who cannot recognize a face by the voice or the manner of walking. 
CZH in this case argues that the CZs which correlate face-gestalt to the knowledge of the person is 
disrupted. 
3) Even in the case of resolving the second case (the disruption of CZs that connect face-gestalt to the 
information of the person), one must relate face-gestalt correlated to the information of the person to a 
proper name. There are patients who are able to correlate the face-gestalt to the information of the person 
but not to the name of the person. CZH argues that the CZs which connect proper names to recognized 
faces are disrupted.  
 
The architecture of all CZs is approximately the same. Connections from high-level features (gestalt) to 
low-level features (single CZs) are mutuals. For example, in the case of ,CZ-face, in perception, 
activation is from low-level features to the gestalt (CZ-face); in memory, on the other hand, the case is 
vice versa: activation starts from the higher level (CZ-person, or higher) and is passed to CZ-face and 
then to lower-level features (eye, hair, etc.). The indicated activation is the hierarchical activation but as it 
was mentioned, there is also a “heterarchical” connection between the CZs that is the connections 
between the CZs in the same level that are integrated into a gestalt. The CZs do not have any specific 
representation, i.e., CZ-face, CZ-name or CZ-person do not have any representation for themselves. They 
only control the activation of neural ensembles in other locations, which is done by temporal binding 
according to CZH. For example, in the case of CZ-face we deal with low-level features such as eyes, 
nose, mouth, etc. What CZ-face does, in very generic terms, is match these low-level features with a 
general abstraction of the human face (in which there are slots for the low-level features). It associates 
particular eyes with the eye slot, particular ears with the ears’ slot, particular lips with the lips’ slot, etc. 
This neural binding is done based on the time-locked activation of low-level features that are tied together 
to form a particular face. The convergence zone controls the running of lower-level activation patterns. In 
this way, the patterns can be integrated in synch. In the case of hierarchy of CZs, the highest-level CZ 
controls the activation of the CZ that is located one level lower. This CZ in turn controls the activation of 
the subsequent lower-level CZ. This process continues until the locations in which the separated features 
of a CZ are computed.  
 
In line with CZH, all the parts that are activated in the brain are correlated by the CZs. These in turn are 
organized hierarchically. In this way the complexity and the cognitive load of a task is not concentrated in 
just one place but rather is shared in distinct locations, from the highest-level CZs to low-level locations 
which compute the features of the CZs. These locations could be found at different parts of the brain such 





In accordance with the neuroimaging experiments, it could be claimed that the 
possibility of the existence of amodal representation in the conceptual representation is 
not excluded (see Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013; Ricciardi & Pietrini 2011; Struiksma, et 
al., 2009). In these studies, the activation of some brain areas, which were considered as 
evidence for embodied cognition, contained modulated activity in brain areas that were 
near to the areas used for embodiment processing (sensorimotor processing).   
 
Considering what was indicated with regard to the non-perceptual areas of long-term 
memory and the fact that they underlie the simulation of our abstractions and 
generalizations from the experiences, the conceptualization is divided into two parts. 
First, the part that is accomplished by the modal representations (which, according to 
embodied cognition theories, is the only part). Second, the part that is accomplished by 
the amodal representations in the locations in which multi-modal information is 
collected and supra-modal representations are made. Convergence zones could be a 
solution for this modal plus amodal simulation; however, in line with Dove (2011:4) 
this is not a satisfying solution to the challenge posed by activation in convergence 
zones because it is provisional and ad hoc. Another solution could be hidden in the 
nature of perceptual and motor systems. Embodied cognition claims that cognition is 
interweaved with sensorimotor experiences and the abstractions and generalizations of 
them. This unification and connection does not exclude the supramodal or amodal 
representations since they help to create more complete and integrative simulations. The 
integration of the supramodal representations happens if they do not act independently. 
Dove proceeds in this hypothesis and argues that the dichotomy of modal versus amodal 
does not fit in the perspective of embodied cognition because it presupposes a clean and 
concrete distinction between cognition and perception (Dove, 2011:4).  
 
3.5.3. The problem of abstraction and three 
dominant theories of embodiment 
 
In agreement with what was indicated regarding conceptualization and abstraction, 
Dove accounts for a limitation of the embodied theories (2011:4). This limitation 
involves the fact that the sensorimotor grounded representations are not exhaustive 
solutions for abstract concepts like democracy. They are suited very well for concrete 
concepts but not for abstract ones. There are three mainstream theories in the embodied 
cognition which attempt to confront the problem of abstraction in their own way; 
however, in accordance with Dove (2011:5), they all suffer from some problematic 
issues in filling this gap. In generic terms, they suffer from two principal problems: 
“insufficiency” and “incompleteness”.  
 
The first theoretical approach is metaphorical-extension theory (Lakoff, 1993126; Lakoff 
& Johnson, 2008). According to this theory, one conceptual domain127 is understood 
metaphorically in terms of another. These metaphors, as their base, possess image 
                                                          
126 In Ortony, A. (1993). Metaphor and thought. 
127 In this theory, the conceptual domain is the representation of any relevant segment of experience. In 
this approach, when a metaphorical extension happens, the conceptual domain, which is understood in 
terms of another one, is called the target domain. For example, in the metaphorical extension between two 
conceptual domains like LOVE and JOURNEY in love is a journey, the conceptual domain LOVE, which 
is understood in terms of JOURNEY, is the target domain. In addition, the mechanism of understanding 
the conceptual domain LOVE by the conceptual domain JOURNEY is called metaphorical extension.   
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schemes128 which are grounded in our embodied experience in the environment, 
linguistic experience, and historical context. In very generic terms, there is a conceptual 
mapping between two conceptual domains. The first conceptual domain, from which we 
draw metaphorical expression and mapping operation, is called the source domain, and 
the second conceptual domain, which we attempt to comprehend by means of 
metaphorical mapping, is called the target domain. For example, the metaphor TIME IS 
MOTION is a primary metaphor129 in which mapping is drawn from the SPACE 
domain to the TIME domain.  
 
The second theoretical approach is similar to conceptual metaphor theory, however it 
focuses more on the action image schemata (Glenberg and Robertson, 1999). The 
general idea is that some abstract language is grounded in motor processes. The most 
important evidence for this claim is Action-Sentence Compatibility Effect130 
(Diefenbach, et al., 2013).  
 
The third theoretical approach proposes that some abstract concepts involve situated 
simulations (Barsalou, 1999). In a study of feature generation tasks on concrete, abstract 
and intermediate concepts131, Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) discovered two 
principal issues. First, the participants generated situational features for both concrete 
and abstract concepts, and second, they tended to generate more events and 
introspective features with abstract words. They concluded that abstract concepts 
correspond more to social aspects while concrete words correspond to physical entities. 
 
In relation with what was indicated about the problem of abstraction and generalization, 
each of these theories has its critical points. In the conceptual metaphor theory, first, the 
linguistic evidence that supports this approach is very weak and skeptical. It is unclear 
whether the linguistic patterns, which reflect conceptual structure, are derived from 
embodiment. Another problem of this approach is that it is implausible from the 
developmental viewpoint. For example, we do not need to learn all the complexities of a 
concept like building to understand theory in terms of it. In addition, experiments show 
that children’s conceptual abilities for abstract items remain poor before the ages 
between eight and ten (Douglas & Peel, 1979). The last critical point corresponds to the 
fact that a metaphor enables our cognitive system to specify the similarities between 
two concepts (between what was experienced and what we want to understand). 
However, it does not highlight the differences, which seem necessary since 
understanding the connection between what is metaphorically extended (sensorimotor 
experience in the case of primary metaphors) and the target concepts requires 
recognition of the target concepts. Without this sort of recognition, humans are not able 
to interpret the metaphor in the correct way. The action schema approach, in turn, has its 
                                                          
128 According to cognitive linguistics, an IS (image schema) is an infrastructural part of our reasoning and 
understanding. In contemporary cognitive linguistics, this term is considered an embodied prelinguistic 
structure of experience which motivates conceptual metaphor mappings.  
129 A basic and understandable metaphor such as KNOWING IS SEEING or TIME IS MOTION may be 
combined with other primary metaphors to produce complex metaphors, also known as compound 
metaphors, like THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS.  
130 The embodied cognition literature suggests that we understand linguistic models and descriptions of 
actions by means of creating simulations of these actions in our mind. The evidence comes from ACE 
that shows that sensibility judgment sentences are faster when the direction of the described action 
matches the response direction. This is called action-sentence compatibility effect.  
131 Three abstract concepts: truth, freedom, and invention, three concrete concepts: bird, car, and sofa and 
three intermediate concepts: cooking, farming, and carpeting. 
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weaknesses regarding the abstraction and generalization issue. For instance, it is not 
clear how we acquire relevant abstract concepts with a few action schemas. This 
flexibility seems to generate a theoretical ambiguity. If the same action schema is 
applied for distinct abstract concepts, how does our cognitive mechanism differentiate 
one from another? How do these limited action schemas cover and indirectly generate 
the unlimited abstract concepts that we know? The third approach also suffers from the 
same weaknesses regarding the abstractness. The evidence in literature is too 
unsubstantial, which cannot help us to resolve the problem of embodied representation 
and abstract concepts from the viewpoint of situated simulation approach. In agreement 
with Dove (2011:5), analyzing the situated simulations proposal, one can argue that 
embodied cognition theories do need an amodal representation to be able to represent 
the abstract concepts and their social and relational aspects of them. In summary, as it 
was mentioned before, all these theories suffer from “insufficiency” and 
“incompleteness”132.  
 
3.5.4. Disembodiment and natural languages 
 
The previous part illustrated that the embodied theories lacked a convincing theoretical 
structure, which explained representation, grounding and acquisition of abstract 
concepts. This causes Dove to propose a hybrid theory that is composed from embodied 
and disembodied parts. The sensorimotor based representations and simulations are 
easily made, relying only on the perceptual features, since they have direct grounded 
referents. This is contrary to abstract concepts, which lack the indicated referents and 
could not have complete and truthful representations, relying solely on the grounded 
based information. In Dove’s terms, the human cognitive system needs ungrounded 
representations for abstract concepts, which lack direct perceptual based features of 
concrete concepts. Namely, for abstract concepts, the addition of a sort of disembodied 
representation is needed. In the three theoretical approaches, which were described in 
the previous part, the general tendency is that abstract conceptual domains do not have 
direct perceptual referents; thus each of these approaches seeks to find a way to 
associate relations, events and objects, which are correlated directly to some 
experimental/cognitive domains, to other domains which are not directly correlated with 
them. Dove (2011:6) in this context coins a new term: dis-embodiment. In his criteria, a 
concept is considered disembodied if it is indirectly embodied. It means that although it 
does contain embodied features, these features have no direct relation with semantic 
content of the represented concept. However, how do these disembodied concepts exist 
in our mind, and more importantly, what is the cognitive mechanism that underlies 
them?  
Language performs two functions in relation with the questions mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. First, it can utilize sensorimotor simulations and action schemas; 
namely, the modality-specific representations which are derived from our sensorimotor 
experiences are relevant to language production and comprehension. Second, the 
inferences and associations are mediated symbolically by language. From these 
inferences and associations, abstract concepts are generated. Thus, the language and its 
systematic mechanism has to be more central for the abstract concepts. In many studies, 
the more important role of language in the abstract concepts is demonstrated (Paivio, 
                                                          
132 Consistent with Dove (2011:5), they are insufficient because they do not offer a complete description 
of their conceptual representation and the methodology, and they are incomplete because they could not 
represent all abstract concepts.  
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1986; Borghi, 2009; Borghi & Binkofski, 2014). In fact, the relationship between 
abstract concepts and language comes from some internal features of language itself 
(Dove, 2011: 6). Some of these internal features are representational arbitrariness of 
words and morphemes, context free concepts and systematic mechanism in natural 
languages.  The fact that these features are correlated with amodal symbol system is 
perfectly appropriate for representing abstract concepts. The representational 
arbitrariness of words and morphemes means that the linguistic symbols that are used 
to represent a concept such as JAR is different in different languages and there is no 
logical reason for the coining of this linguistic symbol for this concept; in addition, the 
phonetic similarity between JAR and CAR has no specific reason and is due to the 
intrinsic arbitrariness. The second feature means that some linguistic productions are 
independent from the contextual stimulations. This originally was an antithesis 
proposed by Chomsky (1966) against Skinner and behaviorism133 (Skinner, 1935). The 
third feature is derived from the fact that we are able to generate sentences in a 
systematic way. This originates from the characteristics of the natural languages by 
which we are able to produce the utterances only in accordance with a systematic 
combination of the symbols; in other words, a natural language is a syntactically 
recombinant symbols system. A natural language, according to Dove134 (2011), 
enhances these features in four ways: a) it enhances the amount of thoughts of an 
individual, which enables him/her to hear and understand the thoughts of others; b) it 
enables one to make the same kind of thought in different situations due to its non 
context-sensitivity property; c) The re-combinability of distinct syntactic structures in a 
natural language is a mirror of the potential re-combinability of thoughts in our mind; 
and d) it enables one to represent truth-value and inferential relations among thoughts.   
 
In line with these terms, the amodal representations exist in our cognitive system 
because it is the essential prerequisite for many thoughts and the combinatorial structure 
of our thoughts in the mind. These amodal representations extract the generalizations 
from the specific information within specific modalities related to entities and events in 
our experiences. Amodal representations, hence, integrate and generalize information 
from different modalities. In addition, they transform information between distinct 
specific modality codes. Namely, an individual, by learning a natural language, accesses 
a context-free and arbitrary symbol system which does not correlate to the specific 
embodied and sensorimotor modalities but rather interacts with them and generalizes 
the stored information in these modalities. In this sense, language, apart from using 
sensorimotor simulation for communicative goals, has a second role that is extracting 
the symbolically mediated associations and inferences. Thus the conceptualization (and 
the stored concepts) is not the mere result of embodiment but rather couched partially in 
the verbal representations. These representations are obtained in part by the 
                                                          
133 Behaviorism is a theoretical approach which tries to understand human and animal behavior. 
According to this theory, all behavior is either the result of our response to the contextual stimuli or 
something correlated to the background of the individual, specifically reinforcement and punishment 
together with the current motivational state of individual and controlling stimuli. In the 1930s 
B.F.Skinner proposed that more intimate events such as thoughts and feelings are subject to the same 
mechanism of observable behavior; this principle was the base of Skinner’s philosophy known as “radical 
behaviorism”. In line with Skinner’s change of tendency from experimental work to philosophical work 
related to the underlying elements of behavior, he started to think about human language with verbal 
behavior (Skinner, 2014). This book became the vocabulary and principal theoretical approach for 
functional analysis of linguistic behavior. This approach, as indicated, was criticized by Noam Chomsky 
and his theoretical approach, which is called innateness theory (See Chomsky, 1976). 
134 Cited from Camp (2009) 
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relationships between different linguistic representations, which in turn could be 
associative or inferential.  
 
In accordance with what was indicated, Dove’s account is similar to DCT. It counts two 
types of conceptual representations; the first one is the representation of sensorimotor 
information and the second one is the amodal, linguistic representation. However, as 
Dove confirms (2011:8), there are some differences between these two theoretical 
approaches. First, their fundamental representational units are not the same. Logogen 
and imagen are the fine-grained units of DCT, but the perceptual symbols are the fine-
grained units of Dove’s account. The perceptual symbols, contrary to logogens and 
imagens, are not necessarily conscious units. They can be schematic and/or multimodal. 
Second, the representations corresponding to the language-made concepts are distinct in 
these two approaches. In DCT, logogens are the fine-grained basic elements of verbal 
representations, and imagens are the minimal units for the sensorimotor representations. 
In Dove’s account, all conceptual representations contain perceptual symbols. The 
distinction between verbal and non-verbal representations does not originate from the 
minimal representational units, like in DCT, but rather from the fact that linguistic 
representations are the generalizations and abstractions of the information and 




In this chapter, several theories of conceptual representation have been described. In the 
first part, Context Availability Theory (Schwanenflugel, et al., 1988; Schwanenflugel, et 
al., 1992; Schwanenflugel, et al., 1996), together with some related experiments were 
explained. CAT assumes that the human cognitive system takes advantage of both our 
subjective internal contextual knowledge and the external contextual information. These 
two sources help us to process and represent two different conceptual categories 
(concrete and abstract words) in our mind. In accordance with this theory, concrete 
concepts are easier to process, represent and retrieve due to our richer internal and 
external linguistic and conceptual information related to them. Therefore, in line with 
CAT, as the contextual information corresponding to a concept increases, our 
comprehension, elaboration and retrieval rate of that concept increase accordingly. 
 
In the second part, Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1990; Paivio, 1991) with its 
presupposition and related experiments were discussed. The most significant 
presupposition of DCT is that human representational mechanism deals with two 
different types of information. The first type is the information obtained from the 
objects and events in our living environment (sensorimotor information) and the second 
type is the information obtained from our linguistic input stored in human memory. The 
representational systems that deal with these two information types are imaginal and 
verbal subsystems. The structural organization of dual coding theory reflects the 
conceptual structure in the long-term memory and the hierarchical order of sensorimotor 
and verbal information. At the most generic level, there is a symbolic representational 
cognitive system which is divided into verbal and non-verbal subsystems. These 
subsystems in the next organizational level are divided into sensorimotor (visual, 
auditory and haptic) subsystems. Finally, at the lowest level, there are representational 
units for each subsystem called imagens (for the non-verbal subsystem) and logogens 
(for the verbal subsystem). In other words, there are componential relations between 
more complicated and less complicated units. The very general assumption of this 
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theory is that the representations of these subsystems are grounded into perceptual, 
motor and affective experiences, which is the reason for the existence of sensorimotor 
subsystems in the verbal subsystem. Hence, the representations have a multi-modal 
structure instead of an abstract unimodal structure, which means that there is continuity 
between behavior and cognition. The two types of relationships in the DCT model of 
human representational system are between system relationship and within system 
relationship. The first type of relationship describes the connection between imaginal 
and verbal subsystems and the second one explains the associations between the 
components of each subsystem. There are concrete relationships between the logogens 
and continuous relationships between imagens. In agreement with DCT, there are three 
processing types in the human representational system. Representational processing is 
the activation of the verbal representations by linguistic stimuli and that of the non-
verbal representations by non-linguistic stimuli. Referential processing is the activation 
of the verbal subsystem and its verbal representations by non-linguistic stimuli, and the 
activation of the non-verbal subsystem by linguistic stimuli. Associative processing is 
the activation of the representations in a subsystem by other representations in the same 
subsystem. In summary, the more salient difference between DCT model and CAT 
model is that DCT accounts for two different types of representational systems but CAT 
model assumes that there is only one representational system for both concrete and 
abstract words and concepts.  
 
Words As social Tools or WAT model (Borghi & Cimatti, 2009; Borghi & Binkofsky, 
2014) is another theory that was explained in this chapter. The principles of this model 
are: a) the centrality of embodiment for all concepts, b) language and linguistics 
contexts and associations are more important for the representation of abstract words 
and concepts, c) the modality of the acquisition of abstract words and concepts relies 
more on language and linguistic associations than the modality of the acquisition of 
concrete ones, d) while sensorimotor networks in the human brain are activated by both 
concrete and abstract words and concepts, linguistic networks are activated more by 
abstract words and concepts e) abstract words and concepts appear in more versatile 
contexts, created by language, and the fact that their representation depends more on the  
cultural and linguistic environment. 
 
In the final section of this chapter, Dove's theory (Dove, 2009; Dove, 2011; Dove, 
2014) was described. This model argues that the concepts represented in our cognitive 
system are neither completely embedded in the perceptual and sensorimotor features nor 
are derived from an abstract computational mechanism. Dove claims that the 
conceptualization of the information in our cognitive system is grounded in both modal 
and amodal representations. He highlights the role of simulation in the process of 
conceptualization and argues that there are two kinds of simulations in the 
conceptualization process, which is on the one hand through sensorimotor simulations 
of our sensorimotor experiences and on the other hand through sensorimotor 
simulations of language and linguistic associations. In the second type, the role of 
language is very important. The human cognitive system, by linking linguistic 
associations, could create inferential relationships, make abstractions, and reach beyond 







4. Supramodality135 and the processing of concrete 
and abstract concepts  
 
In line with what was explained in the previous chapter, there are three different types 
of theoretical accounts for the conceptual representation. The first one argues that the 
embodied experiences provide our cognitive mechanism with sensorimotor information; 
this is the only needed information, by which all types of conceptual representation are 
formed. This approach is called modal approach and rejects all kinds of underlying 
abstract, amodal representations. For instance, WAT account is an example of this view 
(Borghi and Binkofsky, 2014). The second theoretical approach is in accordance with 
the traditional viewpoint. According to this approach, there is an abstract underlying 
system that is responsible for the representation of concepts136. The last approach 
accounts for a hybrid mechanism, which profits from both modal and amodal 
representational systems. In this view, the quantity of interventions of modal or amodal 
systems depends on the nature of the represented concepts and their features. On the one 
hand, if they possess more sensorimotor features, the role of the modal representational 
system is more salient, and, on the other hand, if they possess more associative 
(linguistic) features, the amodal representational system plays a more significant role. 
The example of this category is Dove’s model (Dove, 2009; 2011; 2014) explained in 
the previous chapter.   
 
In this chapter, first, the supramodality concept is described; according to some theories, 
supramodality is the underlying mechanism for the conceptual representation (Ricciardi 
& Pietrini, 2011). I will provide a brief introduction with regard to supramodality, its 
differences with multimodality (that is the underlying representational system for the 
embodied theories) and an explanation will be given as to why in these theories it is 
believed that in the first place an abstract internal representational system is responsible 
for the representation of concepts. Second, some experiments in line with the theoretical 
section will be explained to demonstrate to what extent this theory is correct. 
 
4.1. Supramodality: Is there a supramodal 
functional architecture in the human brain? 
 
Maybe it is not possible to talk about supramodality without understanding the 
structure, topography and the function of mirror neurons137. The mirror neurons are 
                                                          
135 Supramodality has a direct relationship with the body schema concept (Head, 1920). In this model, 
there are combined representations that refer to a process in which primary information (e.g. visual, 
tactile, etc.) are translated into a single sensory modality or an abstract amodal form (Haggard &Wolpert, 
2005) 
136 In the present work, I have not emphasized much the pure amodal representational system. However, 
examples for this type are the models proposed by Fodor (1987) and Chomsky (1980).  
137 Mirror neurons were originally discovered over twenty-five years ago in the ventral premotor F5 
region of the macaque monkey. This area controls the movements of the hand and the mouth. The 
important characteristic of this area is that many of its neurons become activated during a specific goal-
directed action, regardless of the effector (mouth, hand), to enable humans to accomplish that goal. On 
the contrary, these neurons are not fired with the same effectors for a different goal. Depending on the 
action effectors that cause the neurons to fire, the neurons are divided into different categories. The most 
known neuron categories in this area are: grasping, holding, tearing and manipulating neurons (Rizzolatti, 
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some functionally special neurons originally discovered in monkeys’ brains (Di 
Pellegrino, et al, 1992). They are located in the premotor and parietal cortexes. These 
neurons are activated either when the monkeys performed a goal-oriented action or 
when they observed another individual performing the same actions (Kilner & Lemon, 
2013). A similar mechanism that is more developed exists in the human brain. Namely, 
it possesses the same functions of the monkeys’ mirror neurons mechanism, in addition 
to other functions such as learning by imitation, empathy, and language development. 
Topographically speaking, these neurons are located in a similar network; that is, an 
inferior frontal, premotor, and inferior parietal cortical network (Ricciardi, et al, 2009). 
These neurons are more active when humans perceive familiar and acquired actions 
compared to unknown ones.  
 
The important question here is in what way are these mirror neurons connected to the 
supramodal representational system in the human cognitive system? If they fire 
whenever humans perform an action or they “see” other individuals performing it, they 
could be easily correlated to a multimodal representational system. This is because we 
perceive an action by the sensorimotor information. This kind of information, in 
accordance with embodied cognition theories, is obtained by the different modalities 
(modal view); however, humans are not able to conceptualize all actions solely with the 
modal representational system. As indicated, neurons in the F5 area in the premotor 
cortex of a monkey’s brain discharge either when the animal performs an action or 
“sees” others doing it. In line with Kohler et al (2002), many goal-related actions could 
be identified by their sound in the cognitive system of monkeys. Many of the neurons 
fire either when the animal hears or sees the action. These mirror neurons discharge 
independently from the fact that the action is performed, seen or heard. This finding, in 
the homologous area of the Broca area in the human brain, could be interpreted as 
abstract meaning codification. Namely, in this zone, there are abstract meaning contents 
which are accessible from the auditory modality. The same finding is obtained in 
humans by experiments performed on sighted and blind subjects (Ricciardi, et al, 2006; 
Ricciardi & Pietrini, 2011) and the activation of almost the same neurons in both 
groups. In other words, in experiments with sighted and congenitally blind subjects, 
approximately the same neurons discharged. This rejects the hypothesis that the 
activation of the same neurons by other modalities (apart from the visual one) is due to 
the visual memory of the action stored in the long-term memory.  
 
There are several experiments with regard to what was previously explained. For 
example, Cattaneo and Vecchi (2008) investigated unimodal and crossmodal processes 
in spatial working memory. Ricciardi, et al (2006) studied low-level multi-modal 
representation or high level supramodal representation in spatial working memory tasks 
presented by visual or tactile format. Pietrini, et al (2004) investigated whether the 
category related neural response in the ventral visual pathway, that topographically 
speaking is very classified and highlighted, is a modal representation of sensorimotor 
information or an amodal representation of objects and categories independent from the 
sensorimotor information. Farah, et al (1989) studied whether mechanisms of spatial 
attention in parietal lobe are based on modality specific or supramodal representations. 
They performed their experiments (a simple reaction time task to lateralized visual 
                                                                                                                                                                          
et al., 2005). The second characteristic of this area is that its neurons specify how a specific goal is 
achieved. For example, the majority of the grasping neurons are activated if the grasping is done in a 
particular way but not in other ways.  
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target stimuli) with parietal-lesioned patients138. Cohen, et al (1997) investigated 
Functional relevance of cross-modal plasticity in blind humans. In their experiment, 
they concluded that blindness from an early age can cause a functional plasticity139 in 
the area of the “visual” cortex and adds somatosensory processing to it. Ricciardi, et al 
(2009) performed a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment to understand 
whether vision is a necessary prerequisite for the neural mirror system in humans to 
function, and to explain how an abstract representational system helps blind people to 
“see” the actions of others. In the following section, some of these experiments, 
together with the related theoretical issues, will be described.  
 
4.2. Experiments related to supramodality 
 
4.2.1. Ricciardi, et al (2009) 
 
Keeping with the discussion relating to the mirror neurons, the first study described in 
this section is Do We Really Need Vision? How Blind People “See” the Actions of 
Others. In this study, using the fMRI technic, they attempted to shed light on the 
question of the underlying representational system, and to understand whether a 
supramodal representational system exists that helps blind people to form conceptual 
representations of the events that they are not able to conceptualize throughout the 
visual modality. However, before entering into the details of this experiment on sighted 
and blind subjects, one should answer the following question: why is the functional 
architecture of blind subjects useful to understand the cognitive mechanism of sighted 
subjects? In the following section, this question, together with some other details about 
the presence of blind subjects in experiments of this type, will be studied.  
 
I. What does the study of blind people’s brains grant us to 
understand the functionality of sighted people’s brains? 
 
In literature, there are many studies (Amedi, et al, 2002; Struiksma, et al, 2009) in 
relation with the topographic brain details from both structural and functional plasticity 
viewpoints. Behavioral and imaging studies on sighted and blind subjects demonstrated 
that there is a supramodal representational and processing system which enables 
humans to process and represent external information regardless of the modality 
specific system. The results of these studies in literature indicate that the brain 
functional architecture is far beyond the visual information obtained by the sensory 
modalities but rather there is a more abstract mechanism. Congenital and early age 
blindness gives us the opportunity to study not only the crossmodal plasticity and the 
                                                          
138 The study of Farah et al. (1998) is evidence of the existence of supramodality not only for language-
related representation but for the cognitive tasks of all levels in the human cognitive system. In their 
experiment, they tried to understand whether the spatial attentional system is based on different modality-
specific subsystems or whether there is an abstract system that underlies the human spatial attentional 
abilities; this analysis was focused on the parietal lobe. Namely, they wanted to understand if the 
activation patterns of neural networks in the parietal lobe were involved in modality specific attentional 
mechanisms or in an abstract and supramodal attentional mechanism.  




modifications that happen in the “visual” area, but is also a very powerful tool to study 
the functional architecture of the human brain.  
 
This crossmodal functional plasticity in congenitally blind individuals was illustrated, 
for the first time, by the activation of the occipital cortex during Braille reading (Cohen, 
et al, 1997).  According to the studies, early visual brain regions that are in direct or 
indirect contact with retinal input and receive information from them experience 
crossmodal plastic functional modifications. Therefore, lack of vision in congenitally 
blind people leads to a functional reorganization of the “visual” area by means of 
functional brain crossmodal plasticity.  
 
II. Object-form topography and supramodality 
 
Humans are able to identify all types of objects in a very short time. This particular 
cognitive ability is due to an underlying system of cognition with a currently unknown 
nature. The studies and experiments that attempted to clarify this nature, have 
concentrated on the activities of the neurons that exist in the “visual140” pathway. This 
extends from the occipital lobe into ventral and lateral regions of the temporal lobe. 
There are so-called object-selective regions included in both the ventral and dorsal 
visual pathway141. The groups of neurons found in these regions discharge when 
subjects obtain the “visual” information of the objects but not the textures, noise, etc. 
(Grill-Spector, 2003). The identification and division of these areas are difficult because 
they are largely non-retinotopic142 and, as can be observed in figure 4.1143, neurons fire 
in very slightly different areas depending on the different types of objects seen.  
 
 
                                                          
140 The ventral visual pathway 
141 Anterior and lateral to early retinotopic (retinotopy is the mapping of visul input from the retina to 
neurons, in particular the neurons that are part of the visual stream. Retinotopy could be used instead of 
‘retinal mapping’ and ‘retinotopic’ instead of retinally mapped) cortex. 
142 It is a very important concept in visual perception. ‘Non-retinotopic’ refers to the abstract nature of 
codes and representations. They are non-retinotopic since, contrary to retinotopic representations, the 
needed information is not provided directly from perception. 




Figure 4.1. Different object categories make neurons discharge in distinct areas across the entire 
ventral and dorsal stream. Faces and animals activate similar zones that are different in comparison with 
scenes and houses.  
 
Although houses and scenes make the neurons fire in ventral and dorsal areas, faces and 
animals make the neurons fire in lateral and ventral regions. Faces and animals 
seemingly activate similar regions, which is a different area in comparison with the 
neurons activated by the houses and scenes. These patterns in the ventral temporal 
cortex for certain object categories are replicable for the same subject and different 
subjects. The main debate in the current literature for this issue is whether the prototypic 
objects of the categories which activate the maximum amount of neurons should be 
considered as a scheme for the representation of that category, or if they should be 
treated solely as a part of a general object recognition system (Grill-Spector, 2003). In 
addition, many of these neurons in the object-selective regions fire for some segments 
of an object which means that the underlying representational system is not for the 
whole object. According to Haxby et al (2001), the underlying representational system 
possesses a topographically organized representation of form attributes. According to 
this model, the representation of an object is obtained by different activations across all 
ventral cortices, which leads to "visual" perception. Haxby et al (2001) illustrated that 
the activation of neurons for eight object categories were replicable, and identification 
of a category is determined by the distributed pattern of activated neurons across all 
ventral occipital-temporal area (VOT) cortices. They demonstrated that it is possible to 
predict and identify an object category even when the regions of maximal activation are 
excluded. In accordance with Ricciardi and Pietrini (2011), in the extrastriate ventral 
temporal cortex, there are widely distributed and overlapping patterns of different neural 
activations correlated to faces and other object categories. This model (Haxby et al, 
2001) is called ‘objects-form topography’144.  
 
In relation with the indicated model, Ricciardi and Pietrini (2011) performed an fMRI 
experiment to analyze the activated neurons. In this experiment, they intended to 
understand and demonstrate that first, the activation of the neurons is not simply on the 
basis of visual perception but rather there is an underlying supramodal representational 
system, and second, these activations are not due to the existence of imaginal and visual 
memories stored in long-term memory145. Amedi, Malach and Hendler (2001), in line 
                                                          
144 There are different models in parallel with the ‘object-form topography’ model. Tarr and Gauthier 
(2000) proposed a model (process maps) that rejects the ‘object-form topography’ and argues that 
different zones in the ventral temporal cortex are specialized for different types of perceptual processing; 
in particular they claim that the apparent face selectivity of the fusiform face area reflects a more generic 
processing correlated to all object categories, not solely intrinsically specific to faces. Another model 
(topographic representation) proposed by Malach et al. (2002) claims that in the ventral temporal cortex, 
there are a limited number of divided areas and each of them is dedicated to the representation of  specific 
object categories. In this context, two areas are identified: FFA (fusiform face area) and PPA 
(Parahippocampal place area). In this model, eccentrical and peripheral mapping underlie the object 
representations and recognitions. For example, on the one hand, houses activate the neurons in an area 
which is situated in a peripheral visual field representation, and on the other hand, faces and letters 
activate neurons in the zones toward the central visual field representation. They argue that the object 
selective zones are specified in line with the resolution need. Namely, the objects whose recognition will 
be obtained on the basis of fine details analysis are correlated to the centrally biased representations, and 
the objects whose recognition is obtained on the basis of large scale integration are correlated to the 
peripherally biased representation.   
145 To do so, they performed their experiment with sighted and blind subjects analyzing their object 
recognition in tactile and visual modalities in the sighted subjects and tactile in the blind subjects.  
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with the activations in the ventral temporal cortex, performed a study by which they 
concluded that the central stage of the ventral pathway (occipito-temporal region) is 
activated by visual objects rather than textures or scrambled images; this region is 
termed lateral occipital complex (LOC). However, objects possess some features that 
could be perceived by both visual and tactile modalities, thus LOC is preferentially 
activated whenever it perceives information in both haptic and visual modalities. 
However, the question is how can we demonstrate that these activations by haptic 
information are not due to visual memories? To respond to this question, Ricciardi and 
Pietrini (2011) performed the same experiment (the tactile object recognition part) on 
the blind subjects who did not have any visual memory. In their study, they understood 
that both tactile and visual tasks activated neurons in the ventral extrastriate cortex with 
category related patterns in sighted subjects. In addition, they observed category related 
pattern activation in the same area in the tactile object recognition experiment with the 
blind subjects. The results of these experiments are given in figure 4.2146. According to 
the results, there is a supramodal representational system which can function without 
the visual modality and the stored imaginal information is not the reason for the 





Figure 4.2. Areas that were activated in the ventral extriate cortex during visual and tactile object 
recognition tasks with sighted individuals and tactile recognition tasks with blind individuals. Apart from 
LOC area, PPar (posterior parietal cortex) and hMT+ (human middle temporal complex) are specified in 
the images.   
 
Supramodality in the ‘where’ pathway 
 
                                                          
146 Ricciardi and Pietrini (2011: 359). 
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The indicated experiment together with other studies (Mahon et al, 2009)147 
concentrated on the ventral ‘what’ pathway. One could ask whether this supramodal 
functional architecture exists in the ‘where’ pathway of the dorsal occipito-parietal 
stream. Namely, are the blind subjects able to localize the objects and represent the 
surrounding environment activating the same neural zones in comparison with the 
sighted subjects? There are some studies (Collignon et al, 2011; Gougoux et al, 2005) in 
literature that enable us to shed light on this question.  
 
Collignon et al (2011) analyzed in an fMRI study the brain activity of congenitally blind 
and sighted subjects. They processed the spatial or the pitch properties of the sounds. In 
their experiments, they demonstrated that congenitally blind subjects showed a 
significant activation in the occipital cortex; in addition, they found that auditory-spatial 
processing activates the right cuneus and the right middle occipital gyrus. These areas 
are in the dorsal occipital stream that were activated during the visual spatial/motion 
processing in the sighted subjects. On the other hand, using functional connectivity 
analysis, they discovered that the indicated reorganized areas are parts of a more general 
neural network that underlies the audio-visual spatial abilities (i.e., intraparietal sulcus, 
superior frontal gyrus).  
 
Gougough et al (2005) performed an fMRI study to study what the underlying neural 
basis of better performance of blind subjects in some non-visual tasks in the behavioral 
studies is. In literature, there are many behavioral studies reporting a better performance 
of blind subjects for non-visual tasks (e.g., Ashmead et al, 1998; Muchnik et al, 1991). 
The study consisted of a binaural and a monaural sound localization. In the binaural 
sound localization, the blind group showed higher activity in the occipital lobe. During 
monaural sound localization, a group of blind subjects who demonstrated superiority in 
localizing the sounds manifested two activation foci in the occipital cortex (this was not 
seen in the other blind subjects and in the sighted individuals). The results show that 
this superiority is due to the neural activations in occipital areas. Therefore, the 
underlying neural reason for which the blind subjects show enhanced capacities in 
localizing the sounds in monaural and binaural experiments is the neural activations in 
neural zones in the occipital cortex.  
 
These results, together with other studies (Grefkes, Christian, et al., 2002),148 
demonstrate that the cortical areas related to the ‘where’ pathway of dorsal occipito-
parietal stream, like the ‘what’ pathway in the ventral temporal cortex, have a 
supramodal function. However, the notion of supramodality is not dedicated solely to 
                                                          
147 They performed their experiments on the activations of distinct regions in the ventral visual pathway 
that are dedicated to the representation of non living and living objects (e.g., tools, houses versus animals, 
faces). In the fMRI experiments, they discovered that the same neural zones, which manifested category 
preferences for non living stimuli and animals in the sighted subjects, were activated in the congenitally 
blind subjects. 
148 They performed their experiments based on the following hypothesis: there are similarities between 
the organization of posterior parietal cortex (PPC) in humans and macaques, and in particular the cortex 
in the intraparietal cortex (IPS). One of the functional architectures of PPC in the macaque is the 
integration of polymodal sensory information for object recognition and manipulation, which can be 
translated to supramodality. In their experiment, they tested whether an area in the human anterior 
intraparietal cortex is activated when the participants performed crossmodal visual tactiles delayed 
matching with objects. Tactile or visual presentation of the objects (encoding and recognition) both 
activated API. In the informational transfer tasks between modalities, this activity was further enhanced 
(crossmodal matching). Based on these findings, their suggestion is that API in the human brain has some 
equivalent functional architecture of IPS in the macaque brain. 
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the ‘what’ and ‘where’ pathways. The results of the studies indicate that other brain 
areas also benefit from the supramodality. For example, it has been discovered that the 
brain areas specialized for modulation of affective responses and social interactions 
(Bedney, et al., 2009149, Ricciardi, et al., 2009) also possess a supramodal organization.  
 
In summary, the neural activation in the same brain areas in the sighted and blind 
subjects during the tasks indicates that these different functions in the brain depend on a 
supramodal representation that is independent from the sensorimotor information, visual 
memories and mental imagery, and can be accessed either in the bottom-up modality or 
in the top-down modality. Namely, it can be accessed through distinct sensory inputs or 
through brain areas with higher order cognitive functions like working memory and 
attentional modulation.  
 
Taking into consideration all of these explanations, the usefulness of blindness to help 





Ricciardi et al (2009) in their experiment examined whether the human mirror neurons, 
as an essential prerequisite, need vision to develop and function or if there is a more 
abstract and biologically intrinsic system related to the mirror neurons which can 
function without vision. To reach this goal, they compared the neural activities in 
sighted and blind subjects using the fMRI technique with the auditory presentation of 
the actions (familiar and unfamiliar) performed by hands, the environmental sounds and 
motor pantomime of manipulation tasks for both sighted and blind subjects and visual 
recognition of the actions for the sighted subjects.  
 
The results of fMRI specified that the presentation of the familiar action sounds 
activated neural networks in premotor, parietal and temporal cortex. These activations 
were similar to those observed in the results of sighted subjects during both aural and 
visual presentations. This could be a sign of the existence of a supramodal 
representational mechanism in the human brain related to mirror neurons. These results 
are observable in figure 4.3150 and 4.4151. The hand mediated motor pantomimes 
activated brain areas in the motor, somatosensory, and premotor cortex, IF, aMF, SMA, 
posterior ST/MT, SPL, and IPL in both sighted and blind subjects. The overlapping 
areas for motor pantomime and action listening tasks included a left-lateralized mirror 
system cortical network that was in the premotor, temporal and parietal regions in both 
groups; this can be seen in figure 3.3. In comparison with the aural presentation of the 
familiar actions, the one with the unfamiliar actions activated the left IPL and SPL in 
both sighted and blind subjects. In addition, it activated MT/ST in the sighted group and 
aMF in the blind group. The activation of this mirror system network was higher in 
response to familiar action sounds in comparison with unfamiliar action sounds in both 
                                                          
149 Bedney et al. (2009) studied the theory of mind in blind adults. ToM is the capacity of human 
reasoning about the mental state of others. In developing adults, the ToM capacity is performed by some 
brain areas that are temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus (PC) and 
anterior temporal sulci (aSTS). In their experiment, they studied the development of ToM capacity in 
congenitally blind subjects to understand if there is any intrinsic biological supramodal organization 
which develops ToM in adults or if it depends totally on the subjects’ experiences.  
150 Ricciardi et al. (2009 : 9722). 
151 Ricciardi et al. (2009 : 9723). 
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sighted and blind subjects. This higher activation of the mirror system for familiar 
actions in the auditory modality for both groups extends furthermore to the visual 
modality for sighted subjects. In other words, the mirror system activation is higher 
when the subjects observe familiar movements in comparison with unknown or 
unfamiliar actions and movements.    
 
These results are in line with the existence of a supramodal representational system. 
Namely, a left-temporoparietal network underlies action perception in the aural 
presentation task in blind subjects with no visual experience of these actions, and this 
network overlaps with the mirror system network in the left hemisphere activated by 
visual and auditory stimuli in sighted subjects. These findings demonstrated that the 
mirror system could be activated, processed, and developed independently of visual 
stimuli (and/or visual imageries); that is, it can process non-visual representational 
information. Furthermore, they demonstrated that the congenitally blind subjects in the 
aural presentation of actions activated action schemas (for which they did not have any 
visual memory) in similar areas of sighted subjects, which could be a key finding 
against a modal representational system.  
 
In line with these findings, Pietrini et al (2004) demonstrated that supramodal brain 
areas in the ventral and dorsal extrastriate cortex are activated for the acquisition of 
representational information about shape, movement and localization of objects in 
congenitally blind subjects.152 Therefore, these activation patterns in the extrastriate 
regions during non-visual recognition tasks indicate that the visual experience or visual 
mental imageries are not needed for the abstract representation of the objects. Due to 
similar reasons, the activation patterns in the described experiment for blind subjects, 
that are analogous with the ones for sighted subjects in the auditory and visual tasks, 
confirm the existence of a supramodal representational system corresponding to the 







                                                          
152 Their experiments were to understand whether the category-related neural activities in the ventral 
visual pathway depend on the sensory modalities and sensory information or if there is a more abstract 
representational system that underlies these neural activation patterns. They used the fMRI technique in 
tactile and visual recognition tasks with face and man-made objects for sighted subjects and tactile 
recognition tasks with the same stimuli for blind subjects.The results showed that both groups had similar 
neural activity patterns in a ventral extrastriate visual area in the inferior temporal gyrus. These results 
demonstrated that the activated neural network patterns were not due to visual sensory information and 
visual imageries. In addition, they understood that these brain areas did not need visual information to 
represent category-related information. Their findings demonstrated that the category-related neural 
activities in the ventral visual pathway is not solely and simply a representation of visual information, but 





Figure 4.3. Activated neural networks during aural presentation of familiar actions and motor 
pantomime of actions compared with environmental sounds and rest, respectively. As can be observed in 
this neural map, aural presentation of familiar sounds compared with the environmental sounds evokes 
similar patterns of activation in both sighted and blind subjects. In the last photo, the overlapping zones of 
the previous activations involved in motor pantomime and familiar action sound recognition tasks could 
be observed. These overlapping zones, which are shown in yellow, are the neural networks corresponding 






Figure.4.4. Activated neural networks during aural presentation of familiar or unfamiliar actions 
compared with the environmental sounds. In the last row, it can be observed that the activated brain areas 





4.2.2. Domain specific or modality specific 
representation: which one is the underlying 
representational mechanism for the 
conceptual knowledge of concrete 
nouns?153 
 
Handjaras, Ricciardi, Leo, Lenci, Cecchetti, Cosottini, Marotta & Pietrini (2016) 
performed an experiment to understand whether the underlying representational 
mechanism of concrete nouns is a supramodal one or if it depends on the modality 
specific representations of concrete nouns and concepts.154 There are two theoretical 
approaches corresponding to the organization of knowledge in the human brain, which 
were examined in the previously mentioned experiment: modality specificity theory 
(Warrington & Shallice, 1984) and domain specificity theory (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 
1994; Kanwisher, 2000; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Before discussing the experiment, in 
the following parts some theoretical aspects related to domain specificity theory, which 
is the main discussion of this chapter, will be described.  
 
I. Domain specificity theory 
 
Domain specificity theory is another approach in cognitive science which is concerned 
with the organization of knowledge in the human mind. This theory accounts for 
specialized155 learning devices in human cognition. In general terms, a cognitive 
capacity is domain-specific since it is within the functional structure of a single domain 
or a limited range of domains, and more importantly, it is not a general ability within 
the functional architecture of the general domains156. One could argue that this position 
is similar to that of Fodorian modularity of mind (Fodor, 1983)157, however it does not 
                                                          
153 This notion has a direct relationship with modality effect. According to Penney (1975), in the late 
1970s the concept of modality effect was introduced. It referred to differences in the learning and 
performance of stimuli presented in different modalities. 
154 Modality specificity is different from category specificity. In accordance with Farah, Hammond, 
Mehta and Ratcliff (1989), studies of agnosia have unveiled the existence of two types of knowledge 
break down. The first type is the loss of knowledge in specific categories (living things, tools, etc.), 
regardless of the modality that is examined. The second type is the loss of knowledge in specific 
modalities (vision, tactile, etc.), regardless of the category of the stimuli that is tested. These data suggest 
the existence of at least two different organizations of knowledge, based on category and modality, in the 
brain.  
155 Specialization is the separation of tasks within a system. For example, in DCT, imaginal and verbal 
coding subsystems are specialized for different tasks in the representational system; the representational 
system, in turn, is specialized for a particular task within a bigger system and so on.  
156 General domain learning claims that humans have a global knowledge organization which is cohesive, 
interdependent and interconnected in all its parts, and internalized from human experience (and not from 
innate modules); therefore, development and conceptualization in one domain could result in changes in 
other domains.  
157 A module has to possess the following characteristics (Elsabbagh & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; Fodor, 
1983): a) modules are specialized (domain specificity); they function solely with specific kinds of inputs, 
b) information encapsulation; encapsulation involves restrictions on the flow of information into a 
module; it means that a module does not need to be in contact with other psychological systems to 
function, c) obligatory firing; the operation of a module is mandatory, d) the operation within a module is 
unconscious and is not accessible for reflection, e) modules have shallow outputs; the inter-modular 
operational mechanisms are not discovered from the outputs, f) fixed neural architecture; they are 
localized in particular brain areas, g) ontogenetic universals; their development is bound to a given time 
schedule, h) fast speed; this would be due to information encapsulation and obligatory firing.  
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have all the properties that Fodor describes for a module in the human cognitive system. 
Instead, it could be a variant of the nativism approach158. Domain specificity theory is a 
theoretical stream against domain general learning theories (Siegler, 2006); they claim 
that humans develop a global knowledge structure which contains whole knowledge 
that is internalized from experience. In this way, cognitive domains are interdependent, 
and development in one domain influences others.  
 
Modularity, innateness and brain localization159 are the correlated features to this 
approach (Khalidi, 2010). One of the most notable features of domain specificity theory 
is its direct link with modularity. In fact, owing to Fodor’s account (1983), domain 
specificity is one of the characteristics of a module in the human cognitive system, and 
as a result, all modular cognitive capacities are domain-specific. This link is more 
complicated in the case of innateness. Although there is a widespread assumption that 
there is a relationship between innateness and domain specificity, there is no convincing 
evidence to demonstrate this claim160 (Khalidi, 2010). However, an indirect relationship 
between them could exist. It is easier to tell whether and to what extent domain specific 
abilities are innate (Khalidi, 2001). Namely, the link between them is epistemic or 
evidential rather that intrinsic; the amount of explicit learning or relevant experience is 
more easily measured in the case of domain specific abilities than in the case of domain 
general capacities; since it is easier to eliminate some sources of information in the case 
of domain specific abilities (Khalidi, 2010). In the case of the link between domain 
specificity and brain localization, there are many studies which account for such a link 
(Khalidi, 2010). However there is no relevant evidence to demonstrate this link, since, 
for instance, there are various cognitive abilities that are modular and domain specific 
even though they are not situated in one region of the brain. 
 
One important issue that has to be clarified here is the delimitation between a specific 
cognitive domain and a general cognitive domain. For instance, some linguists could 
argue that distinguishing a concrete sentence from an abstract one is located within a 
specific cognitive domain since it solely pertains to the domain of language and not to 
other cognitive domains. One can object to the mentioned claim and maintain that 
language itself is not a single domain but rather it is composed of distinct domains 
(Grenkowski, 2012) such as syntax, semantics, phonology, etc. Therefore, the opponent 
could claim that the indicated ability is located within general domain abilities since it is 
contained in several domains. This demonstrated that it is always possible to claim that 
a domain specific ability is in fact a domain general one unless there exist structured 
principles for delimitating the scope of a domain. However, in accordance with Khalidi 
                                                          
158 Nativism claims that certain abilities are native (biologically given) to human beings. In linguistics, 
nativism argues that natural language is a characteristic of the human species.The term universal grammar 
and its dichotomy (principles and parameters) also accounts for the biological link of linguistic abilities to 
the human species (Chomsky, 1986).   
159 This approach claims that several brain areas exist and each of them is dedicated to a different 
cognitive function. It is true that the brain functions as a whole, but its functional architecture has a very 
precise localization (Lashley, 1929). 
160 Perhaps the history of Evolutionary Developmental Psychology (EDP) could illustrate the link 
between innateness and domain specificity. EDP is an approach with the principles of Darwinian 
evolution, especially natural selection (Bjorklund & Blasi, 2005). Therefore, like evolutionary 
psychology, EDP is rooted in Darwin’s natural selection theory (Darwin, 1859). Despite the early 
integration of evolution and development in EDP, they were separated afterwards. One group of 
developmental psychologists who are in line with some aspects of evolutionary psychology are nativists. 
They claim that human children possess innate cognitive modules which enable them to acquire important 
abilities such as language. Therefore, they believe in an amodal abstract language system.  
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(2010), to be able to assign a given ability to general domains, human beings have to 
possess the ability to apply it in the new situations and for new cases. Hence, the 
number of the domains by itself cannot be an assumption against the specific domain 
theory. In summary, an ability is located within the cognitive architecture of a specific 
domain if the cognizer is not able to apply it in the new contexts and situations, and an 
ability is located within a general domain functional architecture if the cognizer is able 
to apply it to new and unseen contexts.  
 
In literature, there are some studies relevant to the notion of domain specificity theory. 
Caramazza and Mahon (2003), in their investigation in the organization of conceptual 
knowledge, studied the case of patients with category specific semantic deficit. In these 
patients, the conceptual knowledge of one category in comparison with other categories 
is disproportionate and even selectively impaired. The categories, which were 
disproportionately impaired, were fruits/vegetables and artifacts. In addition, category 
specific semantic deficit is not associated with disproportionate deficits for a type or 
modality of knowledge. Caramazza and Mahon interpreted the results of their study in 
favor of specific domain organization for semantic knowledge. In another study, 
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) investigated the animate and inanimate conceptual 
categories. In accordance with the results, they claimed that these categories were 
domain specific and hence could be selectively impaired in different cases of brain 
damages. In their study, they defend the domain specificity theory against the theory of 
category-specific deficits161. Similar to the previously mentioned study, they interpreted 
the results in favor of the domain specificity theory.  
 
II. Experiment performed by Handjaras et al. (2016) 
 
Keeping up with the discussion of the previous part, in this section the details of the 
experiment conducted by Handjaras et al (2016) will be explained. The aims of the 
study were: a) investigating the differences in activation of neural networks for the 
representation of concrete nouns in semantic sensitive cortical regions using distinct 
input modalities and b) analyzing the differences between knowledge organization at a 
cortical level in a smaller neural representation in comparison with a larger one. They 
performed the experiment with both blind and sighted subjects. In addition, they 
employed the same stimuli for both groups with various presentation modalities (i.e., 
pictorial, verbal visual, verbal auditory). As the materials in the following experiment 
(and also in the experiment that will be explained after) are collected from the BLIND 
dataset (Lenci, Baroni, Cazzolli & Marotta, 2013), before explaining the experiment, the 
BLIND dataset and the different steps of its preparation will be described.  
The BLIND norms 
In several approaches in cognitive psychology (see Murphy, 2002)162 and cognitive 
neuroscience (e.g., Martin & Chao, 2001), semantic features have been considered as 
the building blocks of semantic representation. For instance, in cognitive psychology, 
concept and categorization theories (Rosch & Mervis, 1975) or some network models of 
                                                          
161 This theory claims that the categorical nature of the deficits is due to selective damage to non 
categorically organized visual or functional semantic subsystems. In this approach, the sensory functional 
subsystem provides the fundamental organization of the semantic system (Caramazza & Shelton; 1998).  
162 The section related to the application of the semantic features in science with the entire bibliography is 
taken from Vinson, D. P., & Vigliocco, G. (2008). 
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semantic memory (Collins & Loftus, 1975) rely on semantic features. The presence of 
semantic features as the building blocks of semantic representation is also observed in 
computational models (Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis, & Garrett, 2004). In cognitive 
neuroscience, representations based on semantic features have been applied to account 
for category-specific deficits (Warrington & Shallice, 1984) and semantic dementia 
(e.g., Garrard, Lambon Ralph, Patterson, Pratt, & Hodges, 2005). Damage that consists 
of specific types of features, such as damage to sensory features and damage to 
functional ones, or damage that involves features based on their degree of correlation 
with one another, has been claimed to account for semantic deficits in different 
populations (e.g., Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, & Seidenberg, 1998). In addition, 
according to image studies, perceptual and functional/motoric features are part of 
conceptual representation (Martin & Chao, 2001).  
 
Semantic features are not literal components of the underlying concepts, but rather they 
are the superficial and overt manifestations of the underlying representations (McRae et 
al., 2005)163. Barsalou (2003) claims that the subjects use modal perceptual simulations 
of word referents, while Santos, et al (2011) maintain that semantic features reflect both 
sensorimotor information and linguistic associations. In spite of the application of 
feature norms in many studies in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, they 
have some limitations. The most important one is their verbal nature, since not all 
aspects of a concept are describable with language. Certainly, there are many details in a 
stimulus that are not explainable with language. Hence, in feature generation tasks, 
there is always the risk of not naming some important features of a concept due to the 
lack of verbal codes in a language. The second limitation is that in a feature generation 
task, subjects tend to name only the features that distinguish a stimulus from other 
stimuli in the same category; therefore, they eliminate the very general features. Finally, 
the subjects often produce very complex linguistic descriptions which fuse multiple 
features or correspond to complex arrays of knowledge (e.g., birds migrate toward 
warm areas in winter) (Lenci et al, 2013: 1220).  
BLIND norms were collected with a feature generation task. There are some differences 
between BLIND norms and the existing feature norms in literature: a) for the first time, 
semantic features are collected from both sighted and congenitally blind subjects, b) the 
features are produced orally, so there exists a spontaneity element in their production; in 
addition, the limitation of written form filling is eliminated, c) stimuli include concrete 
and non-concrete nouns and verbs. Lenci and colleagues (2013) based their study on 
three theoretical approaches. The first two are the embodied cognition approach and the 
supramodal approach, which were explained in the previous parts. The last account is 
very similar to that of supramodality. Bedny, Caramazza, Pascual-Leone, and Saxe 
(2011) in an experiment claimed that concepts are stored in non-perceptual brain 
regions and contain abstract features. They also discovered that conceptual 
representations are very similar in blind and sighted subjects. They compared semantic 
judgments and neural activity during action verb comprehension in congenitally blind 
and sighted individuals. Subjects made similarity judgments about pairs of nouns and 
verbs with distinct types of visual motion. Blind subjects and sighted ones had the same 
pattern of similarity judgments. They discovered that in the left middle temporal gyrus 
(IMTG) brain region, visual-motion features relevant to action verbs were stored. The 
functional profile and location of this region were identical for both groups. 
Furthermore, IMTG was more active for verbs than nouns. The conclusion was that 
                                                          
163 The part related to the definition and limitations of feature norms is taken from Lenci et al. (2013).  
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IMTG contained abstract representations of verb meanings rather than visual-motion 
images (as embodied cognition accounts claim).   
The subjects were 48 Italian speakers, 22 congenitally blind (10 females, 2 left-handed) 
and 26 sighted (13 females, 1 left-handed). The normed concepts in BLIND consisted of 
50 Italian nouns (from which 40 were concrete nouns) and 20 Italian verbs divided 
among 14 classes. Non-concrete nouns in BLIND were divided into emotions and 
abstract nouns (e.g., “freedom”). Fifteen verbs expressed modes of visual, tactile, and 
auditory perception; five verbs expressed abstract events or states (e.g., “to believe”). 
Stimulus frequencies were estimated on the basis of three Italian corpora: itWaC 
(Baroni, Bernardini, Ferraresi, & Zanchetta, 2009), Repubblica (Baroni et al., 2004), 
and Italian Wikipedia. In this context, the most frequent concepts were vehicles, 
locations, and non-concrete nouns, compared to birds, fruits, mammals, vegetables, and 
tools, which were less frequent concepts.  
Procedure 
The subjects were displayed auditory noun and verb stimuli with the PsychoPy 
software. The experiment was performed in two sessions; the second part was done at 
least 10 days after the first part. At the beginning of both sessions, subjects were given 
the appropriate instructions. Subjects had to verbally describe the meaning of Italian 
words (they were given some examples so that they could do the task better). After 
receiving the instructions, subjects had to do a trial session; in this trial, they had to 
norm two nouns and one verb. The concepts used either in the instructions or in the trial 
were not reused in the test. The instructions and the trial could be repeated until the test 
was clear for the participants. They set one minute as the maximum interval between 
stimuli, although the subjects could pass to the next stimulus by pressing the space bar 
at any time. After the second session of the test, participants performed a familiarity 
rating test on the experimental stimuli. They had to rate their level of experience with 
the object, event, or action to which the indicated noun or verb referred on a scale of 
one to three (one related to little or no experience and three correlated to great 
experience). The average per-concept difference between blind and sighted subjects was 
not salient164 
Transcription, labeling, and comparison of features in sighted and blind groups 
 
Owing to the spontaneity and non standard patterns of oral production, subjects 
produced long and continuous descriptions of stimuli instead of producing the semantic 
features of concepts. As a result, Lenci et al (2013) divided the descriptions into several 
parts; each feature appeared on a separate part. For example, in ha delle mure lunghe (It 
has long walls), [MURO] ([WALL]) and [LUNGO] ([LONG]) are considered as two 
separate features. Another important point was that the separated features were 
transformed into normalized forms. Nouns and adjectives were mapped to their singular 
and masculine forms, while verbs were mapped to their infinitive forms; in the case of 
verbs, the passive forms were used as well. This happened when subjects used the 
passive form to describe a concept. The original forms were maintained only when the 
subjects produced a personal evaluation (“I like it very much”). After normalizing the 
descriptions and features produced, they labeled them with a semantic type; table 4.1165.  
                                                          
164 2.34 (SD= 0.54) for blind subjects and 2.32 (SD= 0.45) for sighted subjects.  




The nineteen semantic types in BLIND are classified in five macro-classes of semantic 
types: a) Taxonomical features, in which there is superordinate category of a concept, b) 
the semantic features, which describe parts and qualities of the entity or event denoted 
by the stimulus concept, c) situational features, which describe different aspects of the 
contexts in which the concept is used, including events, associated  abstract categories, 
and other subjects in a situation, etc., d) introspective features, which describe the 
subject’s evaluation or affective/emotional position of the subject toward the stimulus 
concept, and e) quantity features, which describe the amount related to the stimulus or 
to one of its properties. Apart from the indicated macro-features, there are several 
underspecified feature types. For instance, all perceptual qualities are classified under 
the type ppe in BLIND groups without coding their sensory modality. Similarly, in 
BLIND all features expressing an event associated with the stimulus are grouped under 
the type eve.   
 
The total number of BLIND features for sighted subjects is 19,087 (4,508 distinct 
properties) and 17,062 for blind subjects (4,630 distinct properties). The higher number 
of features for sighted subjects is due to the larger size of this group. The average 
number of features produced per concept per subject and the number of stimuli with no 
produced feature illustrates that the difference between the groups is not statistically 
significant. The only aspect in which the two groups differed significantly was mean 
cue validity (average blind, 0.01, SD = 0.009; average sighted, 0.009, SD = 0.01), 
Wilcoxon paired test V = 1,548, p = .04 (Lenci et al, 2013: 1225). The cue validity of a 
feature with respect to a concept is the conditional probability of the concept given the 
feature. Mean cue validity is the average cue validity across the features associated with 
a concept (Lenci et al, 2013: 1225). Thus, the indicated difference between the two 
groups illustrates that the features produced by blind subjects are more analytic of the 
concepts. However, the general lack of significant differences in other aspects of the 
features produced by blind and sighted subjects suggests that both groups conducted the 









Table 4.1. Semantic feature types that were used to classify the data from sighted (S) and blind (B) 
subjects, together with their production frequencies.  
 
 
a. Behavioral study; material, methods and procedure 
 
Materials, as it was explained, were collected from the BLIND dataset (Lenci et al, 
2013). Handjaras and colleagues in their study selected 40 concrete words from eight 
different semantic categories; namely, vegetables, fruits, natural and artificial places, 
mammals, birds, tools, and vehicles (See figure 4.5)166. A set of psycholinguistic 
features including word length, bigram frequency, syllabic frequency, word frequency 
and familiarity was considered for each noun; then they were compared to exclude 
differences in linguistic features across categories.  
 
 
                                                          






Figure 4.5. These are the concrete nouns used in behavioral and fMRI studies. In line with the above 
explanations, there are 40 concrete nouns classified in eight categories. 
 
The procedure was as follows: the 26 sighted and 22 congenitally blind subjects were 
given the concept names, then they were asked to enumerate features for their 
conceptual contents in one minute. The obtained features were pooled across subjects in 
each group to derive averaged representations of the nouns in both sighted and blind 
participants. In the final step, features were normalized by scaling to unit length. This 
process resulted in 812 normalized features for sighted and 743 normalized features for 
blind subjects. Using the normalized features, representational spaces were produced by 
means of the cosine similarity index (Figure 4.5)167. Then, to compare the similarities 
and differences of two groups in category representation, features were averaged within 
eight semantic categories. Subsequently, they were compared between blind and sighted 
subjects by the Mantel test. 
 
Then, to illustrate the behavioral similarities RSs were compared using the Mantel 
test168 (10,000 permutations, one-tailed rank test). Also, a multidimensional scaling 
Procedure169 (Kruskal and Wish, 1978) (using cosine distance and metric stress 
criterion) was applied to represent behavioral data across sighted and blind subjects.  
Subjects were partitioned in four groups in accordance with the type of presented 
stimuli. There were five sighted subjects with pictorial stimuli of the concrete nouns, 
five sighted subjects with verbal visual stimuli, five sighted subjects with verbal 
auditory stimuli, and finally five congenitally blind subjects with verbal auditory 
stimuli. In the visual presentation modality, as can be understood from the formation of 
the indicated groups, the stimuli could be in the form of written words (verbal visual 
form) or in the form of color pictures of concrete objects (visual pictorial form). 
Participants received the corresponding instructions to perform a mental feature 
generation task for each stimulus, which was presented for ten seconds. To improve the 
                                                          
167 Lenci et al. (2013). 
168 A Mantel test is a method to measure the correlation between two matrices typically containing 
measures of distance. It was first published by Nathan Mantel (See Mantel, 1967).  
169 Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a method to create a map in which the relative positions of a 
number of objects are illustrated, given only a table of the distances between them. The map could have 
one, two, three, or more dimensions 
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generalization of the stimuli, they were instructed to think about as many features of the 




After the behavioral experiment and collecting the features of the stimuli, using RSA170 
(Kriegeskorte and Kievit, 2013), they compared the representational spaces of each 
stimulus in the blind subjects with those of the sighted subjects. The correlation171 
between these spaces indicated an almost complete similarity172. In addition, as can be 
observed in figure 4.6173, a multidimensional scaling analysis illustrated that the nouns 
were in a categorical based organization for both groups of subjects. Hence, this 
information is in line with the hypothesis of the categorical based organization of 
concrete words and concepts in the human brain; namely, they are organized in 




Figure 4.6. In this figure, the categorical based knowledge organization can be observed. This 
illustrates the representational spaces for both sighted and blind subjects in the feature generation task.  
 
b. fMRI study: material, method and procedure 
 
                                                          
170 See annex I.  
171 They used a correlation coefficient that is the degree of linear association between two variables 
(Taylor, 1990). Association, in turn, in statistics is any casual or non casual statistical relationship 
between two random variables or two sets of data. 
172 0.96 (p < 0.0001). 
173 See Handjaras, et al. (2016 : 236). 
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Similar to the study of Mitchell and colleagues (Mitchell et al., 2008), Handjaras et al 
(2016) used an encoding procedure based on a multi voxel pattern analysis174 to unveil 
the brain regions dedicated to conceptual representations of the categories in figure 4.6. 
In particular, with this method they wanted to determine whether the role of the sensory 
modalities is crucial in the conceptualization of the indicated stimuli or not.  
 
They formed four groups from 20 subjects, according to the type of stimulus 
presentation, as follows: visual pictorial, verbal visual, and verbal auditory for the 
sighted subjects, and verbal auditory for the blind subjects. Patterns of activated neural 
networks were registered during the process of mental feature generation for the 
presented stimuli. The MVPA was designed according to a category based encoding 
model due to the results of the behavioral test, to find the activity pattern of the stimuli 
presented in four different ways. Apart from the accuracy value for the discrimination of 
the nouns in the different modalities of the presentation, they used encoding procedure 
to identify the cortical regions involved in the semantic processing. They selected two 
brain networks: small-scale and large-scale. The small-scale level contained region-
specific information, and the large-scale one relies on a distributed network of regions 
involved during the processing of semantic information. These regions with all the 
involved brain areas are illustrated in figure 4.7175. These regions enabled them to 
measure the representational information at two different scales of neural 
representation, and also to compare the knowledge organization in both regions.   
 
 
Figure 4.7. The small-scale level in panel A: in the left hemisphere, the Parahippocampal (PH), the 
Lateral Occipital (LO), the Inferior Parietal (IP) regions, the bilateral Temporo-Parieto-Occipital (TPO) 
junction, and the RetroSplenial Cortex (RSC). The large-scale level in panel B: two large posterior 
                                                          
174 fMRI technique uses blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) contrasts to sample information related 
to neural activity which, in turn, is associated with several brain functions including sensory processing, 
motor control, and cognitive and emotional functions. The general linear model (GLM) approach shows 
task-related brain areas by searching for linear correlations between the fMRI time course and a reference 
model (Mahmoudi et al., 2012). However, one of its limitations is the assumption that the covariance 
across neighbouring voxels is not informative about the cognitive function under examination (2012:1). 
Multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) could be a soloution for this problem. Currently by MVPA, 
scientists can investigate the neural activity related to distributed patterns of neural activity to infer in a 
more precise way the functional role of the brain zones.  
175 See Handjaras and colleagues, (2016: 237). 
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semantic networks (left and right PSN), an anterior semantic network (left ASN) and the bilateral Parieto 




The patterns of representational spaces in small-scale and large-scale zones are 
illustrated in figure 4.8176. The results in the small-scale zone were as follows. Left PH 
and left IP representational spaces showed a very similar pattern in all modalities of 
presentation, which explains that in these areas, the conceptual representation is 
independent from the modality of the presentation of the stimuli; namely, it is 
independent from the sensory modalities. Moreover, in these areas there was a 
significant correlation between behavioral data and neural representation spaces, which 
means that there is a high similarity between language and brain activity. There was a 
category preference, in all modalities between the subjects, for artificial places in left 
PH and tools and fruits in left IP. The interesting aspect in the left LO was that the 
representational spaces in verbal visual and verbal auditory in sighted subjects were 
comparable; however, the representational spaces in verbal auditory in blind subjects 
were similar to those of sighted subjects in pictorial visual. This illustrates the 
functional plasticity and reorganization of LO in blind subjects. In addition, there was a 
significant correlation between the neural representational spaces and the behavioral 
data only in blind individuals. Therefore, this region has a crucial role in the functional 
plasticity related to the semantic knowledge. In addition, a categorical recognition 
ability without a category preference was discovered. In other regions involving TPO 
and RSC, representational spaces shared a common pattern in all modalities in sighted 
subjects, contrary to the case of blind ones in which a distinct pattern of representational 
space was observed. The highest accuracies for both groups of subjects were found in 
the left TPO, while partial accuracies were found in the right TPO, right RSC and left 
RSC (especially for the categories presented in pictorial modality). In both the left and 
right RSCs, categories of natural and artificial places were discriminated in all 
modalities (Handjaras et al, 2016: 238). These results illustrate the important role of 
visual perception in the described representational spaces of the small-scale region 
(even if the category preference is approximately present in the blind subjects). 
 
On the other hand, the results of the large-scale region illustrate very interesting facts 
about the left PSN. In summary, the representational spaces showed unique patterns 
across the modalities in PSNs and the left ASN. This is contrary to the PO cortex that 
manifested a common pattern across all the modalities for sighted subjects and a 
different pattern for blind subjects, which was similar to that of RSCs in the results of 
the small-scale zone. Another important aspect in these data appeared when they were 
compared to the behavioral data. There was a significant correlation only in the left 
PSN; the mean correlation of the left PSN was the highest across all the regions in the 
small-scale and large-scale levels. In the left PSN, the highest overall ability to 
distinguish between the categories in all modalities, without a category preference, was 
found (Handjaras, et al., 2016: 238).  
 
Apart from the indicated brain areas, two primary sensory regions were analyzed in the 
large-scale level. These sensory regions (Heschl Gyri -HG- and the Calcarine Sulci -
CalS-177) allowed them to understand whether low-level perceptual information is the 
                                                          
176 See Handjaras and colleagues, (2016: 238).  
177 Handjaras et al. (2016: 239).  
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underlying reason for the patterns found in the small-scale and large-scale levels or not. 
Neither representational spaces of the HG nor those of the CalS manifested significant 
correlations across presentation modalities. In comparison with the behavioral data, a 
significant correlation was found in neither of the indicated regions. Finally, only few 
categories were classified significantly and there was no category preference 





Figure 4.8. Rank accuracies of semantic categories in small-scale and large-scale levels (white squares: 
Non-Significant (NS) accuracies. Sp: Sighted pictorial form; Sv: Sighted verbal visual form; Sa: Sighted 




The overall category-based knowledge organization, illustrated in figure 4.8, did not 
differ across modalities and between sighted and blind subjects. In particular, the 
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observed differences in neural activity between groups and across visual and auditory 
modalities were limited to the small-scale level. In contrast, in the large-scale level, the 
patterns were independent from both the presence of the visual ability and the modality 
of the presentation of the stimuli. When compared to the behavioral data, these patterns 
had a significant correlation with the linguistic productions.  
 
In line with the described data, sensory-based information activates neural networks in 
the small-scale level while the large-scale level, with a range of distributed neural 
networks, showed how knowledge is organized. In the latter level there was no evidence 
related to the influence of the sensory-based information on the neural activities. The 
regions in the large-scale level did not illustrate any preference for semantic categories; 
in this level, there was a significant correlation with the behavioral data. On the other 
hand, there were some specific regions in the small-scale level with information content 
related to specific categories, which showed that there was a category preference in this 
level (at least in some regions). 
 
 In line with the results, the highest accuracy of semantic categories, in both groups and 
across all modalities, was found in TPO. An important aspect related to TPO was that in 
sighted subjects there was a common representational space pattern, in contrast with the 
blind subjects. However, the representational information in TPO in blind subjects was 
still able to discriminate between the semantic categories, which illustrates that TPO is a 
brain region with a role in semantic processing of non-visual inputs. Another point in 
relation with TPO was that only the pattern in the Sp condition correlated significantly 
with the behavioral data. The interpretation of the indicated data could be as follows: 
due to the fact that in TPO there exists a common shared pattern of representational 
space across verbal visual, pictorial and verbal auditory modalities and the blind 
participants in auditory modality showed a distinct pattern, information encoding in 
TPO would be influenced by visual perception and imagery178. In RSC, similar to TPO, 
sighted subjects shared a common representational space pattern which was differed to 
that of the congenitally blind subjects. In the left RSC, there was a similarity between 
behavioral data and neural representational space only in the pictorial condition. In the 
same condition, a wide range of semantic categories was distinguished. Among all 
categories, natural places and artificial places were classified successfully and showed a 
category preference across all modalities. Just like TPO, these data illustrate that vision 
and imagery play an important role in the process of information encoding in RSC. The 
representational spaces related to LO illustrate a common pattern for Sv and Sa 
conditions while there is a correlation between Sp and Ba conditions. In line with 
Amedi, Stern, Camprodon, Bermpohl, Merabet, Rotman, Hemond, Meijer and Pascual-
Leone (2007), lateral-occipital tactile-visual area is activated by the tactile or visual 
sensory information in sighted and blind subjects. They claim that the activation of this 
area happens when subjects extract information correlated to the shape of the stimuli. 
This study is in line with the results of the present study; namely, LO is activated when 
the ‘visual’ features of the stimuli are distinguished by visual, auditory and tactile 
modalities. PH and IP were the only brain regions with representational space patterns 
independent of sensory modalities. The overall ability, with the exception of the 
category of living things and the category preference for artificial places, in 
distinguishing the semantic categories was observed in PH. As a result, consistent with 
the behavioral data, there was a common pattern of representational spaces in all 
                                                          
178 As indicated, apart from the processing of visual information and imagery, TPO has some role in the 
semantic processing of non-visual inputs in blind subjects. 
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modalities for both groups. Finally, in the IP the ability of discriminating semantic 
categories across the presentation modalities (tools and fruit preferred over other 
categories) was observed. The patterns for the representational spaces shared a common 
structure for all four conditions.   
 
All the regions in the large-scale level, with the exception of PO, showed a modality-
independent processing of semantic information. In addition, left PSN was the brain 
region in which the highest correlation between brain activities pattern and behavioral 
data was found. In the same zone, the highest accuracies were observed when subjects 
distinguished between the semantic categories. This illustrates the existence of a direct 
link between stored information in memory and linguistic outputs. Moreover, no 
preference for the semantic categories was observed.  
 
The presence of the same representational spaces pattern for all modalities in the large-
scale level illustrates the victory of the domain specific theory of knowledge 
organization over the modality specificity theory. This is because the results show that 
the neural activities do not rely on the specific modalities of presentation. However, the 
role of sensory modalities is highlighted in the small-scale level. As a result, the 
specificity theory of knowledge organization and the domain specificity theory are both 
valid approaches but in different scale levels of representation of conceptual knowledge.   
 
4.2.3. Abstract words and concepts: supramodal 
representation or modality specific 
representation? 
Lenci et al. (2013) performed a feature generation study for abstract stimuli too. The 
procedure was the same; they performed a feature generation task on Italian 
congenitally blind subjects and Italian sighted subjects. In this part of the text, I will 
describe the analysis that I179 did based on the features produced by blind and sighted 
subjects for abstract nouns in BLIND dataset. Our analysis can be viewed as a further 
step in relation to that of Handjaras and colleagues (2016), with two significant 
differences. First, our analysis is based on abstract nouns and their features, contrary to 
their study, which was based on the features produced for concrete nouns. Second, this 
analysis does not contain an fMRI part, so it is based totally on the feature generation 
task. As the theoretical part, we based our analysis on the supramodality account 
together with the metaphorical extension theory (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 
2008)180. In other words, in the theoretical part I try to compare the two indicated 
models. The supramodality account has been sufficiently explained in the present 
chapter. In the following section, I will illustrate the key aspects of conceptual metaphor 
theory, and then, with the collected data from Lenci and colleagues (2013), I will try to 
shed light on the following question: why is the metaphorical-extension account 
“insufficient” and “incomplete”181?  
                                                          
179 I did this analysis with the collaboration of IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, Professor 
Pietrini, Professor Ricciardi, and, in particular, Doctor Rampinini.  
180 This approach was briefly explained in part 3.5.3. 
181 In section 3.5.3, I described Dove’s account, which criticizes the embodiment theories, including 
Lakoff’s account, and claims that all of them lack because of “insufficiency” and “incompleteness”.  
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I. Contemporary Theory of Metaphor or Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory182 
As the title of this theoretical approach highlights, the metaphor plays a fundamental 
role in the structure of Lakoff’s model. However, as the title suggests, the concept of 
metaphor, which structures this theory, is different from the classical concept. Classical 
theorists since Aristotle defined metaphor as “a novel or poetic linguistic expression 
where one or more words for a concept are used outside of its normal conventional 
meaning to express a similar concept” (Lakoff, 1993). In line with Lakoff (1993), the 
differences that exist between this classical definition of metaphor and the modern183 
one can be summarized in four points. First, contrary to the classical definition, the 
contemporary theory claims that humans use metaphors in all everyday conventional 
language. Second, we cannot understand all subject matters without metaphors. Third, 
some definitions in the lexicon and in the vocabulary of a language are not literal. 
Fourth, the concepts found in the grammar of a language are not all literal. Hence, the 
big difference between the classical approach and the contemporary view is based on 
the old literal-figurative distinction. According to Lakoff’s conceptual metaphor theory, 
for what is defined as literal in accordance with the classical approach in our everyday 
use of language and thought, there is a metaphorical system that structures our everyday 
conceptual system; this also includes the most abstract concepts.  
The most used example in conceptual metaphor theory by Lakoff is understanding the 
abstract concept LOVE in terms of the concrete concept JOURNEY. In agreement with 
this theory, there are two concepts in the primary metaphorical extension. The source 
concepts or domains that are experientially concrete and possess some sort of ‘bodily 
basis’, and the target concepts or domains that are abstract and cannot be directly 
experienced or perceived (Tay, D., 2014). Therefore, in the metaphor LOVE IS 
JOURNEY, JOURNEY is the source concept and LOVE is the target concept. According 
to the conceptual metaphor account, since many of our concepts are metaphoric, our 
conceptual understanding critically depends on the nature of our bodies and the physical 
environment in which they function. This is the crucial line on which the contemporary 
metaphor approach is based, and more importantly, it is the crucial line which is in 
contrast with the supramodality account. This is because in this account the nature of 
body and the environment provide us the needed information to conceptualize and 
understand the stimuli. This is contrary to the supramodal account that accounts for an 
internal conceptual representation system and is situated on a higher level than the 
modal subsystems. Therefore, the supramodality account does not consider our body 
and the living environment as the only sources of information for the conceptualization 
and understanding of the stimuli.  
The conceptual metaphor account could be better described by means of an example. As 
I mentioned Love is a journey is one of the most used examples by Lakoff. In line with 
Lakoff (1993), there are many ordinary, everyday English expressions based on the 
indicated primary metaphor; namely, LOVE IS JOURNEY. Some instances of these 
expressions are: Our relationship has hit a dead-end, look how far we’ve come, we 
can’t turn back now, the relationship isn’t going anywhere, the marriage is on the 
                                                          
182 Owing to lack of space, I cannot do a complete description of this theory with all of its aspects. I am 
concentrating only on the concepts of mapping, source domain, and target domain.  
183 By the “modern view” or “contemporary view”, I refer to the one proposed by Lakoff in comparison 
with the classical approach described above.  
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rocks, we may have to bail out of this relationship, etc. The general principle that makes 
these expressions understood by the metaphor LOVE IS JOURNEY is that in all of them 
the lovers are travelers on a journey together, with a common goal (destination) to be 
reached. Their vehicle in this journey is the relationship; this vehicle allows the travelers 
(lovers) to progress in their journey to reach their destinations (goals). In line with 
conceptual metaphor theory, a cognizer understands the target domain, journey, in terms 
of the source domain, love. Technically speaking, the metaphor mechanism in this 
account functions as a mapping in the mathematical sense from a source domain to a 
target domain. This mapping procedure is very structured. There are ontological 
correspondences according to which entities in a target domain can be mapped into 
entities in a source domain.  Lakoff and Johnson (2008) used mnemonics to make this 
easier and name the available mappings between the source domains and target 
domains. The default form of these mnemonics is TARGET-DOMAIN IS/AS SOURCE 
DOMAIN: LOVE IS/AS JOURNEY. Therefore, the metaphor LOVE IS/AS JOURNEY is 
a set of ontological correspondences that characterize epistemic correspondences by 
mapping knowledge about journeys onto knowledge about love (Lakoff, 1993). Hence, 
the LOVE IS JOURNEY metaphor is a set of ontological correspondences which is 
totally different from the English metaphor Love is a journey. In other words, LOVE IS 
JOURNEY is a conceptual mapping which includes two types of generalizations: 
polysemy generalization and inferential generalization. Polysemy generalization is a 
generalization made by correlated senses of linguistic expressions, such as hit a dead-
end, be at a crossroads, be stuck, spinning one’s wheels, not going anywhere, and so on. 
Inferential generalization is made by different inferences in different conceptual 
domains. In summary, in my opinion the conceptual metaphor theory could be similar in 
some aspects to the phoneme and phone in phonology. In phonology, phonemes are 
located in the superordinate, abstract, level. The phonemes and phones are in a very 
close relationship. The phones which are the physical realizations of phonemes and are 
located in the subordinate level, are originated, supposedly, from phonemes 
(Trubetzkoy, 1969). Similarly, the metaphor, which is considered as conceptual 
mapping, is located in an abstract, superordinate level, by which the everyday usages in 
the language are produced184. 





In line with what was indicated in the previous parts, the features produced in BLIND 
were related to concrete and abstract stimuli. The behavioral study performed on 
concrete stimuli and their produced features was analyzed in the section corresponding 
to the experiment of Handjaras et al (2016). Therefore, in this section, the abstract 
stimuli, their features, and the differences which exist between the RSA made by 
features produced by sighted and blind subjects will be analyzed.  
 
The abstract stimuli were categorized into two groups: Ideal and Emotion (Lenci et al, 
2013)185. The abstract stimuli that are discussed in this section are ten nouns. Of these 
                                                          
184 Although the difference is that phonemes, contrary to conceptual metaphors, are innate.   
185 In line with what was discussed in the first chapter, emotion words and concepts have many features in 
common with abstract ones, although they are not the same.  
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stimuli, Allegria (Happiness), Dolore (Pain), Gelosia (Jealousy), Passione (Passion) and 
Preoccupazione (Preoccupation) are emotion stimuli while Amicizia (Friendship), 
Democrazia (Democracy), Giustizia (Justice), Libertà (Liberty) and Religione 
(Religion) are Ideal stimuli. As in the experiment of Handjaras et al (2016) for concrete 
stimuli, in this experiment the RSA method will also be applied to compare the 
representational space of each abstract stimulus. I had the possibility of performing my 
analysis of these RSA with Matlab186 software. To do so, first we separated abstract 
stimuli from concrete stimuli in the BLIND dataset. For each abstract stimulus in this 
analysis, we took the related numeric values from the BLIND dataset. In the next step, 
we inserted these values in two new spreadsheets187 in which rows represented the 
stimuli, and columns represented the features produced for these stimuli by the subjects. 
If a feature was not produced for a stimulus, the numeric value of that feature for the 
indicated stimulus was 0. Then, in order to normalize the data, we divided the numeric 
values by the maximum numeric value of the features; this was 19 for the features 
produced by sighted subjects and 14 for the features produced by blind subjects. In the 
normalization process, the maximum numeric value in a matrix becomes one, and other 
values become numbers between zero and one. In this way, the internal structure of the 
data is highlighted and the matrix is prepared for the RSA procedure. In figures 4.9 and 
4.10, RSA related to the indicated abstract stimuli for the blind and sighted groups are 




Figure 4.9. In this figure, RSA related to abstract stimuli in the behavioral experiment on sighted 
subjects can be observed. As in the Handjaras et al (2016) experiment, to measure the similarity between 
the representational spaces, the cosine distance188 method is applied. 
 
 
                                                          
186 It is a multi-paradigm numerical computing environment and programming language. Its programming 
language, developed by MathWorks, allows matrix manipulations, plotting of functions and data, 
implementation of algorithms, creation of user interfaces, and interfacing with other software written in 
other languages, such as C, C++, Java, Python, etc.  
187 One for the features produced by sighted subjects, and another for the features produced by blind 
subjects.  




Figure 4.10. In this figure, RSA related to abstract stimuli in the behavioral experiment on blind 
subjects can be observed.  
 
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 illustrate the representational spaces of the abstract stimuli. These 
representational spaces were made by the features produced by sighted and blind 
subjects in the behavioral experiment (Lenci et al, 2013). The degree of similarity 
between the features of the abstract stimuli, which is translated into the shared 
representational spaces between the stimuli, has been specified by the different colors in 
the above figures. The similarity between the representational spaces of the abstract 
stimuli has been measured from 0 (= color blue), which is the absolute similarity or 
equity,189 to 1 (= dark red) that happens in the case of two stimuli with very little 
similarity. Obviously, between 0 and 1 other grades of similarity exist. The nearer the 
number is to 0, the more similar the representational spaces of the two stimuli are. On 
the contrary, the nearer the number is to 1, the more different the representational spaces 
of the stimuli are.  
 
First, the RSAs created by means of the features produced by sighted and blind subjects 
are analyzed separately, and then the differences between them will be described.  In 
line with figure 4.9, the blue squares that make a diagonal in the big square in both 
figures illustrate the total similarity of the representational spaces of two stimuli. This 
total similarity happens because the representational space of one stimulus is compared 
with itself. Therefore, the produced features and the representational spaces are the 
same. For instance, Amicizia (= Friendship) is compared with itself. The features 
produced by sighted subjects for this stimulus are: Person (produced 19 times), Feeling 
(15 times), Relationship (8 times), Thing (2 times), To-be-felt (3 times), To-feel-good 
(2 times), Animal (2 times), Life (3 times), Affection (3 times), Idea (2 times), Strong (2 
times), Bond (3 times), To-tie (3 times), To-establish (3 times), Interest (3 times), To-
exist (2 times), Sharing (3 times), To-know (2 times), To-love (2 times), To-share (2 
times), Good (2 times), To-transfer (2 times), Two (2 times), Value (2 times), Affective 
                                                          
189 This happens in the case of the comparison of representational space of a stimulus with itself: 
Religione (= Religion) vs Religione (Religion). 
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(2 times), Big (2 times), Deep (2 times), Complicity (2 times), More (2 times), Mutual 
(2 times), Nice (2 times), Sex (2 times), Solidarity (2 times), Times (2 times), To-
exchange (2 times), To-have-to-be (3 times). These features all together make the 
representational space of the stimulus Amicizia (= Friendship). As in this case, 
representational spaces that should be compared belong to one stimulus and the 
produced features are the same, therefore both representational spaces are situated in 
one location. Hence, the squares on the diagonal of the RSA with the color blue 
illustrate the total similarity between the representational spaces of two stimuli. As 
another example, it can be considered as the middle of the scale, where the cosine 
distance is 0.5 and the light green is employed to show the similarity between the 
representational spaces. In this context, the stimuli Dolore (= Pain) and Passione (= 
Passion) can be considered. The features produced for Dolore (Pain) by sighted subjects 
are as follows: Person (6 times), Feeling (9 times), Thing (4 times), To-be-felt (9 times), 
Someone (5 times), Life (4 times), Condition (2 times), Event (2 times), Physical (14 
times), Moral (6 times), To-hurt (6 times), Negative (4 times), Malaise (3 times), 
Psychic (3 times), Sad (3 times), Unpleasant (3 times), Inner (2 times), Knock (2 times), 
Non-physical (2 times), Pain (2 times), Problem (2 times), Psychological (2 times), To-
be caused (2 times), To-be-left (2 times), To-derive (2 times), Trauma (2 times), Ugly (2 
times), Wound (2 times), Something (7 times). On the other hand, the features produced 
for the stimulus Passione by sighted participants are: Person (9 times), Feeling (17 
times), Thing (6 times), Other-person (5 times), To-be-felt (7 times), Someone (5 
times), Action (3 times), Strong (2 times), Individual (2 times), To-do (2 times), 
Positive (2 times), Particular (2 times), Soul (2 times), Negative (2 times), Love (4 
times), Sport (3 times), To-like (3 times), Transport (3 times), Hobby (3 times), To-
dedicate (2 times), Usually (2 times), Actively (2 times), All (2 times), Attention (2 
times), Inside (2 times), Something (9 times). In agreement with the indicated data, 
these two stimuli have a graded similarity. According to cosine distance measurement, 
they have a 0.5 correlation. This means that they do have neither a high similarity nor a 
low one. For instance, the feature Someone (5 times) exists for both stimuli; and the 
features To-be-felt, Thing, Feeling, Person exist for both stimuli190. On the other hand, 
there are features that are present in one stimuli but not in the other. As an example, 
features such as Life, Condition, Physical and Moral are present in the features of 
Dolore (= Pain) but not in those of Passione (= Passion); Positive, Action, Strong and 
Individual are present in the features of Passione (= Passion) but not in those of Dolore 
(= Pain). As the last example, two stimuli that have the least similarity in their 
representational spaces could be considered. In accordance with figure 4.9, Dolore (= 
Pain) and Democrazia (= Democracy) can be selected due to the dark red color of the 
square that illustrates the low similarity of representational spaces between these two 
stimuli. The features produced for Dolore (= Pain) were indicated above. The features 
produced by sighted subjects for Democrazia (= Democracy) are: Person (6 times), 
Thing (3 times), Other-person (2 times), To-be-felt (2 times), Man (2 times), To-express 
(3 times), Form (6 times), Idea (2 times), State (4 times), Country (4 times), Freedom (4 
times), People (13 times), Government (11 times), Right (7 times), Citizen (3 times), 
Representative (6 times), Duty (4 times), Election (4 times), Nation (3 times), Political 
(3 times), Power (3 times), Thought (3 times), To-decide (3 times), To-have-to-be (3 
times), Concept (2 times), Equality (2 times), Everyone (2 times), Moment (2 times), 
Nowadays (2 times), Opinion (2 times), Population (2 times), Society (2 times), Then (2 
times), To-be-elected (2 times), To-live (2 times), Vote (2 times), Word (2 times). As 
can be seen, there are many discrepancies between the features produced for the 
                                                          
190 The production numbers of these features for the indicated stimuli are different.  
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indicated stimuli. As an example, Other-person, Man, To-express, Form, Idea, Strong, 
State, Country, Freedom and many other features are present in the features of 
Democrazia (= Democracy) but not in those of Dolore (= Pain). On the other hand, 
Physical, Moral, To-hurt, Negative, Malaise, Psychic, Sad, Unpleasant and many others 
are present in the features of Dolore (= Pain) but not in those of Democrazia (= 
Democracy).  
 
In line with figure 4.10, and with what was explained about figure 4.9 and the features 
produced by sighted participants, the blue squares that make the diagonal of the big 
square illustrate the total similarity of the representational spaces of two stimuli. This 
total similarity exists because the representational space of one stimulus is compared 
with itself. Regarding the middle of the scale and the graded similarity, Preoccupazione 
(=Preoccupation) and Gelosia (=Jealousy) can be considered. According to figure 4.10, 
these stimuli have a partial similarity191. This grade of similarity can be described 
considering the features produced by blind subjects for these stimuli. The features 
produced by blind subjects for the stimulus Preoccupazione (= Preoccupation) are: 
Feeling (9 times), Something (9 times), Person (4 Times), Mood (4 times), Event (4 
times), Someone (4 times), Thing (2 times), To-think (2 times), Condition (3 times), 
Problem (3 times), Situation (4 times), To-happen (7 times), Anxiety (4 times), Health 
(3 times), To-do (3 times), Apprehension (2 times), Dear-one (2 times), Discomfort (2 
times), Future (2 times), Generally (2 times), No-positive (2 times), No-to-know (2 
times), Tension (2 times), Thoughtful (2 times), To-cause (2 times), To-end-up (2 
times), Fear (3 times). On the other hand, the features produced for the stimulus Gelosia 
(=Jealousy) are: Feeling (13 times), Something (6 times), Person (8 times), Mood (4 
times), Positive (3 times), Other-person (8 times), Someone (5 times), Thing (3 times), 
Man (2 times), To-be-felt (2 times), Negative (6 times), To-lead (5 times), Couple (4 
times), Love (4 times), Relationship (4 times), Friendship (3 times), Situation (3 times), 
Brother (2 times), Concept (2 times), Envy (2 times), Evil (2 times), Human (2 times), 
Morbid (2 times), More (2 times), Object (2 times), Possessive (2 times), Right (2 
times), Somehow (2 times), Someone else (2 times), Strong (2 times), Suspect (2 times), 
To-be-controlled (2 times), To-exist (2 times), To-fear (2 times), To-invade (2 times), 
To-love (2 times), To-want (2 times), We (2 times), Well (2 times). In agreement with 
figure 4.10, the similarity of the representational spaces of Gelosia (=Jealousy) and 
Preoccupazione (=Preoccupation) is partial. Due to this partiality, the square which 
regards this similarity is marked in light green. This partiality will be clear considering 
the indicated features for these stimuli. On the one hand, there are some common 
features (with equal and non-equal production) and on the other hand, there are many 
features that belong exclusively to one stimulus and not to the other. As an example, 
Feeling, Someone, Person, Mood, Thing and some other features are the ones in 
common. On the contrary, there are some features that belong exclusively to Gelosia 
(=Jealousy). Some examples are as follows: Positive, Other-person, Man, To-be-felt, 
Negative, To-lead, Couple, Love, Relationship and some other features. Similarly, 
Event, To-think, Condition, Problem, To-happen, Anxiety, Health, To-do, 
Apprehension, Dear-one, Discomfort and some other features are the ones that belong 
exclusively to Preoccupazione (=Preoccupation). This partial sharing of the features 
between these stimuli make a graded similarity of their representational spaces, which is 
marked by the color light green. As another example, Gelosia (=Jealousy) and 
Democrazia (=Democracy) can be considered. These stimuli have the least similar 
representational spaces in figure 4.10; this is marked by the color dark red. The features 
                                                          
191 According to cosine distance, the grade of similarity of these stimuli is between 0.4 and 0.6.  
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produced for Gelosia (=Jealousy) were described above. The features produced by blind 
subjects for Democrazia (= Democracy) are as follows: Person (2 times), To-express (5 
times), To-derive (4 times), Right (4 times), To-do (4 times), People (12 times), 
Government (10 times), Opinion (6 times), Freedom (4 times), To-say (4 times), Will (4 
times), Greek (3 times), Nation (3 times), Power (3 times), Representative (3 times), 
State (3 times), System (3 times), Thought (3 times), Word (3 times), City (2 times), 
Decision (2 times), For (2 times), Free (2 times), Freely (2 times), Modern (2 times), 
Not-to-impose (2 times), Political (2 times), To-decide (2 times), To-live (2 times), 
World (2 times), Action (4 times). There are many features that belong only to one of 
the indicated stimuli. As an example, Feeling, Something, Mood, Positive, Other-
person, Someone, Thing, Man, To-be-felt, Negative, To-lead and other features belong 
solely to Gelosia (=Jealousy); on the other hand, People, Government, Opinion, 
Freedom, To-say, Will, Greek, Nation, Power and other features belong exclusively to 
Democrazia (=Democracy). This big discrepancy between the features produced for 
Democrazia (=Democracy) and Gelosia (=Jealousy) is the reason for which the 
similarity of representational spaces of Gelosia (=Jealousy) and Democrazia 
(=Democracy) is so low, which is marked by the color dark red in figure 4.10.  
 
The differences between the RSAs made from the features produced by sighted and 
blind subjects are very tiny. As can be observed in figure 4.9 and 4.10, there are only 
small differences in the colors, which means that there are not a lot of differences 
between the features produced by these two groups. As an example, the representational 
spaces of Passione (=Passion) and Giustizia (=Justice) are more similar in the RSA 
made from the features of blind subjects; it is marked by the color yellow, used in figure 
4.10, in comparison with the color orange, used in figure 4.10. As another example, 
Preoccupazione (=Preoccupation) and Gelosia (=Jealousy) can be considered; the color 
in figure 4.9 is sky blue which is a bit different than the color in figure 4.10 which is 
light green. This means that representational spaces of these two stimuli are more 
similar in the RSA made from the features of the sighted group. However, these 
differences are not salient. For example, according to cosine distance measurement, the 
distance between Passione (=Passion) and Giustizia (=Justice) in figure 4.9 is almost 
0.7, while the distance between the same stimuli in figure 4.10 is almost 0.68. The same 
thing happens for Preoccupazione (=Preoccupation) and Gelosia (=Jealousy). The 
distance between these stimuli in figure 4.9 is 0.4 while the distance between the same 
stimuli in figure 4.10 is 0.45. In agreement with these details, despite some little 
differences in the features produced by the sighted and blind groups, the general scheme 
of these RSAs is almost equal. This high similarity of pattern between the RSAs could 
be more evidence in favor of supramodality and against the embodiment theories. In our 
discussion, it is in favor of the supramodal account and against Lakoff’s conceptual 
metaphor theory because if our concepts (especially the abstract ones) were made 
exclusively on the basis of conceptual metaphors, which in turn are based on the 
sensorimotor information192, there would be a big difference between the features 
produced by the sighted and blind subjects. The reason is that the latter group does not 
have access to the features based on vision. Therefore, it seems that these results could 
be in favor of supramodality theory and against conceptual metaphor theory.  
 
 
                                                          
192 One of the most important types of source domain is image scheme, which originates from our bodily 





The main discussion of this chapter concerns the existence or non-existence of a 
supramodal representational system as the underlying coding mechanism in human 
cognitive system. This hypothesis was examined in different experiments. The most 
important factor that was used in the experiments to shed light on this question was the 
comparison of response patterns of blind subjects with those of sighted subjects. It can 
be good evidence in favor of or against supramodality, since if there is no underlying 
supramodal representational system, the response patterns of the two indicated groups 
should be totally different due to the lack of visionary features in the mind of 
congenitally blind subjects. In other words, in agreement with embodied cognition 
theories, if the underlying representational system was multimodal and a stimulus was 
conceptualized by getting sensorimotor features from different modalities, the lack of 
vision would be a big problem. Owing to this deficiency, the human underlying 
representational system would not receive sufficient information of the stimuli in the 
environment, and according to some theories, would not receive information to process 
abstract stimuli. In fact, this claim was rejected in the experiments that were described 
in this chapter. The results of the fMRI experiment (Ricciardi et al, 2009) illustrated that 
familiar action sounds activated similar networks in blind subjects in comparison with 
the networks that were activated in sighted subjects during both aural and visual 
presentations. In another study, Handjaras et al (2016) performed an experiment to 
understand whether the underlying representational system of concrete nouns is a 
supramodal one or if it depends on the modality specific representations of concrete 
stimuli. The results of the behavioral study of this experiment showed an almost equity 
of the RSAs made by the features of concrete stimuli produced by sighted and blind 
subjects193. The results of the fMRI study were in favor of the supramodal account too 
(Handjaras et al, 2016). The neural activities did not differ across modalities or between 
sighted and blind subjects. The observed differences across visual and auditory 
modalities and between sighted and blind subjects were limited to the small-scale 
level194. In the last discussed experiment, I did an analysis on the collected data related 
to the abstract stimuli from BLIND dataset (Lenci et al, 2013). Again, in this study, the 
results were in favor of the supramodal account and against the conceptual metaphor 
theory. The results of all the experiments in this chapter were in line with the existence 
of a supramodal underlying representational system. In summary, the lack of vision in 
congenitally blind subjects does not make a big difference in the pattern of their 
response in comparison with that of sighted subjects. In fact, the response patterns of 
these two groups are very similar. This similarity means that the activated neural 
networks in sighted and blind subjects are almost the same when they try to define the 
meaning of the stimuli in feature generation task. In the case of abstract stimuli, this 
similarity seems to illustrate that abstract concepts are not totally based on sensorimotor 
information, but there is a supramodal representational system in the human cognitive 
system which enables us to conceptualize the stimuli with a similar scheme, 
independently from the fact that we lack vision ability or not. This similar scheme is the 
reason for which similar neural networks in sighted and blind subjects are activated in 
the fMRI experiments, or is the reason for which similar features and RSAs are 
produced by sighted and blind subjects in the feature generation tasks.  
 
                                                          
193 Figure 4.6.  








In the different chapters of my thesis, I tried to give a brief explanation of the 
representational differences between concrete and abstract words and concepts. The 
main discussion started from the third chapter, where different theoretical approaches 
were described. In this conclusion, I will give a summary of what was explained, 
together with the problems and doubts that exist for each of these positions.  
 
The first theory discussed in my thesis was Context Availability Theory. In accordance 
with this theory, it is easier for human beings to think of a context for a concrete 
concept than for an abstract one. The fundamental aspect of this theory is not whether it 
is possible to construct a context at all for a concept, but how long it takes to create such 
a context. Hence, according to this theory, all the concepts possess contexts based on 
stored information in our memory. In agreement with Schwanenflugel and Stowe 
(1989), concrete words are retrieved faster since they activate more associative 
information. However, if abstract items are presented in an appropriate context with 
sufficient verbal information, the concreteness effect disappears. This results in a faster 
retrieval of presented abstract items just like concrete ones. 
 
Apart from the incongruences in the experimental results, which is a common aspect for 
all theories, perhaps the most significant problem of this approach is the lack of a 
theoretical basis. Namely, for example in the case of Paivio’s DCT, there are many 
explanations about the cognitive procedures in the human mind, the relationship 
between and within the subsystems and so on. Similarly, in the case of propositional 
approaches, such as the one proposed by Chomsky, Fodor, or Pylyshyn, a very potent 
and powerful theoretical part is observed which is the basis for the subsequent 
experiments. However, CAT lacks this theoretical part and in fact, the theoretical claims 
in CAT originated from the experimental evidence. There is no theoretical explanation 
for why just one coding system exists, or for how the human cognitive system translates 
the input information into a readable code in memory, or for how different codes are 
linked to one another, or for how a retrieval process starts and finishes when the human 
cognitive system tries to construct appropriate context for a given concept. These 
questions, together with other problematic issues, form the weaknesses of this approach.  
 
The second approach related to the representation of concrete and abstract concepts is 
called Dual Coding Theory. Paivio proposes that the human cognitive system functions 
with two different types of representations and codes: verbal and non-verbal 
representations. Consequently, for each type of representation there exists a different 
coding sub-system, namely, imaginal and verbal subsystems. According to DCT, the 
probability that a representation, stored in different functional zones, is recalled and 
retrieved from memory is greater than when it is stored in just one functional zone. The 
most direct experimental evidence for this comes from works on Selective interference 
effect. This effect occurs when subjects attempt to mentally manipulate two 
representations of the same code at the same time (e.g., two verbal tasks, two 
imaginal/visual spatial tasks). In this context, subjects performed more poorly than they 
performed either of those tasks together with another task of mental manipulation of a 
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different code (Atwood, 1971; Segal & Fusella, 1971). The selective interference effect 
is very direct evidence for what DCT claims, since according to DCT the poorer results 
in the case of mental manipulations of one type of code is due to the fact that in both 
tasks, subjects use the same coding system and therefore the cognitive procedures of the 
tasks interfere with one another.  
 
In spite of having many empirical successes, Paivio’s approach did not have global 
acceptance, and different alternative approaches, like the ones discussed in my thesis, 
were proposed. The incompatibility between this theory and the computational approach 
to the mind could be the main reason for this non-global conformity. Despite the 
opposition of dual coding theory against the computational coding of memory 
performance, the fundamental principles of these approaches are not against each other. 
In fact, this is the reason for the existence of the approaches which have reconciled 
these two positions (Thomas, 2017). A part from this contradictory position, there are 
other internal issues of DCT. For example, the nature and existence of imagery code 
have not been discussed by Paivio or others. One of the issues related to imagery code is 
that Paivio is concentrated too much on the visual imagery, and has not counted on 
other types of mental imageries. In other words, if there is mental imagery as a code in 
the human cognitive system, it exists in different forms according to the type of 
sensorimotor information stored in our memory: it could be visual, auditory, olfactory, 
etc. For instance, Flanagan (1984) proposes “six-code theory” instead of DCT. He 
distinguishes different sense type mental images, which is different from the unique 
imagery code, as opposed to the verbal code, defined by Paivio. In fact, if we think 
about human sensorial preceptors as separated channels, we understand that the 
sensorial information to create mental images arrives and is stored in different parts. 
Consequently, we have different types of mental images specified by the sensorial type 
of the input. Obviously, the idea of the existence of functionally independent senses has 
its opponents. For instance, the supramodality and the different approaches related to 
this concept is a position that believes in a unique, integrated perceptual system. There 
are also some approaches that completely reject mental imagery as a memory code and 
claim that mental images are the by-products of some more sophisticated cognitive 
processes in which the codes are much more abstract than the mental images (Pylyshyn 
1978; 1999; 2003). Another important part of DCT is its verbal code. According to 
Thomas (2017), for Paivio verbal code is a speaker’s inner speech in the natural 
languages. However, owing to the fact that mentalese or “propositional representation” 
plays a very significant role in the cognitive theories, it seems that the DCT inner 
speech subpart has to be substituted by mentalese. This is because in most of the 
cognitive theories, covert speech is not considered as an essential part of the memory 
coding. Therefore, in agreement with these theories, DCT subparts are imagery and 
mentalese, instead of imagery and inner speech (Baylor, 1973). There is also a three 
coding approach which suggests that there is a separate part for the propositional code; 
hence, they are imagery, verbal and propositional memory codes (Anderson, 1983). 
However, this approach is not without theoretical and empirical problems. When we 
think about inner speech and mental imagery we can experience both phenomena, but 
this is not the case for propositional codes. It means that empirically and theoretically, 
inner speech and mental imagery are in the same functional level; both of them are 
empirically demonstrated. However, the level of abstraction of the propositional codes 
is too high, which impedes us from demonstrating it empirically. In other words, they 
are not in the same level and the subparts proposed by Paivio are more plausible than 
mentalese and imagery. Mentalese is not an empirically demonstrated concept, but 
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rather a theoretical claim without any empirical evidence. This superior abstraction level 
of mentalese is the reason why some scientists claim that mentalese is essential so that 
imagery is accounted as a memory code (Fodor, 1975), or why some other scientists 
hold that imagery is constructed on the basis of mentalese (Pylyshyn 1978; 1999; 2003). 
Contrary to reconciling mentalese and imagery and locating them in the same functional 
level, these approaches are more plausible, since they consider mentalese in a more 
abstract level as the constituent and core of the lower levels in DCT. A more plausible 
way to reconcile mentalese with Paivio’s DCT is considering mentalese as the 
foundation of the verbal and imaginal subparts. Paivio claims that verbal codes in DCT, 
like the imaginal ones, are in the form of images: auditory and/or vocal-motor images 
(Paivio, 1971; 1986). In this way, there could be two options for the construction of a 
relationship between mentalese and mental codes of DCT. The first one is in line with 
Pylyshyn’s position. In this position, mentalese could be considered as the basis and 
core of all types of mental images (pictorial or verbal ones). Following Fodor and 
Kosslyn’s positions, the second option is that we consider only those mental images 
with semantic content as mental representations. Mentalese here has the function of 
creating associations with the mentioned mental representations and constructing their 
semantic contents. These two options could resolve the theoretical problem that exists in 
Paivio’s DCT even if Paivio rejects any sort of connection between his model and 
computationalism. However, if both verbal and imaginal codes are imagery, how can 
we distinguish the two types of code in DCT? Paivio claims that this is possible by 
considering more linguistic associations for the verbal codes. These associative 
connections are weaker in the case of pictorial images. The problem of this pure 
theoretical claim is that first, it is not clear if this difference of degree of strength in 
having associative connections is an appropriate means to differentiate between memory 
images (verbal and pictorial ones), and second, it is not empirically demonstrated. For 
example, it is not clear if one’s associate network of the word book, with other related 
words like university, and library, is stronger than its network with related pictures such 
as library and university. A more unproblematic way of differentiation between DCT 
images is analyzing pictorial images in parallel to what they represent and verbal 
images as symbols of what they represent (they are not images of objects and events in 
the environment but they symbolically refer to concepts), regardless of whether their 
representational power is intrinsic, their associative networks are more powerful, or they 
are grounded in the mentalese (Thomas, 2017). For example, one’s pictorial image of 
cat refers to what exists in our living environment, or his/her auditory image of piano 
refers to its sound, or his/her verbal image of cat, except the animal, could refer to 
different concepts of cat that in a specific cultural and social context have been 
accepted. This could be a more plausible account to distinguish between the two 
memory codes in Paivio’s DCT. Although it is not a measurable difference and needs 
more explorations. However, it seems that it could be considered as the basis to 
differentiate between verbal and imaginal images in DCT.  
 
The third theoretical stream on representational differences between concrete and 
abstract words and concepts is Words As social Tools (Borghi & Cimatti, 2009; Borghi 
& Binkofsky, 2014). The principles of this model are: a) the centrality of embodiment 
for all the concepts, b) the language and the linguistics contexts and associations are 
more important for the representation of abstract words and concepts, c) the modality of 
the acquisition of abstract words and concepts relies more on the language and the 
linguistic associations than the modality of the acquisition of concrete ones, d) while 
sensorimotor networks in the human brain are activated by both concrete and abstract 
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words and concepts, the linguistic networks are activated more by abstract words and 
concepts, and e) abstract words and concepts appear in more versatile contexts, created 
by language, and the fact that their representation depends more on the cultural and 
linguistic environment. The problem of this account is similar to the context availability 
theory and common to all associationistic theories according to the terminal meta 
postulate described in chapter 3. This theory is formed on the basis of experiments and 
the obtained results. In other words, it is a pure empiristic view and cannot respond to 
many questions beyond our knowledge.  
 
Dove’s representational pluralism is the fourth account on the representation of concrete 
and abstract words and concepts in the human cognitive system. The crucial point of 
this account is based on a claim in the embodied cognition theories. These theories 
believe that all the concepts are grounded in sensorimotor information, contrary to 
cognitivism positions (Dove, 2014). There exist different accounts of embodied 
cognition theories, but all of them agree that concepts are constructed by sensorimotor 
information or the conceptualization process is constrained by sensory and motor 
systems (Glenberg, 2010). This claim is acceptable in the case of concrete concepts, 
however the viability of this position for abstract concepts is doubtful at this time. There 
are several attempts to address this issue. For example, Lakoff & Johnson (1980), and 
Lakoff (1987) proposed the metaphoric extension account, Barsalou (1999) suggested 
situated simulation, and Kousta et al, (2011) tried to explain the role of emotion in this 
procedure. However, there are problematic issues in all of them (Dove, 2009). Dove’s 
account is in fact a solution to this gap. He attempts to bind cognitivism with 
embodiment to solve the problem of abstract concepts. In his theory, acquisition of a 
natural language means acquiring a symbol system with different computational 
properties. Conceptual content can then be captured in part by the associative or 
inferential relationships of embodied linguistic representations with other embodied 
linguistic representations (Dove, 2014:4). For example, a concept such as PUG is not 
represented by multi-modal simulations or action schemas associated with pugs, but 
multimodal simulations or action schemas associated with talking about or listening to 
others talk about pugs also play some role—that is, sensorimotor experiences of words, 
phrases, and sentences (2014:4). Obviously, the role of language in the representation of 
more abstract items like DEMOCRACY will be more remarkable. In summary, the 
account proposed by Dove is a hybrid account of modal and amodal positions. In this 
view, a new conceptual code appears by the language acquisition. 
 
A possible methodological problem for this account could be the fact that, for instance, 
it is not clear where the human cognitive system uses sensorimotor information for 
conceptualization and retrieval of the concepts and where it uses language associations 
to do it. Dove claims that the conceptualization and retrieval of concrete concepts is 
more dependent on sensorimotor information, and the linguistic associations are more 
significant in the case of abstract concepts. However, we do not know how concrete and 
abstract concepts are defined in the human cognitive system. Moreover, Dove does not 
define any biologically given linguistic system in the human mind. According to him, 
the amodal symbolic system is the basis for the abstract conceptual representations. 
However, this language-based symbolic system in the end is linked to modal 
information. It means that in this account we do not have a biologic based 
computational coding system like the one defined in traditional cognitivism. Therefore, 
the question is how does the internal system of natural languages function? How can we 
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access limitless new meanings and interpretations by inferences and associations in 
natural languages? 
 
Until this point, all the presented accounts were rooted in the embodied cognition and 
its underlying principles. Even Dove’s account is never separated totally from 
embodiment, since language as the symbolic amodal system is indirectly rooted in the 
sensorimotor information. The general problems which could be addressed in all 
embodied cognition accounts are as follows. The first problem is that all these accounts 
could be “brainbound” (Clark, 2008). This means that human cognition directly depends 
on neural activity, and human mind is considered inner and neurally realized. This 
approach does not take into account the fact that cognition might be rooted beyond 
bodily borders. As Noe explains (2009): “the subject of experience is not a bit of your 
body. You are not your brain. The brain, rather, is part of what you are”. This is 
paradoxical for an embodied cognition account due to the idea that the role of the brain 
is much more highlighted that the role of the body. The second problem is that these 
theories treat bodily boundaries as a statistic whole. They do not take into account the 
plasticity concept and the changes and aspects of it on the human body. 
 
Finally, in the last chapter, supramodality and different related theoretical discussions 
were illustrated. This account is different from others in not considering sensorimotor 
information fundamental for the conceptualization of the stimuli. In line with the 
experiment described in chapter 4, congenitally blind subjects are able to have a similar 
pattern of neural activities in performing the same tasks that sighted subjects do. This 
illustrates that the lack of visionary ability in congenitally blind subjects does not render 
them unable to have a similar pattern of neural activities in comparison with sighted 
subjects. This could be evidence of a supramodal representational system, a system in 
which the codes are not modal-based but rather are abstract and supramodal. The 
example of this could be the experiment discussed in the last chapter. The results of the 
fMRI experiment (Ricciardi et al, 2009) illustrates that familiar action sounds activated 
similar networks in blind subjects in comparison with the networks that were activated 
in sighted subjects during both aural and visual presentations. This and similar results 
demonstrated that human conceptualization, at least partly, is on the basis of 
supramodal, abstract information. As a last point, it should be mentioned that 
supramodality is not dependent on multimodal plasticity. The reason is that 
supramodality is not only seen in congenitally blind subjects, but it is also observed in 










































Representational Similarity Analysis 
 
Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA) is a method which could be applied to meet 
the need of integrating or relating three major branches of research: brain-activity 
measurement, behavioral measurement, and computational modeling. In the case of 
computational models, for instance, it would be very difficult to understand their 
viability through brain-activity data, since there is no clear methodology to correlate 
units of a computational network model and channels of the brain-activity data. This 
correspondence issue exists for correlating the data obtained from different modalities 
of brain-activity measurement and between subjects and species. To overcome this 
correspondence issue, Kriegeskorte, Mur, & Bandettini, (2008), suggested abstracting 
from the activity patterns themselves and computing representational dissimilarity 
matrices (RDMs), which characterize the information carried by a given representation 
in a brain or model (Kriegeskorte et al, 2008: 2). By using RSA models, they claim that 
multi-channel measures of neural activity are quantitatively related to each other and to 
computational theory and behavior by comparing RDMs.  
One of the successes of evaluating computational models of single neurons with brain 
activity data was the correspondence between a computational model of a single neuron 
and electrophysiological recordings of the activity of that type of neuron under a variety 
of circumstances (e.g., across different stimuli) (e.g., David and Gallant, 2005; Koch, 
1999; Rieke et al., 1999)195. However, this approach becomes dysfunctional in larger 
scales where computational models have to simulate comprehensive brain information 
processing, which consists of units with different functional properties. The most 
significant problem is the spatial correspondence problem. In other words, it is not clear 
which single-cell recording or functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) voxel 
could be related to a certain unit of the computational model. Another problematic issue 
in this correspondence puzzle is that often the voxels and sensors of brain imaging, for 
example, reflect the activity of large numbers of neurons (Kriegeskorte et al, 2008: 2). 
Therefore, in line with the indicated issues, there could not be a one-to-one correlation. 
We are faced with similar problems in correlating data obtained from different brain-
activity measurements. Invasive electrophysiology, for instance, is ideal in terms of 
temporal (ms) and spatial (single neuron) resolution. However, the problem is that it is 
able to record only a small subset of neurons. Imaging techniques (fMRI and scalp 
electrophysiology) do not have this problem; they measure neural activity across large 
parts of the brain or across the whole brain. However, in these methodologies a single 
channel illustrates the activity of tens of thousands of neurons (high-resolution fMRI), 
or even millions of neurons (scalp electrophysiology). In single neural activity 
                                                          
195 Cited in Kriegeskorte et al. (2008).  
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measured by two different methodologies, the same, or very similar, recorded 
information is expected, but due to their different process and functionality they sample 
different information. In invasive electrophysiology, the electrical activity of single cells 
is measured, whereas in fMRI, the hemodynamic aspect of brain activity is measured. 
fMRI patterns are spatiotemporally displaced, smoothed, and distorted. Scalp 
electrophysiology combines high temporal resolution with a spatial sampling of 
neuronal activity that is even coarser than in fMRI.  
According to Kriegeskorte et al (2008), to overcome these problems a modality-
independent way of sampling information of a brain region’s representation is needed; 
this approach also enables the researchers to understand the consistency or 
inconsistency of sampled information by a certain technique. Kriegeskorte and 
colleagues claim that by comparing activity-pattern dissimilarity matrices, we can 
correlate the sampled information by different modalities and information-processing 
models. Hence, this approach is based on using the RDMs as the signature of the 
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